







LEUVEN - PARIS - BRISTOL, CT
2021
Publié avec le soutien de l’Agence Nationale de la Recherche 
(Projet ANR-15-CE33-0008) et du Laboratoire 
«  Savoirs, Textes, Langage  » (CNRS / Université de Lille)
TABLE DES MATIÈRES
Leone Gazziero  : Aristote et le langage. Mode d’emploi . . . . . . .  1
Walter LeszL  : Aristotle on Language and on Language and
 Thought. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
Simon NorieGa-oLmos  : Aristotle’s Semantic Thinking and His 
 Notion of Signification in De interpretatione 1 and Beyond .  81
Luca GiLi  : Tensing the Verbs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  143
Ana Maria mora-marquez  : Elements of (Dialectical) Argumen-
 tation Theory in Aristotle’s Topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  173
Myriam Hecquet  : Aristote linguiste et grammairien  : l’analyse 
 de la λέξις dans les Réfutations sophistiques . . . . . . . . . . . . .  201
Leone Gazziero  : Ὁ ἄπειρος πρῶτος τὴν ψῆφον βαλέτω. Leaving 
 No Pebble Unturned in Sophistici elenchi, 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  241
Pierre CHiroN  : La question du langage dans le premier livre de 
 la Rhétorique d’Aristote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  345
Andrea FaLcoN  : Aristotle on the Infant Mind in Physics I 1. . . .  367
Michel CrubeLLier  : La pensée langagière dans le De Anima 
 d’Aristote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  383
Giuseppe FeoLa  : Φαντασία and νοῦς: on the Relation between 
 φαντάσματα and νοήματα in Aristotle’s Psychology. . . . . . .  413
Annick JauLiN  : Metaphysica Z 17. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  439
Aurélien DiJaN  : Aristote et le langage – une bibliographie essen-
 tielle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  457
Ο ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ ΠΡῶΤΟΣ ΤῆΝ ΨῆΦΟΝ ΒΑΛΕΤῶ. 
LEAVING NO PEBBLE UNTURNED IN SOPHISTICI ELENCHI, 1* 
Leone Gazziero
(Cnrs, Université de Lille)
A Claudio Majolino, con amicizia e 
ammirazione  : siamo tutti, in certa 
misura, specialisti di qualcuno o di 
qualcosa, Magister M è specialista 
di tutto e di tutti. 
«  Was soll man nun dazu sagen, wenn 
jemand, statt diese Arbeit, wo sie noch 
nicht vollendet scheint, fortzusetzen, sie 
für nichts achtet, in die Kinderstube geht 
oder sich in ältesten erdenkbaren Entwicke-
lungsstufen der Menschheit zurückversetzt, 
um dort wie J. St. Mill etwa eine Pfeffer-
kuchen- oder Kieselsteinarithmetik zu ent-
decken  !  » (G. Frege, Die Grundlagen der 
Arithmetik, VII).
Caveat. Even though Aristotle speaks often about language, his 
remarks do not fall within the province of any given discipline, let 
alone belong to the same subject matter or amount to a πραγματεία of 
their own1. Rather, they are somewhat scattered across the Aristotelian 
* It is my pleasant duty to thank first and foremost my mentors, Sten Ebbesen and Jean 
Celeyrette, without whom I would be truly lost. I’d like to thank next Alain Lernould, 
Michael Lewis, Shahid Rahman, Tony Street and Walter Young for their constant advice 
and guidance. Last but not least, many thanks to the semi-anonymous referees who han-
dled my case («  Aristotelica Linguistica  : paper 7  »)  : in the land of the double-blind, the 
one-eyed reviewer is king and it does not befit the vulgar scribbler that I am to take credit 
for their suggestions on how to inform and entertain at the same time. 
1 Πραγματεία is a notoriously difficult expression to translate in scientific English (or 
to deal with in most modern languages, for that matter) – all the more so because Aristo-
tle did not care to state what it meant exactly. On a first approximation, it encompassed 
specific, relatively self-contained – occasionally overlapping – inquiries that investigate 
or concern themselves with identifiable and arguably unified subjects. It so happens that 
Porphyry explained – in his conceited, self-promotional account of Plotinus’ life – that 
when his master entrusted him with the edition of his writings he imitated (μιμησάμενος) 
Andronicus of Rhodes’ thematic arrangement of Aristotle’s (and Theophrastus) works  : 
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corpus and are to be gleaned from a vast array of texts, including ethical 
and political writings (where language plays a remarkable role in shaping 
human sociability), treatises on natural history (where Aristotle outlines 
the physiology of phonation in some animals such as birds and human 
beings), books on the soul (where Aristotle describes how language is 
intertwined with perception, imagination and thought) and works on dia-
lectics, poetics and rhetoric (where linguistic expression is described as 
a powerful means of both persuasion and deception). Moreover, however 
relevant and to the point, what Aristotle has to say about language is, for 
the most part, accessory in nature and purpose  : as a rule, Aristotle looks 
at language for the sake of something other than language itself.
SaCra paGina. The prologue to the Sophistical Refutations is no excep-
tion  : 
[Urtext] Aristotelis Sophistici elenchi 1, 164a 20 - 165a 17  : «  περὶ δὲ τῶν 
σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων καὶ τῶν φαινομένων μὲν [21] ἐλέγχων, ὄντων δὲ 
παραλογισμῶν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐλέγχων, λέγωμεν [22] ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν 
ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων. [23] Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οἱ μὲν εἰσὶ συλλογισμοί, οἱ δ’ οὐκ 
ὄντες [24] δοκοῦσι, φανερόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοῦτο [25] 
γίνεται διά τινος ὁμοιότητος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ὡσαύτως [26] ἔχει. καὶ 
γὰρ τὴν ἕξιν οἱ μὲν ἔχουσιν εὖ, οἱ δὲ φαίνονται, [27] φυλετικῶς φυσή­
σαντες καὶ ἐπισκευάσαντες αὑτούς, καὶ [164b 20] καλοὶ οἱ μὲν διὰ 
κάλλος, οἱ δὲ φαίνονται, κομμώσαντες [21] αὑτούς. ἐπί τε τῶν ἀψύχων 
ὡσαύτως· καὶ γὰρ τούτων τὰ [22] μὲν ἄργυρος τὰ δὲ χρυσός ἐστιν ἀλη­
θῶς, τὰ δ’ ἔστι μὲν οὔ, [23] φαίνεται δὲ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, οἷον τὰ μὲν 
λιθαργύρινα [24] καὶ καττιτέρινα ἀργυρᾶ, τὰ δὲ χολοβάφινα χρυσᾶ. [25] 
Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ συλλογισμὸς καὶ ἔλεγχος ὁ μὲν [26] ἔστιν, 
ὁ δ’ οὐκ ἔστι μέν, φαίνεται δὲ διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν· οἱ [27] γὰρ ἄπειροι 
ὥσπερ ἂν ἀπέχοντες πόρρωθεν θεωροῦσιν. ὁ μὲν [165a] γὰρ συλλογι­
σμὸς ἐκ τινῶν ἐστι τεθέντων ὥστε λέγειν ἕτερον [2] ἐξ ἀνάγκης τι τῶν 
κειμένων διὰ τῶν κειμένων, ἔλεγχος δὲ [3] συλλογισμὸς μετ’ ἀντιφά­
σεως τοῦ συμπεράσματος. οἱ δὲ [4] τοῦτο ποιοῦσι μὲν οὔ, δοκοῦσι δὲ 
«  ὁ <scilicet  Ἀνδρόνικος ὁ Περιπατητικός> δὲ τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου εἰς 
πραγματείας διεῖλε τὰς οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταὐτὸν συναγαγών ·οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ 
κτλ. [Boys-Stones 2018, 36  : Andronicus the Peripatetic divided the works of Aristotle 
and Theophrastus into treatises, bringing related topics together. For my part, etc.]  » (Vita 
Plotini 24, 9-11). Understandably enough, the notion of πραγματεία has come under close 
scrutiny by Aristotelian scholars discussing early stages of the Aristotelian corpus’ trans-
mission  : Moraux 1951 and 1973, 45-141  ; Gottschalk 1987  ; Barnes 1997  ; Drossaart 
Lulofs 1999  ; Lengen 2002 (in fact, a loose collection of linguistic-savvy, albeit unrelated, 
case studies)  ; Primavesi 2007  ; Chiaradonna 2011  ; Hatzimichali 2013  ; Tutrone 2013  ; 
etc. On the Late Ancient commentators’ strictly disciplinarian (as in discipline-oriented) 
exegetical approach and its ancient (and modern) assets and liabilities, cf. Gazziero 2019. 
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διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας· ὧν εἷς [5] τόπος εὐφυέστατός ἐστι καὶ δημοσιώτατος, 
ὁ διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων. [6] ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα διαλέγε­
σθαι [7] φέροντας, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀντὶ τῶν πραγμάτων [8] χρώμεθα 
συμβόλοις, τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν [9] πραγμάτων 
ἡγούμεθα συμβαίνειν, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ψήφων [10] τοῖς λογιζομένοις. 
τὸ δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅμοιον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ [11] ὀνόματα πεπέρανται καὶ τὸ τῶν 
λόγων πλῆθος, τὰ δὲ [12] πράγματα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἄπειρά ἐστιν. ἀναγ­
καῖον οὖν πλείω [13] τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τοὔνομα τὸ ἓν σημαίνειν. 
ὥσπερ οὖν [14] κἀκεῖ οἱ μὴ δεινοὶ τὰς ψήφους φέρειν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιστη­
μόνων [15] παρακρούονται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων οἱ τῶν 
[16] ὀνομάτων τῆς δυνάμεως ἄπειροι παραλογίζονται καὶ αὐτοὶ [17] 
διαλεγόμενοι καὶ ἄλλων ἀκούοντες [Hasper 2013, 13-14  : now we must 
discuss sophistical refutations, that is, arguments that appear to be refuta-
tions, but are in fact fallacies rather than refutations. In accordance with the 
nature of things, however, we must start from the primary things. That some 
arguments do constitute deductions, while others seem to, but in fact do not, 
is clear. For just as in other cases this comes about because of a certain 
similarity, so too with arguments. For also with regard to their condition 
some people are really in good shape, whereas others only appear to be 
because they have decked themselves out as tribesmen and have equipped 
themselves  ; and some people are beautiful because of their beauty, while 
others appear to be so because they have dressed up. It is like this also with 
lifeless things, for some of them are really made of gold or silver, whereas 
others are not, but appear so to the senses  : things made of litharge or of 
tin, for example, appear to be made of silver, and yellow-coloured things of 
gold. In the same way, one argument constitutes a real deduction or a real 
refutation, while another does not, even though it appears to due to our lack 
of experience. For those without experience are like people remaining at a 
distance and judging from far away. For a deduction is an argument based 
on certain granted points, such that it states, by way of necessity, something 
different from the points laid down because of them, while a refutation is a 
deduction together with the contradictory of its conclusion. But some argu-
ments do not achieve this, even though they seem to on various grounds – of 
which one type of argumentation is very fertile and popular, the one based 
on words. For since it is impossible to have a discussion while adducing the 
things themselves, and we use words as symbols instead of the things, we 
assume that what follows for words, also follows for the things (just as with 
stones for those who do calculations). It is not the same, however, since the 
words are limited, just like the number of sentences, whereas the things 
themselves are unlimited in number. It is then inevitable that the same 
sentence or a single word signify several things. Just as in calculation, those 
who are not versed in moving stones around are tricked by the experts, so 
too those without experience of the possibilities of words are deceived by 
means of fallacies, both when themselves participating in a discussion and 
when listening to others]  ». 
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[Urtext]’s focus is clearly on argumentation  : its whole point is to lay 
the groundwork for the study of fallacies, namely arguments which, 
despite looking good on the outside, turn out to be defective after all – 
treacherous, in fact  : their appearance belies their reality, insofar as they 
actually fail to to bring about the conclusion they force upon the incom-
petent and the untrained. There’s no reason not to take [Urtext] at face 
value and acknowledge that, if language is part of the picture in any way, 
it is factored in as a source of illusion and misdirection. What makes 
language interesting in this context is that it accounts for the numerous 
drawbacks that discursive reasoning and argumentation are prone to and 
more than a few predicaments they are lumbered with. 
Aristotle might as easily have either elaborated upon the fact that we 
simply cannot dispense with language, or have expounded in greater 
detail how we rely on it each and every time a symbolic substitute is 
easier to handle than the real thing. Instead, he mentions both facts only 
in passing, while making another point altogether – the «  ἐπεὶ γὰρ κτλ.  » 
clause makes it pretty clear ([Urtext], 165a 6-10). The point being  : to 
the extent that we use linguistic signs as placeholders for the things and 
facts which we talk about, we are easily tricked into thinking that what-
ever is the case for words and word-compounds (sentences and the like), 
also goes for the things and facts they refer to. But if we believe that, then 
we are in for a big surprise – several, in fact. As the cruel tribesmen of 
old ([Urtext], 164a 27) used to say – no doubt, while inflating and even 
stuffing their offerings with straw to make them look bigger and fatter 
than they actually were2 – «  trust in words is easily misplaced and, more 
often than not, it turns out to be a recipe for disaster  : it welcomes decep-
tion, error, misjudgement – you name it  ». To make a long story short, 
as far as [Urtext] is concerned, language as such does not truly matter 
or, at least, it does not seem to matter for itself. What really counts is the 
fact that unscrupulous debaters and rogue dialecticians take advantage of 
some of its features to cheat their way in and out of arguments. If we 
come to understand how they manage to get away with it, we’ll do a 
better job at stopping fallacy-mongers or, if we feel so inclined, we’ll be 
able to turn the tables on them weasels. That being said, even though 
2 The tribualiter inflantes (φυλετικῶς φυσήσαντες) scam which Aristotle hints at in 
[Urtext], 165a 27 definitely caught Latin commentators’ imagination, for they indulged 
in all sorts of anatomical and even surgical details calling on «  Alexander  »’s notoriously 
spurious authority (relevant texts in Ebbesen 1981, I, 351-357). 
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Aristotle spends more time explaining why linguistic expression derails 
the ordinary course of our arguments than trying to figure out what language 
is and how words and sentences actually work, since it is no accident that 
language puts arguments in harm’s way3, it is definitely worthwhile to try 
and extrapolate out of [Urtext] as much of Aristotle’s views on language 
as we possibly can4. 
Where do We Start (and Where do We Go from there)  ? Making a 
virtue out of necessity – or a vice… in fact, a bit of both – seems to be 
the right thing to do, insofar as Aristotle’s answer to the question «  what 
do we need language for in the first place  ?  » is not so different from his 
answer to the question «  what can possibly go wrong due to the way we 
talk to each other  ?  ». There are more things in heaven and earth than 
we can dream of  ; a great many ghosts linger from the past and at least 
as many loom over the future  ; wicked souls carry within them more 
wicked things than we care to count and the same goes for blessed people 
and blessed things, as well as for everyone and everything in between. 
Still, we have very little to show when we bring all of the above to some-
one else’s attention. This is where words come in handy  : you wish to 
trade granny’s valuables for some quality time with your neighbour’s 
daughters… fair enough, start a proper conversation, even if you’ll prob-
ably have to meet them half-way, for – despite going by the same name – 
your idea of fun probably involves a different scenario than theirs  ; 
besides, no one really knows what Grandma’s earrings and necklace look 
like (she keeps telling everyone they made her look like the Queen on 
her wedding day, but – if they ever existed at all – only God knows 
where she locked them up after Grandpa passed away). We can get all 
cultivated and sophisticated about it (and we will) but, bottom line, 
[Urtext] conveys the kind of plain, down-to-earth message that anyone 
can easily grasp and hold on to. That is, words stand for more stuff than 
you can shake a stick at – which is fine, considering we can hardly put 
on display the countless things, facts and personal commotion we bring 
3 As usual, Paolo Fait hit the nail on the head  : «  language is easily misused and turned 
into a source of paralogisms. Such availability is not an accidental but a regular feature of 
language on account of its symbolic nature  » (Fait 1996, 181). 
4 All the more so – one might add – since the prologue of the Sophistici elenchi has not 
received as much scrutiny as other Aristotelian texts. At any rate, [Urtext] has not been 
studied as much as it deserves – even by scholars who take stock of related matters as 
speech (Modrak 2001), homonymy (cf. e.g., Shields 1999) and meaning (Charles 2000). 
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up for discussion. There’s a flip side to it – there always is. You can 
hardly take a word’s meaning for granted, quite the contrary. The same 
linguistic item can refer to different things – which is not so fine, con-
sidering there’s not much we can do about it apart from running the 
appropriate tests to determine whether a given word or sentence has more 
than one meaning or not5. 
notULae (maioreS). Although we’re not going to depart from the 
general idea that – as far as Aristotle is concerned – there’s nothing mys-
terious or complicated about language, a few issues still deserve to be 
addressed in a more technical vein, starting with a handful of straight-
forward questions about Aristotle’s choice of words. 
Πράγματα ([Urtext], 165a 6-7, 9 and 12). As interpreters have observed 
on a number of occasions6, [Urtext] leaves readers with a distinct sense 
of déjà-vu. Most likely, it is just another illusion7 – still, we can’t help 
5 We have already touched upon language’s unpredictable features in the «  Introduc-
tion  », so no particular reminder is needed here, apart from the trivial observation that the 
whole treatment of fallacies due to expression in the Sophistical Refutations (as well as a 
good deal of related materials in the Topics and elsewhere) rests on the assumption that 
linguistic diagnosis is both a reliable tool and a case-by-case matter. It is a reliable tool, 
insofar as no linguistic flaw is supposed to go undetected, as long as we stick to Aristotle’s 
grid that is, which he deemed – and declared – to be inductively and deductively fool-
proof (Sophistici elenchi 4, 165b 28-29 with Di Lascio 2013 who, for as long as her health 
permitted, really was the most brilliant Aristotelian scholar of the young generation). It is 
a case-by-case routine, insofar as those who do not know their way around words are said 
to be lacking in experience rather than, say, knowledge or intelligence – which means that 
there’s nothing wrong with their understanding  ; rather, their predicament has to do with 
their failure to look at all the facts (De generatione et corruptione I 2, 316a 5-11) and to 
look at them closely enough to discern what’s what ([Urtext], 164b 26-27). 
6 Cf. e.g. Belardi 1975, 144  ; Chiesa 1991, 212-214 and 2013, 54  ; Whitaker 1996, 
11  ; Levine Gera 2003, 134. 
7 There’s little chance that Jonathan Swift turned to Aristotle for inspiration. Language 
planning stood out prominently in his immediate background (cf. Knowlson 1975, Cohen 
1977, Kelly 1978, Salmon 1983, Reed 1989 and Mulhall 2002) and provided him with all 
the elaborate schemes and enthusiastic schemers he could possibly need to poke fun at 
(amongst language reformers, John Wilkins and his characteristics have repeatedly been 
identified as Swift’s most conspicuous targets, notably by Walker 1973 and Probyn 1974). 
At any rate, no Swift specialist has suggested an «  Athenian  » connection – neither Kelly 
1988 who dealt with Swift’s manifold linguistic interests in a plain and concise way, nor 
Baker Wyrick 1988, Francus 1994, Söderlind 1970, etc. In view of some of the sugges-
tions, one wishes they had. For instance, it is difficult – for the layman at least – to figure 
out what to make of fabrications like Gierl 2008’s, who – on an illustrious cyberneticist’s 
whim and some fifty Google (not even Yahoo’s, to add insult to injury) hits upon the 
clock to «  support this notion  » (p. 317) – has written, and published, an essay on Swift’s 
Lagadian and Leibniz’s Prussian Academy («  Lagadogs, do you want to live forever  ?  »). 
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feeling that what [Urtext] rules out as impossible bears an uncanny 
resemblance to a literary episode of which so many of us have such fond 
memories  : namely, the brazen linguistic expedient devised by the same 
Lagado’s Projectors who went to great lengths to extract sunbeams out 
of cucumbers (good luck with that), restore weekly shitloads of poo back 
to its pristine undigested state (good luck with that too), erect buildings 
starting from the roof and working downwards (if bees can do it, why 
not humans  ?), use spiders instead of silk-worms (this one might actually 
work), etc. In this particular instance, Swift’s Academics set their minds 
to achieve precisely what Aristotle says can’t be done  : for the sake of 
brevity and out of concern for speech fatigue and lung consumption, 
Lagado’s best minds planned to give up words as substitutes for things 
and elected to stick to the things themselves instead. What things did 
Swift have in mind exactly  ? Presumably, the kind that lead readers to 
cough up a hearty laugh8. If Lagado’s professors believe that it is «  more 
convenient for all Men to carry about them such things as were necessary 
to express a particular business they are to discourse on  », then how 
much better to cast the whole lot in a buffoonish light than to grant them 
their wish and leave them doing the heavy-lifting which words freely 
offer to the ordinary folk9  ? Unsurprisingly enough, we learn next that 
the «  scheme for entirely abolishing all Words whatsoever  » had the 
Wise look like pedlars struggling under the burden of the sum of things 
to say, which they – quite literally – packed on their shoulders. Whatever 
we are to think of the idea of letting things speak for themselves10, there’s 
8 To be sure, the fact that most references to abstract or semi-abstract items would be 
lost altogether is another serious shortcoming of Lagado’s linguistic scheme  : try to teach 
your children the Lord’s Prayer and convey the exact meaning of «  τὸν ἄρτον ἡμῶν τὸν 
ἐπιούσιον δὸς ἡμῖν σήμερον  » by pointing at the sky and showing them a loaf of bread. 
It simply won’t work. Whatever ὁ ἄρτος ὁ ἐπιούσιος means here, there’s more to it than 
making sandwiches on a daily basis. But where’s the fun in that  ? 
9 J. Swift, Gulliver’s Travels III, 5 – no wonder women and common people («  such 
constant irreconcilable Enemies to Science  ») saved the day  : «  this Invention would cer-
tainly have taken Place, to the great Ease as well as Health of the Subject, if the Women 
in Conjunction with the Vulgar and Illiterate, had not threatened to raise a Rebellion, etc.  » 
(p. 271). 
10 In small doses, the notion is as respectable as it gets and, in the right hands, more 
than a little effective. Here’s an instructive anecdote Aristotle told in his books on politics 
«  φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Περίανδρον εἰπεῖν μὲν οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν πεμφθέντα κήρυκα περὶ τῆς 
συμβουλίας, ἀφαιροῦντα δὲ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας τῶν σταχύων ὁμαλῦναι τὴν ἄρουραν· 
ὅθεν ἀγνοοῦντος μὲν τοῦ κήρυκος τοῦ γιγνομένου τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀπαγγείλαντος δὲ τὸ 
συμπεσόν, συννοῆσαι τὸν Θρασύβουλον ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας ἄνδρας ἀναιρεῖν 
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little doubt that Swift was referring to very tangible things – solid stuff 
we can put under each other’s nose or throw at each other’s head if need 
be. Is it safe to assume that Aristotle’s πράγματα carry the same onto-
logical weight in [Urtext]  ? It is tempting to read into Aristotle’s text a 
similarly strong commitment to the cumbersome realities of everyday 
life11, if only to do justice to its deliberate accumulation of concrete 
details and situations  : bodily vigour both genuine and counterfeit, legit-
imate beauty and cosmetic charm, true and fool’s gold, authentic silver 
as opposed to tin and litharge, botched abacus calculations and personal 
gain through fraudulent moneymaking. Sure enough, in most cases, there’s 
no need to seek any further than the actual objects which discussions and 
calculations are about – especially ordinary talks and honest-to-God tabs. 
That being said, Aristotle makes no noticeable effort to either include or, 
for that matter, exclude any particular sort of things. More to the point, 
there’s no clear indication that the text calls for a restriction of the noto-
riously wide range of realities πρᾶγμα can refer to12  : robust particulars 
as well as not-so robust universals (De interpretatione 7, 17a 39 - 17b 1), 
all kinds of actions and deeds as well as their representation as events 
occurring in a literary plot (Ethica nicomachea II 3, 1105b 5 and Poetica 
14, 1453b 1-6 respectively), what we think about when we use a word 
(Topica I 18, 108a 18-26) or the image associated with it (Rhetorica, III, 
2, 1405b 11), the formal content of productive and theoretical sciences 
(Metaphysica, Λ, 9, 1075a 1-3), hard facts as opposed to idle speculations 
(De generatione et corruptione I 8, 325a 17-19), states of affairs that 
either occur as often as not or, on the contrary, never obtain (Metaphysica 
[Reeve 1998, 90  : Periander said nothing to the messenger who had been sent to him for 
advice, but levelled a cornfield by cutting off the outstandingly tall ears. When the mes-
senger, who did not know why Periander did this, reported what had happened, Thrasybulus 
understood that he was to get rid of the outstanding men]  » (Politica III 13, 1284a 28-33). 
Herodotus (Historiae V, 92) and Diogenes Laertius (Vitae philosophorum I, 100) tell more 
or less the same tale, except that – according to their version – Thrasybulus did the garden-
ing whereas Periander did the house cleaning rather than the other way around. On how 
the two different versions of the story might be related, see Forsdyke 1999. 
11 Tweedale 1987, 421, Whitaker 1996, 10-11, Wheeler 1999, 211, Lo Piparo 2003, 184 
and Crivelli 2004, 88 as well as 2015, 193 are not explicitly committed to the view (Whitaker 
came pretty close though), nonetheless their vocabulary – «  external objects  » (Whitaker), 
«  real things  » (Tweedale, Wheeler), «  things in the world  » (Wheeler), «  non-mental 
objects  », «  worldly entities  » (Crivelli) and «  sheep-pragma  » (Lo Piparo) – definitely 
suggests something along those lines. 
12 Useful surveys of the different meanings of πρᾶγμα may be found in De Rijk 1987, 
36-39 (≈ de Rijk 2002, 111-114) and Pritzl 1998, 183-186. 
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Δ 29, 1024b 17-21), etc. Accordingly, the educated guess is that, in 
[Urtext], πράγματα cover pretty much everything we can think of and 
convey through words  : actual things first and foremost, of course, but 
also anything else we can set our mind to and put into words, whether it 
exists or not, and – if it exists – whether it is abstract, concrete or all 
shades of grey in between13. 
As it happens, we don’t have to look far for confirmation  : 
[T1] Aristotelis Sophistici elenchi 7, 169a 37 - 169b 1  : «  μᾶλλον ἡ ἀπάτη 
γίνεται μετ’ ἄλλων σκοπουμένοις ἢ καθ’ αὑτούς (ἡ μὲν γὰρ μετ’ ἄλλου 
σκέψις διὰ λόγων, ἡ δὲ καθ’ αὑτὸν οὐχ ἧττον δι’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος)· 
εἶτα καὶ καθ’ αὑτὸν ἀπατᾶσθαι συμβαίνει, [169b] ὅταν ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου 
ποιῆται τὴν σκέψιν [Hasper 2013, 22  : deception occurs more often for 
those investigating with others than for those doing so by themselves (for the 
investigation with others is through sentences, whereas that by oneself is just 
as much through the object itself). Next, even by oneself, one ends up being 
deceived when one conducts the investigation at the level of a sentence]  ». 
Whatever one deems to be language’s involvement in private musings 
and ruminations – and, as far as mental argumentation and its presen-
tation are concerned, thought and speech get along famously14 – the fact 
13 That πράγματα stand here for all kinds of things we can speak of – those we’ve got 
on our mind no less than those we perceive through our senses – has been suggested more 
than once. To start with, the idea fits, nicely, ancient narratives about how things got their 
names in the first place  : mostly because people gave them one irrespective of their being 
related to reasoning or perception – cf. e.g. Boethius’ account (which stands out as the 
least imaginative if not outright whimsical… think of the assembly of the wise, the χορὸς 
σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν who – according to Olympiodorus’ Prolegomena, 21.32-38 – gathered on 
several occasions to name things, first, and to name names next)  : «  prima igitur illa fuit 
nominum positio, per quam vel intellectui subiecta vel sensibus designaret [such was the 
first imposition of names through which things pertaining either to reasoning or perception 
were referred to]  » (In Categorias commentaria, 159b). As demonstrated time and again 
over the last thirty years, on the Porphyrian ancestry of names’ institution(s) and its late 
ancient and mediaeval aftermath, along with Hoffmann 1987 which is definitely in the 
same league, Sten Ebbesen is the most prolific and reliable guide  : Ebbesen 1990, 2003, 
2005, 2007 and 2019. In more recent times, Hadot 1980, 310-311 has become the standard 
reference. Courtine 2004, 1076 is the most convincing advocate of the view that «  the 
expression “the things themselves” does not refer primarily to an extra-mental and 
a-semantic reality – a stone, an ox, or an ass (which in fact it would often be difficult to 
bring into the discussion) – but to the affair at issue  » – cf. already Wieland 1962, 159-160 
(discussing the «  πρᾶγμα vs ὄνομα  » issue in Sophistici elenchi 16, 175a 5 et sq.) and 
Nuchelmans 1973, 33-36  ; as well as Berti 1994, 120  ; De Rijk 1996, 118-119 (developed 
further in de Rijk 2002, 104-111) and Di Mattei 2006, 14-15. 
14 I see no compelling reason to open that particular can of worms – only a fool would 
be in a rush to quote on «  mental language  » in a footnote, where the wise are reluctant to 
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remains that he who thinks things over for himself does not get any 
smarter with his hands or, for that matter, with his wits. He may well be 
better off on his own, at least insofar as he is less liable to linguistic 
deception than those who, being in a sharing mood and all, depend more 
on oral or written communication  ; yet, he does not get to manipulate 
things – whether in the flesh or not – any more than those who debate 
on the same subject. All things being equal, he who processes problems 
all by himself does not so much have a better understanding of whatever 
he is after as he simply does not have to worry about dialogical etiquette, 
especially the confusions it begets when, out of the blue, «  strangers  » 
become «  odd people  », dogs stop barking and start shining bright, and 
a «  good  » death, which is its own reward, turns out to be a «  well-
deserved  » one too just because all of the above happen to share the same 
names  : ξένοι, κύνες and ἀξία respectively15. More to the point, assuming 
even recommend themselves. A few bare texts will suffice to drive home the point that 
public and private argumentation follow pretty much the same compositional pattern which 
starts with uncombined thoughts and uncombined linguistic expressions (De interpretatione 
1, 16a 10-15), builds up to form mental as well as spoken statements – be they affirmative 
or negative compounds – (De interpretatione 1, 16a 10-15 again, along with 14, 23a 33-36 
and 24b 2-6), and leads to full-fledged deductions and demonstrations which occur either 
inwardly or outwardly (Analytica posteriora I 10, 76b 24-27). Moreover, as far as discursive 
content and process go, inner and outer speech share the same basic semantic requirements 
– most notably, a strict univocity or, to be more accurate, a strictly regulated polysemy 
(Metaphysica Γ 4, 1006b 7-11). But then again, who am I to deny serious readers their pound 
of chosen books and selected papers  ? Here they are, down to the last ounce  : Nuchelmans 
1973, 36-39  ; Mignucci 1975, 203-206  ; Polansky and Kuczewski 1990  ; Chiesa 1992  ; 
Matelli 1992, 52-55  ; Panaccio 1999, 36-52  ; Di Mattei 2006  ; Duncombe 2016  ; Chriti 
2018  ; McCready-Flora 2019. If one were to single out the most influential ancient inter-
preter on the issue of mental and oral discursivity, Boethius’ name – in one of his many 
pages of Porphyrian observance (cf. In De interpretatione commentarium. Editio secunda, 
30.3 and sq.) – would be the first to spring to mind. Magee 1989, 64-141 and Suto 2011, 
77-113 – in some of their pages of Ebbesenian observance (cf. Ebbesen 1981, I, 133-170) – 
will provide readers, even the voracious type, with as much food for thought as they can 
possibly bite off and chew over in one or more sittings.
15 Of course, there’s more to what I dubbed «  dialogical etiquette  » than meets the eye. 
Aristotle covers its many niceties when he portrays how dialecticians are supposed to 
handle specific lines of argument on their own and around people (cf. e.g. Topica, VIII, 1, 
157b 34 - 158a 2) or when he describes how demonstrations – and argumentation at 
large – fare when you go through the moves in your head and when you vent them out 
(cf. e.g. again Analytica posteriora I 10, 76b 24-27). Even though no additional bibliography 
is required at this stage, let’s recall the most influential assessment of the specificity of 
dialectical argumentation, namely Moraux 1968 – through the usual bibliographical threads 
follow up routine, interested readers should be able to trace forward the most representative 
works (Brunschwig 1986  ; Dorion 1990  ; Wolff 1995  ; etc.). 
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the solitary thinker is ahead of the pack, this has little to do with him 
getting any closer to actual things – or abstract ones for that matter. 
A few Aristotelian digressions may be construed to imply that language 
blurs precisely the distinction between the two, making it hard for us to 
cope with the ontological variety beneath the even surface of words, 
especially when we expect hard things to be what we cogitate and discuss 
and are deceived by our expectations  : 
[T2] Aristotelis Sophistici elenchi 33, 182b 13-16 and 22-25  : «  ἐν τοῖς 
παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν, ὅσπερ δοκεῖ τρόπος εὐηθέστατος εἶναι τῶν παρα­
λογισμῶν, τὰ μὲν καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσίν ἐστι δῆλα (καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι σχεδὸν 
οἱ γελοῖοι πάντες εἰσὶ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἷον κτλ. […]). τὰ δὲ καὶ τοὺς 
ἐμπειροτάτους φαίνεται λανθάνειν (σημεῖον δὲ τούτου ὅτι μάχονται 
πολλάκις περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων, οἷον πότερον ταὐτὸ σημαίνει κατὰ πάντων 
τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν, ἢ ἕτερον· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ταὐτὸ σημαίνειν τὸ ὂν καὶ 
τὸ ἕν, οἱ δὲ τὸν Ζήνωνος λόγον καὶ Παρμενίδου λύουσι διὰ τὸ πολλα­
χῶς φάναι τὸ ἓν λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ ὄν) [Hasper 2013, 50 slightly modified  : 
with those dependent on homonymy – which seems to be the most simple-
minded mode of fallacy – some arguments are clear even to any chance 
person (for jokes too are almost all dependent on the expression, for example 
etc.)  ; while others appear to go unnoticed even by the most experienced 
people. (A sign of this is that these people often quarrel about words, for 
example, whether “being” and “one” signify the same thing in all cases or 
something different. For some hold that “being” and “one” signify the 
same thing, while others solve the argument of Zeno and Parmenides by 
claiming that “one” and “being” are said in many ways)]  ». 
[T3] Aristotelis Sophistici elenchi 7, 169a 22-25  : «  ἡ δ’ ἀπάτη γίνεται τῶν 
μὲν παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι διαιρεῖν τὸ 
πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον (ἔνια γὰρ οὐκ εὔπορον διελεῖν, οἷον τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ 
ὂν καὶ τὸ ταὐτόν) [Hasper 2013, 22  : the deception in refutations depending 
on homonymy and amphiboly comes about through not being able to draw 
distinctions in the case of what is said in many ways. For with some terms, 
it is not easy to draw distinctions, for example, with “one”, “being” and “the 
same”]  ». 
[T4] Aristotelis Sophistici elenchi 6, 168a 23-26  : «  τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῇ 
λέξει οἱ μέν εἰσι παρὰ τὸ διττόν, οἷον ἥ τε ὁμωνυμία καὶ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ 
ὁμοιοσχημοσύνη (σύνηθες γὰρ τὸ πάντα ὡς τόδε τι σημαίνειν), κτλ. 
[Hasper 2013, 20  : among the apparent deductions and refutations due to 
the expression, some depend on equivocation, such as homonymy, amphiboly 
and similarity in form of expression (for customarily one signifies every-
thing as something individual), etc.]  ». 
[T5] Aristotelis de sophisticis elenchis 7, 169a 30-36  : «  χαλεπὸν γὰρ διε­
λεῖν ποῖα ὡσαύτως καὶ ποῖα ὡς ἑτέρως λέγεται (σχεδὸν γὰρ ὁ τοῦτο 
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δυνάμενος ποιεῖν ἐγγύς ἐστι τοῦ θεωρεῖν τἀληθές, μάλιστα δ’ ἐπίσταται 
συνεπινεύειν), ὅτι πᾶν τὸ κατηγορούμενόν τινος ὑπολαμβάνομεν τόδε 
τι, καὶ ὡς ἓν ὑπακούομεν· τῷ γὰρ ἑνὶ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ μάλιστα δοκεῖ παρέ­
πεσθαι τὸ τόδε τι καὶ τὸ ὄν [Hasper 2013, 22  : it is difficult to distinguish 
which things are said in the same way and which are said differently. For 
someone who can do that is practically on the verge of knowing the truth. 
However, what especially lures us into assenting is that we assume that 
everything predicated of something is an individual and understand it as one 
thing. (For individuality and being seem most of all to go together with 
substance and what is one thing)]  ». 
At this juncture, it is immaterial to decide whether or not [T2] is a 
– presumably early – instance of the ἀπορῆσαι ἀρχαϊκῶς sleight of hand 
Aristotle pulled elsewhere on Parmenides and the Platonists who thought 
they could outsmart Parmenides at his own game16. It is also of little 
consequence whether we emphasize differences or similarities between 
homonymy, amphiboly and figure of speech in the other texts17. Rather, 
what deserves here to be underscored is the fact that – despite what our 
linguistic habits would have us believe – the things which actually come 
in all shapes and sizes are neither the only ones nor the most intriguing 
we can occupy our mind with or bring up for debate. 
Λόγοι ([Urtext], 164a 25, 165a 11, 13, 15). Even though later Aris-
totelian scholars either scorned the issue or ignored it altogether18, in 
their ancient and mediaeval heyday, commentators took very seriously 
Aristotle’s claim that there are only so many linguistic expressions we 
can rely on in order to refer to the countless things out there («  and in 
16 Parmenides’ old-fashioned views are criticized in Physica I 2, 186a 23 et sq. (cf. Berti 
1990, Castelli 2018 ). Fellow Academics are blamed for setting problems in an obsolete way 
in Metaphysica, N 2 1088b 35 et sq. (cf. Merlan 1967, Leszl 1973, Dorion 2011). 
17 It is easy enough to do both in the footsteps of Ancient and Mediaeval sources on 
«  actual  » and «  imaginary  » equivocity – homonymy being tantamount to using one word 
with multiple meanings and form of expression having to do with words whose similar 
morphology tricks us into believing they refer to the same things or kind of things 
(cf. Gazziero 2016, 252-255). 
18 Agostino Nifo – for one – only saw the potential for fun, since he settled for a good 
laugh rather than a convoluted explanation (cf. Expositiones in libros De sophisticis 
elenchis, 5vb). As a matter of fact, he dismissed a legitimate issue (why πράγματα are 
supposed to be infinite whereas λόγοι – and ὀνόματα – are supposed to be limited in 
number  ?) with a joke (for no one ever went to the trouble of counting them, no one really 
knows whether there are more things than linguistic expressions or the other way around, 
for that matter). Giulio Pace – for another – hardly gave the problem any thought either, 
since he did not even touch upon it, however briefly, in his influential Commentarius 
analyticus on Aristotle’s Organon. 
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here  », says me pointing to little Nahida’s forehead). One could hardly 
blame them for doing so  : after all, for Aristotle himself, the fact that 
πράγματα and ὀνόματα along with λόγοι do not always add up is the 
main reason why we end up on the losing side of a number of phony 
arguments. As may be expected from experts whose relentless question-
ing was only matched by their eagerness to tear each other’s views apart, 
all possible readings have been expounded at some point or another. 
Besides stating the obvious (namely, that there actually are fewer linguis-
tic expressions than things and states of affairs, period), interpreters have 
come up with several other, more imaginative, solutions. According to 
some, neither things nor linguistic expressions are really infinite  ; accord-
ing to others, they both are  ; according to others still (sometimes the 
same, endorsing different solutions) the former are more infinite than the 
latter or vice versa19. Despite their differences and nuances, commenta-
tors of old were in general agreement that – whether in short supply or 
not – what Aristotle referred to as λόγοι are ordinary sentences or state-
ments. Had the traditional consensus not been breached in recent times, 
we might leave it at that and willingly move on. As it happened though, 
a few translators and Aristotelian scholars – philosophers and linguists 
alike – have interpreted [Urtext] as if λόγοι meant definitions or accounts 
instead of ordinary pieces of verbal communication and argumentation20, 
at least in 165a 11 and 13 – which, by the way, never augurs anything 
19 Interested readers will find an edition of relevant texts and a critical survey of who’s 
who in Gazziero 2021. 
20 A few otherwise dependable translators have λόγοι stand here for definitional formu-
las. Pickard-Cambridge 1928, 536  : «  names are finite and so is the sum-total of formulae, 
while things are infinite in number. Inevitably, then, the same formulae, and a single name, 
have a number of meanings  » (revised, for the worse, by Barnes 1984, 278  : «  names are 
finite and so is the sum-total of accounts, while things are infinite in number. Inevitably, 
then, the same account and a single name signify several things  ») and Tricot 1939, 3 «  les 
noms sont en nombre limité, ainsi que la pluralité des définitions, tandis que les choses 
sont infinies en nombre. Il est, par suite, inévitable que plusieurs choses soient signifiées 
et par une même définition et par un seul et même nom  ». While sensible interpreters have 
resisted the temptation to explore the new path (cf. e.g. Robinson 1941, 144-145 or McKeon 
1947, 29-31), more than a few eminent philosophers have followed the translators’ lead 
and explained the text along the same lines  : Hintikka 1959, 146 and Aubenque 1962, 
107-108 and 118-120, whose Aristotelian credentials were impeccable, are – unquestion-
ably – the most influential. A number of philosophically inclined linguists or linguistically 
inclined philosophers – many of them Italians – have gone down the same road, most 
notably Pagliaro 1962, 44 and 47-48  ; Belardi 1975, 138-139 and 1976, 81-82  ; Coseriu 
1979, 432-436  ; Lo Piparo 2003, 183  ; and Gusmani 1986, 535 note 2, 1993, 111 and 2004, 
155 note 12. 
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good  : cherry picking where, just a few lines apart, a given word occurs 
with the same meaning and where it doesn’t looks pretty suspicious, to 
say the least. Here’s one more reason why, in this particular instance, we 
should dismiss novelty as a serious step back rather than a bold step 
forward  : to start with, the whole point of [Urtext] 165a 10-13’s clause 
(«  τὰ μὲν γὰρ [11] ὀνόματα πεπέρανται καὶ τὸ τῶν λόγων πλῆθος … 
σημαίνειν  ») is that the numerical imbalance between the countless 
things we can bring up for discussion and the limited linguistic means at 
our disposal leads to confusion and deception. As soon as we acknowledge 
that we’re dealing with ambiguity as a distinctive linguistic liability21, 
we can confidently rule out the possibility that the multiple reference 
involved in [Urtext] has anything to do with the rather innocuous – in 
fact, very useful – feature of Aristotelian definitional accounts, which are 
supposed to apply to more than one individual thing without becoming 
equivocal in the process22. Should they turn out to be ambiguous after 
all, then equivocation would be the norm rather than the exception… 
nothing wrong with that either, of course  ; but it certainly does not have 
an Aristotelian ring to it, not even a tinkle. Let’s stick to our guns then 
and trust our elders on this one. 
notULae (minoreS). On the rare occasions Aristotle gives it to them 
straight, interpreters – pros and amateurs alike – should count their bless-
ings and be content with the plain sense of what they read. Before we 
turn to [Urtext]’s most peculiar feature, namely its analogy between 
those who are involved in pebble reckoning, on the one hand, and those 
21 Pace Aubenque 1962, 119  ; Coseriu 1979, 434  ; Bellemare 1982, 273  ; Chiesa 1991, 
230-232  ; Gusmani 1993, 111  ; Berti 1994, 123-124  ; etc. this is precisely what πλείω 
σημαίνειν means here. As vigorously pointed out by Leszl 1970, 32 and Dorion 1995, 
207-208, πλείω σημαίνειν in [Urtext], 165a 12-13 is synonymous with πολλαχῶς λέγε­
σθαι (Sophistici elenchi 19, 177a 9-11) or πολλὰ σημαίνειν (10, 170b 20-22) and it means 
equivocity. Let’s not forget either that, as often as not, syntactical ambiguity or amphiboly 
is simply dubbed λόγος by Aristotle (cf. 4, 165b 29  ; 6, 168a 25 and 7, 169a 22-23 with 
Garcia Yebra 1981, 44 and Fait 1996, 183 note 3). 
22 Whether or not Aristotelian definitions are said in many ways (and there are more 
pros and cons to either position than any Aristotelian scholar who hasn’t taken leave of 
her senses would care to admit in a footnote – cf. e.g. Charles 2010 and Deslauriers 2007 
for a book-length defence of each side of the debate), it is still true that a formula’s plural 
reference never puts its univocity at risk, even when we struggle to define peculiar indi-
viduals – namely, those who are both eternal and one of a kind (ἀίδια καὶ μοναχά), like 
the sun or the moon  : God forbid, should two suns rise tomorrow instead of one, the same 
– unambiguous – definition would be common to both, as Aristotle claims in Metaphysica 
Z 15, 1040a 28 - 1040b 2. 
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who are involved in argument-driven discussions, on the other hand, let’s 
briefly engage in one last round of lexical probing, which will help us 
lay further the groundwork for our reconstruction of Aristotle’s main line 
of argument in [Urtext]. 
Σύμβολα ([Urtext], 165a 8). As with about everything else in Aris-
totle, Aristotelian σύμβολα come with a few strings attached23. [Urtext] 
is the welcome exception, insofar as there is not much insight to be 
gained by asking, say, to what precise extent linguistic symbols are either 
by nature or by convention, or whether there’s good reason to set spoken 
symbols and written ones apart, or again how straightforward or how 
layered a relation symbol’s signification actually is, etc.24 Rather, what 
23 A bibliographical due diligence process might start by looking into three monuments 
of Swiss (and Franco-Swiss) philology  : Müri 1931, Meier-Oeser 1998, 712-713 and 
De Libera & Rosier Catach 2004, 1159-1164. It will consider next the Greco-Roman 
«  tessarae hospitales  » (cf. Knippschild 2002, 152-157) whose affinity with linguistic 
symbols has not gone unnoticed by attentive Aristotelian readers (cf., e.g., Bellemare 
1982, 268-271  ; Magee 1989, 39-40  ; Gusmani 2004, 156-157 and Baghdassarian 2014, 
55-56). Overviews worth mentioning should include at least a few more items, that is 
Belardi 1999, 12-14  ; De Angelis 2002, 18-22  : Suto 2012, 45-51 and Viltanioti 2015, 
34-41. It is hard to tell what to do exactly with Lo Piparo 2003 highly unconventional take 
on Aristotle and linguistic symbolism, besides saying, first, that – as Franco Lo Piparo 
himself, in not so many words, warns his readers right off the bat (Lo Piparo 2003, 2) – his 
translations are so unorthodox («  non-canonical  » he calls them) one wonders eventually 
whether we’re reading the same texts and, second (and more to the point), that his whole 
notion of a non-conventional non-substitutional symbol (cf. Lo Piparo 2003, 43, 62, 184 
emphasis on «  non-substitutional  ») – especially when applied to the prologue of the 
Sophistici elenchi – is simply too far off the mark to warrant discussion. 
24 Those are, of course, perfectly legitimate questions and have been debated forever 
– they simply do not have much bearing on [Urtext]. In recent times, they have been 
conflated with another issue, namely the alleged nuance to be made between linguistic 
symbols (σύμβολα) and linguistic signs (σημεία) – «  alleged  » insofar as ancient com-
mentators made no difference between the two  : most notably Ammonius who stated that 
the Philosopher used them interchangeably (In De interpretatione commentarius, 20.6-7 
with Brunschwig 2008, 61-66) and Boethius who translated both σύμβολα and σημεία as 
notae (De interpretatione. Translatio Boethii, 5.6 and 8 with Magee 1989, 49-63 and Suto 
2012, 43-76). Since Kretzmann 1974 forcefully argued that they are not synonyms, the 
issue has become a powerful catalyst and has received a huge amount of scholarly atten-
tion. With very few exceptions (Sedley 1996, 89 note 8 declined to battle his way through 
the rival interpretations  ; Wheeler 1999, 198 declared himself neutral  ; Tselemanis 1985, 
194-198 was both critical and supportive of Kretzmann’s views but – as far as I know – 
has not made good yet on his promise to provide a more positive and constructive account), 
Aristotelian specialists have felt compelled to take sides and either rallied round Kretz-
mann’s standard (Pépin 1985  ; Chiesa 1986 and 1991, 285-309  ; De Angelis 2002  ; Walz 
2006  ; etc.), or fought against the rising tide of Kretzmann’s supporters (Weidemann 
1982  ; Arens 1984, 27  ; Magee 1989, 36-49  ; Polansky & Kuczewski 1990  ; Wolanin 
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Aristotle made sure we don’t miss in [Urtext] is that symbols serve in 
a subsidiary capacity. We use them as a makeshift solution – as it hap-
pens, a permanent fix, but a fix nonetheless, with a few flaws of its own 
to boot. Accordingly, granted that we simply can’t do without language 
as a much-needed substitute for whatever we aren’t able to bring directly 
to each other’s consideration, we should not put too much stock in linguis-
tic expression either. At the very least, we are advised to keep tabs on it, 
lest it ends up creating more problems than it actually helps us solve. 
More to the point – and this is the peculiar feature of linguistic symbols 
which [Urtext] brings to the fore – despite being a rare commodity, 
words are ten a penny  ; they are as cheap as the pebbles Aristotle com-
pares them to and, as it turns out, every bit as tricky  ! 
Τῶν ὀνομάτων δύναμις ([Urtext], 165a 16). The very concept of 
δύναμις – along with its manifold relations to other Aristotelian notions 
(actuality, substance, movement, generation and change to name a few) – 
has a scholarly record second to none25. Yet, its association with ὀνόματα 
in the prologue of the Sophistici elenchi is hardly mentioned at all in 
recent literature26. This though should come as no surprise – for, as it 
occurs in [Urtext], the compound is self-explanatory, to a certain extent. 
In addition, it has very little to do with exciting – and excitingly fashion-
able – topics such as the hazardous chemistry involved in many linguistic 
1995  ; Modrak 2001, 19-20  ; Di Mattei 2006  ; Noriega-Olmos 2013, 55-59  ; Raspa 2018  ; 
etc.). 
25 To begin with, its bibliography speaks for itself. Crubellier, Jaulin, Lefebvre & 
Morel 2008 and Lefebvre 2018, by and large, deserve to be mentioned as the top contenders 
in their respective categories (team and solo effort). As it happens, Cleary 1998, 32’s most 
promising reference to the «  power of speech (De Juv. 469a 3)  » turns out to be a lapsus 
calami in an otherwise flawless essay – as a matter of fact, speech plays no special role 
in Aristotle’s treatise on the cycle of life and no role at all in the cardiocentric account of 
animal sustenance and development  : «  φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι μίαν μέν τινα ἐργασίαν ἡ 
τοῦ στόματος λειτουργεῖ δύναμις, ἑτέραν δ’ ἡ τῆς κοιλίας, περὶ τὴν τροφήν [it is clear 
that, as far as nutrition is concerned, the mouth has the faculty of performing one function, 
whereas the stomach has the faculty of performing a different function]  » (De iuventute 
et senectute 3, 469a 2-4  ; King 2001, 71-73 distinctive «  life process  » focused approach 
studies nutrition as a case in point). 
26 Considering the results, one wonders whether scholars ought to have left it alone 
altogether. For instance, Belardi 1975, 171 allusion is entangled in a dubious operation of 
Saussurian revamp. Gusmani 1992, 20 (≈ Gusmani & Quadrio 2018, 58) comments boil 
down to one problematic claim  : δύναμις in [Urtext], 165a 16 pertains to «  referential 
polyvalence  », i.e. the trivial fact that words refer to more than one thing belonging to the 
same class (sharing the same account, that is) – which, for reasons pointed out above, is 
plainly wrong. 
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interactions27. To be sure, the spell words and speeches cast – especially 
on audiences28 – was a concept Aristotle and his contemporaries were 
27 Should one wonder whether «  chemistry  » is the right word here, let him be 
reminded that, as a matter of course, the power of speech had long been compared to the 
property of remedies and poisons (φάρμακα). Gorgias, for one, had drawn a parallel 
between the effects – both good and bad – of speech on the soul, on the one hand, and the 
actions of drugs – whether healing or noxious – on the body, on the other  : «  τὸν αὐτὸν 
δὲ λόγον ἔχει ἥ τε τοῦ λόγου δύναμις πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς τάξιν ἥ τε τῶν φαρμάκων 
τάξις πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τῶν φαρμάκων ἄλλους ἄλλα χυμοὺς 
ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἐξάγει, καὶ τὰ μὲν νόσου τὰ δὲ βίου παύει, οὕτω καὶ τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν 
ἐλύπησαν, οἱ δὲ ἔτερψαν, οἱ δὲ ἐφόβησαν, οἱ δὲ εἰς θάρσος κατέστησαν τοὺς ἀκούον­
τας, οἱ δὲ πειθοῖ τινι κακῇ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφαρμάκευσαν καὶ ἐξεγοήτευσαν [Laks & Most 
2016, 179-181  : the power of speech has the same relation with the arrangement of the 
soul as the arrangement of drugs has with the nature of bodies. For just as some drugs 
draw some fluids out of the body, and others other ones, and some stop an illness and 
others stop life, in the same way some speeches cause pain, others pleasure, others fear, 
others dispose listeners to courage, others drug and bewitch the soul by some evil persua-
sion]  » (Encomium Helenae 14). Relevant literature includes Segal 1962, Verdenius 1981, 
Leszl 1985, Mourelatos 1987, Porter 1993, Noël 1994 and 2008, Valiavitcharska 2006, 
Pratt 2015 and Bourgeois 2017. Let it be noted that the pharmaceutical metaphor occurs 
in Plato’s Cratylus as well, where δύναμις however has less to do with the emotional 
response linguistic expressions may trigger than with their discriminatory power – which, 
interesting though it is (cf. already Bury 1894 and Souihé 1919, 82-84), is hardly relevant 
here  : «  ποικίλλειν δὲ ἔξεστι ταῖς συλλαβαῖς, ὥστε δόξαι ἂν τῷ ἰδιωτικῶς ἔχοντι 
ἕτερα εἶναι ἀλλήλων τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα· ὥσπερ ἡμῖν τὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν φάρμακα χρώμασιν καὶ 
ὀσμαῖς πεποικιλμένα ἄλλα φαίνεται τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα, τῷ δέ γε [394b] ἰατρῷ, ἅτε τὴν 
δύναμιν τῶν φαρμάκων σκοπουμένῳ, τὰ αὐτὰ φαίνεται, καὶ οὐκ ἐκπλήττεται ὑπὸ τῶν 
προσόντων. οὕτω δὲ ἴσως καὶ ὁ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὀνομάτων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν σκο­
πεῖ, καὶ οὐκ ἐκπλήττεται εἴ τι πρόσκειται γράμμα ἢ μετάκειται ἢ ἀφῄρηται, ἢ καὶ ἐν 
ἄλλοις παντάπασιν γράμμασίν ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ ὀνόματος δύναμις [Reeve 1997, 112-113  : 
because of variation in their syllables, names that are really the same seem different to the 
uninitiated. Similarly, a doctor’s medicines, which have different colours and perfumes 
added to them, appear different to us, although they are really the same and appear the 
same to a doctor, who looks only to their power to cure and isn’t disconcerted by the 
additives. Similarly, someone who knows about names looks to their force or power and 
isn’t disconcerted if a letter is added, transposed, or subtracted, or even if the force a name 
possesses is embodied in different letters altogether]  » (Platonis Cratylus 394a 5 - 394b 6 
with Barney 2001, 85-86  ; Sedley 2003, 81-86  ; Ademollo 2011, 167-178  ; Smith 2014). 
28 The vagaries of mass communication as opposed to the more controlled environment 
of cross-examination – or questions and answers driven exchange – were not lost to 
ancient theorists and practitioners. Let’s stay close to our main example ([T6]) and take 
full advantage of it. Blurring the boundaries between fiction and reality in subtle enough 
ways to have us wonder to this day whether we should take his word for it and to what 
extent [a], Thucydides had the Athenian envoys’ set the tone of the so-called Melian 
dialogue along these lines precisely [b]. In particular, holding all the cards of the negotia-
tion, Athenian representatives had no qualms about the Melian dignitaries stopping the 
uninterrupted – or rather unchecked – flow of their eloquence in front of the Melian peo-
ple  : «  ἐπειδὴ οὐ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος οἱ λόγοι γίγνονται, ὅπως δὴ μὴ ξυνεχεῖ ῥήσει οἱ 
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perfectly familiar with. In particular, they all knew too well that some 
πολλοὶ ἐπαγωγὰ καὶ ἀνέλεγκτα ἐσάπαξ ἀκούσαντες ἡμῶν ἀπατηθῶσιν (γιγνώσκομεν 
γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο φρονεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους ἀγωγή), ὑμεῖς οἱ καθήμενοι ἔτι ἀσφα­
λέστερον ποιήσατε. καθ’ ἕκαστον γὰρ καὶ μηδ’ ὑμεῖς ἑνὶ λόγῳ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ μὴ 
δοκοῦν ἐπιτηδείως λέγεσθαι εὐθὺς ὑπολαμβάνοντες κρίνετε. καὶ πρῶτον εἰ ἀρέσκει 
ὡς λέγομεν [86] εἴπατε [Mynott 2013, 379  : we see that our discussions are not to take 
place before the popular assembly – no doubt to prevent us from deceiving the people at 
large with one continuous presentation of persuasive arguments that would go unchal-
lenged (for we do realise that this is the point of your bringing us before this smaller 
body). Why then don’t you who sit before us adopt yet one further safeguard  ? Why don’t 
you too deal with the issues point by point rather than in just one speech and take up 
straightaway anything you object to in what we say  ? And you can begin by saying if this 
proposal is acceptable to you]  » (Thucydidis Historiae V, 85-86 with Frazier 1997 and 
Tsakmakis 2006 but, pace in terra agli uomini di buona volontà, without Spina 2019). 
[a] «  thUCydideS on thinGS Said  ». The nature of Thucydides’ reports of words traded 
on different memorable – and not so memorable – occasions has been debated forever. 
West 1973a provides a handy description and listing of Thucydides speeches (a detailed 
synopsis is also to be found in Mynott 2013, 624-628)  ; Rood 2015 offers an all-purpose 
survey of – and rich bibliography about – the reception of the so called «  archaeological  » 
section (most notably I, 22) where Thucydides is quite forthcoming about how much 
invention he resorted to in order to supplement available evidence. In fact, Thucydides is 
so candid about the approximation issue that – as Pelling 2000, 115 aptly put it – «  the 
only feature which most interpreters share is their confidence in their interpretation, and 
their utter bemusement that others should not see it the same way  ». Wilson 1982 – argu-
ably one of the most lucid assessments of Thucydides’ authenticity claim – will serve here 
as a convenient terminus a quo for a few bibliographical bearings  : Loriaux 1982  ; 
Dover 1983  ; Plant 1988 and 1999  ; Orwin 1989  ; Bicknell 1990  ; Develin 1990  ; 
Porter 1990  ; Badian 1992  ; Rengakos 1996  ; Garrity 1998  ; Nicolai 1998 and 2011  ; 
Tsakmakis 1998  ; Porciani 1999 and 2007  ; Winton 1999  ; Farber & Fauber 2001  ; 
Greenwood 2006, 57-82  ; Scardino 2007, 399-416  ; Moles 2010  ; Schutrumpf 2011  ; 
Dorion 2013  ; Feddern 2016 and 2018  ; Liberman 2017, 49-64. Despite not making the 
chronological cut, we should also mention, at the very least, a bibliography that covers 
one hundred years of previous Thucydidean scholarship on speeches, West 1973b, a note 
on the most problematic aspect of the debate, namely the meaning of τὰ δέοντα 
μάλιστ’ εἰπεῖν in I, 22.4, Winnington-Ingram 1965, plus Huart 1973 and Cogan 1981. 
For some reason, Thucydides’ portrayal of Nicias – the superstitious old fart whose weak 
leadership and inferior military skills have been held largely responsible for the Syracusan 
disaster – has enjoyed a considerable amount of scholarly attention and interest. His 
speeches, letters and battlefield addresses have been studied as a case in point for assess-
ing Thucydides’ fairness as a more or less informed observer by Westlake 1941, Mur-
ray 1961, Adkins 1975, Del Corno 1975, Marinatos 1980, Lateiner 1985, Zadorojnyi 1998, 
Morrison 2006, Niedzielski 2017, Tompkins 2017 and Titchener & Damen 2018. [b] «  the 
meLian affair  ». If one does not dismiss the whole episode as a later interpolation – a 
neat trick if you ask me, albeit a bit controversial  : in recent times, Hemmerdinger 1948 
actually came up with this rather elegant solution to the Melian conundrum, but few have 
followed in his footsteps, apart Canfora 1970, 1971 and 1992 (as well as one of Canfora’s 
pupils, namely Cagnazzi 1983) – then he or she’s in for the bibliographical ride of a life-
time… «  there is no keeping up with the bibliography  » dispiritingly declared Andrewes 
1970, 182, taking his cue from Wassermann 1947, 18 note 1 («  there is hardly any book 
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words are not to be trifled with, lest they mess with your head the way 
«  dishonour  » (τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλούμενον – a powerful catchword indeed) 
played tricks on the mind of Melian leaders – at least according to Thucy-
dides’ account of the negotiation which paved the way for the islanders’ 
swift demise  : 
[T6] Thucydidis Historiae V, 111  : «  οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐπί γε τὴν ἐν τοῖς αἰσχροῖς 
καὶ προύπτοις κινδύνοις πλεῖστα διαφθείρουσαν ἀνθρώπους αἰσχύνην 
τρέψεσθε. πολλοῖς γὰρ προορωμένοις ἔτι ἐς οἷα φέρονται τὸ αἰσχρὸν 
καλούμενον ὀνόματος ἐπαγωγοῦ δυνάμει ἐπεσπάσατο ἡσσηθεῖσι τοῦ 
ῥήματος ἔργῳ ξυμφοραῖς ἀνηκέστοις ἑκόντας περιπεσεῖν καὶ αἰσχύνην 
[4] αἰσχίω μετὰ ἀνοίας ἢ τύχῃ προσλαβεῖν. ὃ ὑμεῖς, ἢν εὖ βουλεύησθε, 
φυλάξεσθε, καὶ οὐκ ἀπρεπὲς νομιεῖτε πόλεώς τε τῆς μεγίστης ἡσσᾶσθαι 
μέτρια προκαλουμένης, ξυμμάχους γενέσθαι ἔχοντας τὴν ὑμετέραν 
αὐτῶν ὑποτελεῖς, καὶ δοθείσης αἱρέσεως πολέμου πέρι καὶ ἀσφαλείας 
μὴ τὰ χείρω φιλονικῆσαι [Mynott 2013, 384  : surely you will not be 
drawn into that sense of shame which is quite fatal when it is danger and 
dishonour that are staring you in the face. For many people, even though 
they can see the dangers they are being led into, are still overcome by the 
power of a name – this thing we call “dishonour” – and, victims of a word, 
in fact fall of their own accord into irreversible disaster and so bring on 
themselves a dishonour all the more shameful because it comes more 
from their folly than their misfortune. That is the outcome you will be 
well advised to avoid and you should realise that there is no loss of face in 
or article on Thucydides which does not mention the Melian Dialogue, etc.  »). Skipping 
over international relations, political and security studies whose dubious or inexistent 
philology and the occasional lack of concern for getting at least the facts straight should 
deter even the most compulsive reader (e.g., Lunstroth 2006, 99  : «  the “Melian Dia-
logue”, a debate between two Athenian generals and members of the Melian “magistrates 
and the few”, etc.  » where does Thucydides say that “two generals” – presumably Cleo-
medes and Teisias – spoke for the Athenian expeditionary corps  ? this is not what is 
suggested in V, 84  : «  λόγους πρῶτον ποιησομένους ἔπεμψαν πρέσβεις κτλ.  » Alas, 
Lunstroth did not care to share where this particular insight came from – is it just possible 
that this precious piece of information [sic] lingered in one of the several Wikipedia entries 
Lunstroth took the trouble to look up  ? … there, I said it. A pedant might offer Dionysius 
of Halicarnassus στρατηγοί at De Thucydide, VII, 40 as a tentative source, but to what 
avail  ? there’s nothing to be salvaged anyway), also leaving aside anachronistic perspectives 
(cf., e.g., Alker 1988’s «  neoclassical polymetrics  » or Mara 2008’s, 46-54 «  psychocul-
tural  » and «  game-theoretic  » gimmicks), we’ll narrow it down to the body of studies 
devoted to the literary aspects of the alleged exchange between Athenian envoys and 
Melian oligarchs  : De Sanctis 1930  ; Méautis 1935  ; Deininger 1939  ; Hudson-William 1950  ; 
Andrewes 1960  ; Stahl 1966, 158-171  ; Amit 1968  ; Liebeschuetz 1968  ; Volk 1971  ; 
MacLeod 1974  ; Radt 1976  ; Rengakos 1984  ; Gomez-Lobos 1989  ; Seaman 1997  ; Vick-
ers 1999  ; Morrison 2000  ; Roman 2007  ; Greenwood 2008  ; Vimercati 2008  ; Boya-
rin 2012  ; Von Reden 2013  ; Kurpios 2015  ; Fragoulaki 2016  ; Ponchon 2017, 286-314. 
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submitting to a great power which is offering reasonable terms – namely, 
for you to become allies, retaining your own territory on payment of tri-
bute – and that when you have a choice between war and safety you should 
not be so contrary as to insist on the worse option]  ». 
Artful a fabrication though it is likely to be – and the whole speech 
definitely smacks of invention supplementing evidence (emphasis on 
invention)29 – the unmitigated brutality and verbose callousness of the 
Athenian spokesmen in the so-called Melian dialogue present us with an 
interesting linguistic pattern nonetheless. As Thucydides had it, Athenians 
29 If we are to believe Thucydides and get along with the idea that Melians were actu-
ally offered terms and that those terms were not so harsh that no amount of pedagogy 
would have convinced them to comply («  μέτρια προκαλουμένη  » at [T6] 111.4 might 
suggest just that  ; on the other hand, V, 91-92 puts Melian submission in a far bleaker 
light, as does V, 97  : καταστραφῆναι sounds pretty ominous to me), then we have to 
admit that envoys on both sides got off to a bad start and basically had it all backwards. 
What follows is merely a cautionary tale about the dangers of reading too much into the 
dialogue (as did, among others, Price 2001, 195-204 and Viansino 2007 who construed it 
as a communication breakdown of tragic proportion between irreconcilable worldviews  ; 
and Coleman 2010, 82 who went so far as to make of Melos’ talks the paradigm of 
«  incommensurable conceptual schemes  » clashing together, which is outright extrava-
gance). On the one hand, Athenians should have known better than to take seriously the 
last simpletons of a kind that had long become a laughing stock all over Greece (III, 83  : 
«  οὕτω πᾶσα ἰδέα κατέστη κακοτροπίας διὰ τὰς στάσεις τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ, καὶ τὸ εὔηθες, 
οὗ τὸ γενναῖον πλεῖστον μετέχει, καταγελασθὲν ἠφανίσθη [Mynott 2013  : simplicity 
of spirit, which is such an important part of true nobility, was laughed to scorn and van-
ished]  » with Crane 1998 and Williams 1998). How do you expect to reason with people 
eager to gamble their very survival on a bunch of poor assumptions about the righteous-
ness of their cause, the goodwill of the Gods (or the Spartans’ for that matter) and the 
amenability of their foes to sail back home empty handed but fully enlightened about the 
wickedness of their ways – as if anybody mounted educational expeditions and dispatched 
ships by the dozens just to teach their neighbours a lesson in political realism  ? On the 
other hand, what is there to say about the Melians, apart from the fact that they could not 
have botched it any worse had they done it on purpose  ? What were they thinking  ? You 
simply don’t get in the way of a charging bull – this only pits your weakness against its 
strength. What do you do instead  ? Nothing. As long as rebellion or resistance get you 
nowhere, you bide your time in shame, the same exact way Athens’ other allies were 
biding theirs (as foreshadowed in V, 91), bearing in mind that if you leave bullies to their 
own devices, they will self-destruct sooner than later, screw up big time and butcher their 
lives – just like Aussie legend Steve-o-Bradbury did back in 2002 (https://youtu.
be/5fFnSRKUBFU). Then – and only then – you are welcome to join the lynch mob and 
have all sorts of fun, starting with the kind of retribution Athenians fretted over after the 
Sicilian failure (VIII, 1) and, even more so in the wake of the Aegospotami defeat (Xenophon, 
Hellenica II, 1.30-32, 2.3 and 6-10), when such retribution was allegedly (Ehrhart 1970  ; 
Bommelaer 1981, 103-115  ; Wylie 1986  ; etc.) – but most likely (Strauss 1983  ; Robin-
son 2014  ; Kapellos 2019) – visited upon them, to some extent at least (Spartans can be 
such killjoys sometimes). 
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pursued a conscious strategy consisting, primarily, in downplaying the 
emotional response morally loaded words like «  justice  », «  injustice  », 
«  courage  », «  piety  », «  honour  », «  shame  », «  uprightness  », «  bravery  », 
etc. were supposed to elicit from any self-respecting Greek individual. 
Accordingly, from the very start, they strove to neutralize the power of 
such «  alluring expressions  », claiming – for instance – that they would 
neither rely on them (V, 89 «  ἡμεῖς τοίνυν οὔτε αὐτοὶ μετ’ ὀνομάτων 
καλῶν, κτλ. [as far as we’re concerned, we won’t resort to fine words, 
etc.]  »), nor allow their Melian counterparts to use them in order to talk 
their way out of their current predicament (V, 89  : «  οὔθ’ ὑμᾶς ἀξιοῦμεν 
ὡς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν οἴεσθαι πείσειν κτλ. [we don’t expect you to think that 
you can convince us either, etc.]  »). [T6] achieves this process of linguis-
tic demystification  : since the Melians, being the pompous asses that they 
were, proved utterly impervious to the recommendation to steer clear of 
all idle talk about justice and honour as irrelevant and beside the point 
(V, 89  : «  ἐπισταμένους πρὸς εἰδότας ὅτι δίκαια μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ 
λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἀνάγκης κρίνεται, κτλ. [Hornblower 2008, 233  : we 
both know that in the discussion of human affairs, justice enters only 
when there is a corresponding power to enforce it, etc.]  »), the Athenians 
urged them to resist the power of seduction of such deceptive words 
(ὀνόματος ἐπαγωγοῦ δύναμις), lest they succumb to their charm (ἡσση­
θεῖσι τοῦ ῥήματος ἔργῳ) and, hell-bent on living up to their own pious 
incantations, they end up losing everything. Truth be told – but we enter 
here into uncharted territory without much reason to do so – as [T6]’s 
subtle wordplay (αἰσχρὸν, αἰσχύνη, αἰσχίω) suggests, Athenians went 
further still  : not only did they strip all the καλὰ ὀνόματα the Melians 
could muster of the sentimental value and emotional associations they 
ordinarily conveyed, but they also reassessed them in the light of the 
situation at hand by shifting the traditional standards of praise and blame 
from slavish submission (V, 86  : δουλεία  ; V, 92  : δουλεῦσαι  ; V, 100  : 
δουλεύοντες) to doing whatever it takes to avoid enslavement (V, 100  : 
πᾶν πρὸ τοῦ δουλεῦσαι ἐπεξελθεῖν), namely taking up arms in order to 
preserve one’s own freedom. If the Melians were to listen to the Atheni-
ans, then doing the honourable thing – that is, holding their ground in the 
face of impossible odds instead of giving in to fear and despair – would 
have been a shame more shameful (αἰσχύνη αἰσχίων) than demeaning 
themselves by surrendering and living on in shame. For the Athenians’ 
insinuation to pay off, the word «  αἰσχρὸν  » had to retain its power and 
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convey the moral stigma it carried before, so that people might still be 
goaded into avoiding whatever the word came to be attached to. Accord-
ingly, what changed was not so much the meaning of the word, but its 
reference through the self-serving reappraisal of the way it applied to 
deeds. Of course, Athenians were neither the first nor the only ones to 
wreak such abuse upon language. What happened to αἰσχρὸν in Melos 
was not so different from what happened in Corcyra (and elsewhere) to 
ἀνδρεία and other fine words caught in the linguistic turmoil which, 
according to Thucydides, matched the upheaval and excesses of the con-
flict turning to ubiquitous civil strife  : «  τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνο­
μάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιώσει. τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος 
ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη, κτλ. [Mynott  2013, 212  : men assumed 
the right to reverse the usual values in the application of words to actions. 
Reckless audacity came to be thought of as comradely courage, etc.]  » 
(III, 82)30. 
Working a linguistic angle on opponents and audience, especially by 
telling them what they wanted to hear, was not outside the dialectical 
compass of well-trained practitioners, by any stretch of the imagination31. 
30 Language as a collateral victim of the violent disruption brought about by civil war 
is yet another favourite topic in Thucydidean studies («  the most celebrated aspect of 
Thucydides’ presentation of stasis is his discussion of the debasement of language  », as 
Orwin 1988 put it). Amongst those who have insisted on the axiomatic import of the 
ἀξίωσις τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα in III, 82, we should mention  : Müri 1969 (whose early 
suggestion that there is more to III, 82 than simple μετονομασία was remarkably on the 
mark as was his comparison between Greek during the iron age of στάσις and German 
under Nazi rule  ; at any rate, it is far more convincing than the alleged analogies with 
Orwell’s Newspeak and Spanish propaganda drawn by Edmunds 1975, 834-835 and 
Thompson 2013, 273-274 and 286-288 respectively)  ; Hogan 1980 (whose interest in the 
partisan «  judgment of worth or estimation  » perverting the «  customary use of words to 
assess worth, to praise and blame  » was also much to the point)  ; Wilson 1982b (whose 
idea that post-stasis rhetoric cashed in on the usual meaning of words, which did not 
change, is germane to the point we’ve just made)  ; Loraux 1986 (developing Hogan’s and 
Wilson’s views and introducing an interesting parallel with Rhetorica I 9, 1367a 33 - 
1367b 4). A few more references to complete the picture  : Solmsen 1971  ; Macleod 1979  ; 
Worthington 1982  ; Swain 1993  ; Piovan 2017 (in fact, an English translation of an essay 
in Italian published the same year or the other way around)  ; Spielberg 2017. 
31 Whether he asked questions or answered them, it was in the dialectician’s best inter-
est to cultivate an unthreatening demeanour (on Aristotelian «  irony  » cf. e.g. Sophistici 
elenchi 12, 172b 21-24 as well as Topica, VIII, 1, 156b 4-9 and 18-20), lest he got both 
the competition and the assistance all riled up, which would only make it harder to get the 
right answers out of his respondent and to get a sympathetic ear from the very people who 
were going to assess his performance. In particular, whenever they might have raised the 
suspicion of flying in the face of well-accepted views, dialecticians were well advised not 
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That being said, the power of words expert dialecticians were expected 
to harness in [Urtext] – if they hoped to avoid running into all sorts of 
discursive hazards – carries little or no emotional weight. The δύναμις 
of a word or its worth is but its meaning, that is the thing or things it can 
stand for, irrespective of whatever the word itself makes people feel like 
when they either utter or hear it. Our claim rests both on contextual and 
internal evidence, which – as we briefly pass it in review – will lead us 
to [Urtext]’s main thread, namely the pebble analogy we’ll discuss next. 
To start with, the equivalence between what a word means and what 
a word is worth is well attested both in Aristotle and contemporary 
sources  : 
[T7] Lysiae In Theomnestum 7, 90.24 - 91.5  : «  ἐγὼ δὲ οἶμαι ἡμᾶς, ὦ 
ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὐ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων διαφέρεσθαι ἀλλὰ τῆς τούτων 
[91] διανοίας, καὶ πάντας εἰδέναι ὅτι, ὅσοι <ἀπεκτόνασί τινας, καὶ 
ἀνδροφόνοι εἰσί, καὶ ὅσοι> ἀνδροφόνοι εἰσί, καὶ ἀπεκτόνασί τινας. 
πολὺ γὰρ <ἂν> ἔργον ἦν τῷ νομοθέτῃ ἅπαντα τὰ ὀνόματα γράφειν ὅσα 
τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἔχει· ἀλλὰ περὶ ἑνὸς εἰπὼν περὶ πάντων ἐδήλωσεν 
[Todd 2000, 105  : but in my view, gentlemen of the jury, you must decide 
on the basis not of the words but of their meaning (διάνοια)  : you all 
recognize that those who kill people are also man-slayers, and those who 
are man-slayers have also killed people. It would have been a considerable 
task for the lawgiver to write all the words that have the same meaning 
(δύναμις), but by talking about one of them, he made clear his views about 
them all]  ». 
[T8] Aristotelis Rhetorica III 2, 1405b 4-7 and 15-17  : «  κάλλος δὲ ὀνόμα­
τος τὸ μὲν ὥσπερ Λικύμνιος λέγει, ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις ἢ τῷ σημαινομένῳ, καὶ 
αἶσχος δὲ ὡσαύτως. […]. τὰς δὲ μεταφορὰς ἐντεῦθεν οἰστέον, ἀπὸ καλῶν 
ἢ τῇ φωνῇ ἢ τῇ δυνάμει κτλ. [the beauty of a word lies, as Licymnius says, 
either in its sound or in the thing the word stands for, and the same goes for 
its ugliness. (…). Therefore, metaphors should be drawn from words whose 
beauty lies either in the vocal sound or in their meaning, etc.]  ». 
[T9] Aristotelis Analytica priora I 39, 49b 3-9  : «  δεῖ δὲ καὶ μεταλαμβά­
νειν ἃ τὸ αὐτὸ δύναται, ὀνόματα ἀντ’ ὀνομάτων καὶ λόγους ἀντὶ λόγων 
καὶ ὄνομα καὶ λόγον, καὶ ἀεὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ λόγου τοὔνομα λαμβάνειν· ῥᾴων 
γὰρ ἡ τῶν ὅρων ἔκθεσις. οἷον εἰ μηδὲν διαφέρει εἰπεῖν τὸ ὑποληπτὸν 
τοῦ δοξαστοῦ μὴ εἶναι γένος ἢ μὴ εἶναι ὅπερ ὑποληπτόν τι τὸ δοξαστόν 
(ταὐτὸν γὰρ τὸ σημαινόμενον), ἀντὶ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ λεχθέντος τὸ ὑποληπ­
τὸν καὶ τὸ δοξαστὸν ὅρους θετέον [Smith 1989, 56  : one ought also to 
only to reassure their public on the spot (cf. Topica VIII 1, 156b 20-23), but also to sound 
as little exotic as they possibly could (on Aristotle’s linguistic «  conservatism  » cf., e.g., 
Metaphysica α 3, 994b 32 - 995a 3 and Rhetorica III 2, 1404b as well as 13, 1414b 15-18). 
264 LEONE GAZZIERO
substitute things which have the same value for one another (words in place 
of words, phrases in place of phrases), whether a word or a phrase, and 
always to take the word instead of the phrase  : for the setting out of terms 
will be easier. For example, if there is no difference between saying that the 
believable is not the genus of the opinable and that what is opinable is not 
just a certain kind of believable (for what is signified is the same), then 
“believable” and “opinable” should be put as terms in place of the phrase 
stated]  ». 
As Lysias states in [T7] – and will illustrate through a remarkably 
aggressive exemplification32 – different words have the same δύναμις as 
long as they have the same meaning. Accordingly, in the eyes of the law, 
blaming someone for beating his mother or accusing him of battering the 
woman who gave him birth should not be treated differently  ; in the same 
vein, the accusation of throwing away one’s shield should carry the same 
exact weight as the reproach of abandoning or relinquishing it – why  ? 
because, even though the actual wording differs, what is referred to boils 
down to the same thing33. That is to say – with Aristotle’s [T9]34 – when-
ever the σημαινόμενον of two linguistic expressions – however different 
they are – is the same (ταὐτὸν), they have the same meaning or signify 
the same thing (ταὐτὸ δύναται). For all practical purposes, δύναμις and 
32 Lysias’ accumulation of misdeeds and misnames has a characteristic comical effect, 
as interpreters have pointed out time and again (most recently  : Todd 2007, 671-674  ; 
Colla 2012  ; Kastle 2012  ; Larran 2014  ; etc.). 
33 The linguistic tenets of Lysias’ distinction between the letter and the substance of 
the law are all the more interesting since – in [T7] – δύναμις is roughly synonymous with 
διάνοια or, at any rate, it serves the very same purpose, insofar as they are both set against 
ὄνομα and refer to what ὄνομα stands for in the mind of the speakers. A similar opposition 
between διάνοια and ὄνομα is to be found in Aristotle as well, who – notoriously – 
rejected a competing classification of fallacies according to which these are to be arranged 
in two main families which alternatively aim at the thought (διάνοια) or at its verbal 
expression (ὄνομα)  : «  οὐκ ἔστι δὲ διαφορὰ τῶν λόγων ἣν λέγουσί τινες, τὸ εἶναι τοὺς 
μὲν πρὸς τοὔνομα λόγους, ἑτέρους δὲ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν· ἄτοπον γὰρ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν 
ἄλλους μὲν εἶναι πρὸς τοὔνομα λόγους, ἑτέρους δὲ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοὺς 
αὐτούς [Hasper 2013, 25  : the distinction that some postulate between arguments does not 
exist  : that there are arguments related to the word and arguments related to the thought. 
It is absurd to suppose that some arguments are related to the word, while others are 
related to the thought, without these being the same arguments]  » (Sophistici elenchi 10, 
170b 12-16 with Hecquet 1993). 
34 For the most recent – and most detailed – survey of what analytical ἔκθεσις is about, 
cf. Crubellier, Marion, McConaughey & Rahman 2019  ; one will welcome the great nov-
elty of the novelty part and, for the benefit of the binge reader, add to the already rich 
bibliography a couple of antiquarian curiosities (Rescher & Parks 1971 and Hintikka 1978) 
and at least as many landmark studies (Mignucci 1991 and Ierodiakonou 2002). 
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σημαινόμενον – as opposed to vocal sound – may thus be treated as 
synonyms, as Aristotle does in [T8]35. 
[Urtext] warrants a similar conclusion. We use linguistic expressions 
– ὀνόματα for short36 – instead of things as their symbols. For there are 
only so many linguistic items available at any given time, it is inevitable 
that some expressions have more than one meaning. Those who ignore 
it, are likely to be preyed upon by those who are familiar with the power 
names have not so much to hurt, elate or demean as to refer indiscrimi-
nately to different things. 
* * *
proLeGomena de abaCo. Not entirely convinced  ? Aristotle himself 
must have thought that the point deserved further clarification, for he 
came up with a compelling analogy between the way we do a sum and 
the way we conduct an argument, which he used first – in [Urtext], 
165a6-10 – to explain why we labour under the delusion that, if our find-
ings sound convincingly argued for or look good on the pebble-board, 
then we must be right and then – in [Urtext], 165a 13-15 – to illustrate 
why we are likely to be taken advantage of when we lack the proper 
dialectical and computational training. How to best make sense of Aris-
totle’s comparison between the way we mishandle counters, on the one 
hand, and the way we lose our way with words, on the other  ? If the 
question is worth asking at all, it should come as no surprise that getting 
to the bottom of it will involve challenging a few entrenched ideas. It will 
also require that we either add new pieces of information or highlight 
previously neglected ones. As usual, a combination of both is what we 
need in order to explain the abacus facts behind Aristotle’s simile. Hence, 
after we bulldoze our way through a few false assumptions about ancient 
reckoning boards’ arrays and inscriptions, we’ll focus on two of its most 
35 As far as [T8] is concerned, Zanker 2016, 67 note 106 has already made the point 
abundantly clear. 
36 Characteristically, Aristotle does not burden [Urtext] with subtleties he displays 
elsewhere. In this particular instance, the distinction he makes in De interpretatione 3, 16b 
6-7 between ὀνόματα (names) and ῥήματα (verbs or predicates) – which is all the more 
understandable since, to an extent, it is a distinction in name only  : «  αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν 
καθ’ ἑαυτὰ λεγόμενα τὰ ῥήματα ὀνόματά ἐστι καὶ σημαίνει τι [by themselves and said 
for themselves, verbs are names and signify something]  » (3, 16b 20-21). See Graffi 2020, 
80-88 for a recent survey of relevant issues in Aristotle and Ademollo 2015 for a similar 
overview as far as Ancient Philosophy at large is concerned. 
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distinctive features. Whilst one (i.e. the abacus being a positional system 
through and through) holds little mystery for the educated crowd, the 
other (i.e. the abacus’ place value system being hybrid in more than one 
sense, as opposed to it being abstract and homogeneous) has not yet 
received the attention it deserves. For obvious reasons, the latter deeply 
affects our understanding of the former  : by and large, the nature of the 
abacus’ scale and arrangement determines what its positionality is all 
about. Therefore, taking it into account is likely to result in a new way 
of looking at an old problem. 
raiderS of the LoSt abaCUS. A great deal of guesswork and no small 
amount of amateurism have gone into the reconstruction of ancient 
counting boards. Another partisan review of the past and current status 
of abacus studies would only add confusion to an already confused field. 
More to the point, it would neither achieve much by itself nor shed much 
light on Aristotle’s pebble analogy. For one thing, we can hardly fall 
back on the all-too-perfunctory surveys provided in past years by non-
specialists like J.P. Pullan (who, apparently, never divulged his first 
name) or Parry Moon37. For another, we would not be better off were we 
to put our stock in recent endeavours which display more courage than 
wisdom and turn out to be highly speculative at best and very much 
mistaken at worst. Since it has a reputation as the «  most comprehen-
sive  », «  valuable  », «  timely  », etc. treatment of Greek counting boards 
and is especially praised for «  presenting an astonishingly extensive record 
of everything one can find in Ancient Greek literature on the subject  »38, 
Schärlig 2001 (Prix F. Zappa 2003) is definitely a force to be reckoned 
with39. And – no doubt – when it comes to pushing the philological 
37 Pullan 1968, 16-29  ; Moon 1971, 21-28. For all their good will and conciseness, 
there’s not much to go on here and, more to the point, very little we can actually use to 
explain Aristotle’s analogy. If we were to go all the way back and begin at the beginning, 
we would be rewarded with some fine pieces of early abacus scholarship  : Saglio 1877  ; 
Hultsch 1893  ; Nagl 1899, 1903, 1914 and 1918. Time travellers are advised to expect some 
turbulence though, especially while going through the Pritchett-Lang controversy back in 
the sixties and the fifties  : Lang 1968 (cf. already Lang 1956), 1965, 1964 and 1957  ; 
Pritchett 1968 and 1965  ; Wyatt 1964. 
38 Cf. e.g. Cuomo 2004, Ribémont 2001, Ineichen 2002 and Fromentin 2003. 
39 It would be remiss of me if I singled out Alain Schärlig for criticism and, doing so, 
I missed the wood for the tree. The truth is that, for all its exuberance, the forest that has 
outgrown Schärlig’s milestone study is of much superior quality – certainly – but, more 
often than not, it concerns itself with local (or tangential) issues  : Knoepfler 2001, 78-81  ; 
Mathé 2009  ; Marcellesi 2013, Rousset 2013  ; Doyen 2014  ; Schärlig 2014 (which is as 
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envelope as well as going against the grain, Schärlig 2001 truly is in a 
league of its own. Its conspicuous inaccuracies and preposterous sugges-
tions should give even the layman reader pause40. They certainly go a 
long way towards explaining why it has never been so tempting to refine 
the whole abacus-thing out of existence. Amongst those who think we 
should dispense with it altogether, Reviel Netz is arguably the most 
extreme, according to whom «  ultimately, the very notion of the abacus 
as a clearly defined artefact is misleading  » or, at any rate, «  designated 
abaci are less important than the skills that make them so easy to construct 
and use on an ad hoc basis  »41. Yet another case of a remedy worse than 
the disease  ? One thing is for sure  : if the abacus is not so much a mate-
rial device as a «  state of mind  », then we are simply left with nothing 
to be right or wrong about Aristotle’s analogy. In fact, for it to work, there 
must be more to manipulating the pebbles on a reckoning board than Netz’ 
mere arithmetic skills at play42. 
much about ancient accounting as it is about, say, ancient horse breeding or ancient 
swordsmanship). 
40 In the historians’ business, it is the details that sell the story and, as often as not, 
Alain Schärlig gets them wrong. Even if one leaves out the occasional misattribution 
(Schärlig 2001, 181  : Aristotle is quoted, almost chapter and verse, from a work, the Sand 
Reckoner or Ψαμμίτης (Arenarius), whose authorship is commonly ascribed to Archi-
medes) as well as the trivial embroidery (Schärlig 2001, 28  : where does the discussion 
about tides, in Alexis’ fragment 15, come from anyway  ?), literary forgery is where old 
fashioned readers usually draw the line  : what are we to make of Schärlig’s most egregious 
blunder (Schärlig 2001, 25), namely the longish and tedious (no kidding  : «  longue et 
fastidieuse  ») description of how we use fingers for numbers in the «  Esperanto of sorts  » 
Aristotle must have learned buying vegetables or whatever he was purchasing at the Athenian 
marketplace where people notoriously did business all day despite the fact they did not 
speak the same language  ? If you can’t recall where exactly Aristotle dealt with finger-
numbering and would like to find out, you’ll have to ask Schärlig himself, for he’s probably 
the only one who knows for sure. (Hunain ibn Ishaq, whose Arabic paraphrasis of the 
peripatetic physical problems Schärlig, ever the erudite, did not care to mention, would 
certainly have had a few interesting things to contribute  ; unfortunately, he’s not been 
around for a long time and – God rest his soul – did not divulge where the whole fingers 
stretching and bending digression – Problemata physica arabica XVI 2, 648.56 et sq. – came 
from). Admittedly, philological sloppiness – a venial sin, if a sin at all – is no indication as 
to whether Schärlig’s account of the ancient abacus is flawed too. We have at least a 
couple of reasons to believe it is and we’ll get there in a moment. 
41 Netz 2002a, 327, minus a «  perhaps  » at the beginning of the sentence. 
42 It might seem a bit unfair to turn tables on Reviel Netz and nit-pick him apart while 
relying – heavily at that – on his brilliant characterisation of Ancient Greek numeracy. Guilty 
as charged, Your Honour  ! we’re all in Netz’ debt and he’s most likely forgotten more about 
these matters than your average scholar is likely to ever learn. More to the point, even if he’s 
not the first (already in the late Eighties, Høyrup 1989’s notion of «  sub-scientific mathematics  » 
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So, where does this leave us  ? The long answer would be somewhere 
between a rock and a hard place, for nobody in their right mind would 
either abide by Netz’ suggestion and throw the baby out with the bath-
water or follow in Schärlig’s footsteps and throw good money after bad. 
Luckily for us, the short answer skirts the problem altogether. In fact, 
strange though it may sound, Netz’ easy way out of the predicament of 
piecing together how the ancient abacus actually worked and Schärlig’s 
headlong rush into it have more than meets the eye in common. To start 
with, they share two related, albeit mutually exclusive, misconceptions. 
The first is the odd idea that – for all practical purposes – the abacus’ 
arrangement mirrored the decimal system, its columns and rows con-
veniently matching units, tens, hundreds, thousands, etc. The second is 
the even odder idea that the inscriptions on several of the surviving abaci 
were a nuisance to the extent that, being inconsistent to a fault with the 
decimal system itself, they made actual calculations harder than they 
already were (as opposed to making them easier, as one would expect). 
The first assumption – the «  decimal bias  » (hereafter referred to as 
[baSe-10 biaS]) – is simply mistaken and betrays little or no awareness 
of the epigraphic and literary evidence. The second assumption – the 
«  booby-trapped abacus bias  » (henceforth noted [CompLiCation biaS]) – 
simply defeats the purpose of resorting to the abacus in the first place 
and betrays a poor understanding of the abacus’ practical vocation 
which, most assuredly, was not to add to the very problem it was meant 
to solve. 
parS deStrUenS (maLLeUS abaCiStarUm). Before we discard both mis-
givings, let’s dwell a little longer and in modest detail on each  :
[baSe-10 biaS]. As it will become clear through a cursory survey of 
the literary and epigraphic evidence, relevant sources and surviving abaci 
– at least those which still bear inscriptions – typically refer to non-
decimal monetary or weight values (as in «  so and so much worth of 
etc.  »). As a matter of fact, with so few exceptions as to make no differ-
ence, no known document alludes to numeric values as such in connexion 
with the abacus, let alone abstract units, their multiples or fractions. 
covered pretty much the same ground), he’s certainly taken «  Greek practical mathematics  » 
(another convenient label for roughly the same field by Asper 2003 and 2009, 108-114) to 
an all different level, starting with the «  counter culture  » pun, which – in the words of 
Giordano Bruno – «  se non è vero è molto ben trovato  ».
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Although most of the available evidence points in the opposite direction, 
Alain Schärlig and Reviel Netz take it for granted that the ancient abacus 
was the practical implement of an abstract, homogeneous calculation 
system. «  Abstract  » insofar as lines and spaces between – columns, for 
short – stood for abstract numeric digits. Or so the story goes. «  Homo-
geneous  » insofar as the abacus layout was a plain arithmetic scale, each 
column standing in the same relationship to the next and its value consist-
ently increasing – or decreasing – by the same factor  : times 10 no doubt. 
Or so the story goes again. 
Truth be told, the idea of a «  decimal abacus  » (Schärlig 2001, 182) 
is not so new. On the contrary, it is as tough as old boots, more’s the pity 
it hasn’t got a leg to stand on then. Some thirty-five years before the 
discovery of the first abacus in Salamis, Delambre 1811, 205 (a loose 
English adaptation of a French mémoire of 1807) already suggested that 
its columns stood for units, tens, hundreds and thousands. Nagl 1914, 5 
and 1918, 5 took the notion for gospel  ; as did Heath 1921, 46  ; Smith 1921, 
7-8 and 1925, 158  ; Cajori 1928, 22  ; and Thomas 1939, 35. The idea 
still lingers here (Sugden 1981  ; Vilenchik 1985  ; Swiderek 1998) and 
there (Teeuwen 2003, 353  ; Molland 2013, 517  ; Woods 2017, 419-420), 
and it will for the foreseeable future – if only because Reviel Netz lent 
it considerable credit  : 
«  the ancient Mediterranean abacus – the normal instrument for any calcu-
lation in Archimedes’ world – simply was a decimal, positional system. [...]. 
In other words, the instrument consists of a series of scratches dividing rows 
to which the calculator assigns, for the given calculation, values such as 
“units”, “fives”, “tens” and onwards  » (Netz 2003, 260  ; cf. Netz 2002a, 
326-327 and Netz 2002b, 275-276). 
[CompLiCation biaS]. If the facts don’t fit the theory, change the facts 
or, failing that, explain them away. Unlike other – more result-driven – 
scientists, historians usually deem tampering with the evidence beneath 
them. On occasion, however, all they have to offer as an explanation is 
so far-fetched that one can’t help but wonder whether they’re really any 
better off for it. This must be one of those occasions. As a matter of fact, 
it defies reason to suggest that rational people – and certainly Ancient 
Greeks were as reasonable as you and me – would knowingly mess up 
their abacus for no other reason than to make their computational routine 
more exciting. Incongruous though this is, it is precisely what a number 
of specialists fall back on when they realize that, first, it is not possible 
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– by any stretch of the imagination – to match the surviving abacus’ 
monetary (and ponderal) inscriptions with a decimal scale and, second, 
for that very reason, [baSe-10 biaS] simply cannot be defended on factual 
ground. Clutching at straws, they came up with the not so brilliant notion 
that, for all their smartness, Ancient Greeks built a flaw into their abacus 
design. Worse yet, in spite of the obvious and most unfortunate drawbacks 
(we’re talking about counting money and goods, for crying out loud), 
they never cared to fix the issue – which is, by the way, as strong an 
indication as any that there never was anything wrong with it in the first 
place. 
Lest I give the impression that I’m swinging at a strawman of my own 
construction, let him speak for himself. In the words of the greatest abacist 
of recent times  : 
«  to begin with, let it be known that one talent was worth six thousand 
drachmas. As a result, Ancient Greeks did not pass from thousands to tens 
of thousands  ; on the contrary, they went from thousands to sixains of thou-
sands. This was a breach of the base-10 routine and a pitfall on the abacus. 
[…]. More departures from the base-10 norm (and, consequently, more traps 
on the abacus  !), below the drachma this time  : one drachma was worth six 
obols and one obol was worth eight coppers  » (Schärlig 2001, 47). 
With friends like that, who needs enemies  ? If we were to follow Schär-
lig’s reconstruction, we would end up with more misleading symbols on 
the abacus’ edges than dependable ones – which is downright absurd or 
«  it is not a bug, it is a feature  » kind of hilarious (truly, some things 
never change  !). Why on earth – if you don’t mind my asking – would 
anyone have suffered to be misled more often than not when he laid eyes 
on the abacus  ? Because this is precisely what would happen if a good 
half of the abacus’ inscriptions turned out to be at odds with its alleged 
computational standard. 
Truth be told again, the idea of a counting board riddled with «  com-
plications  » (Schärlig 2001, 182, 208) is not that new either. Quite the 
opposite, its pedigree is as old as the first recorded archaeological dis-
covery, for Alexandros Rizos Rangavis – who described the Salamis 
abacus as early as 1846 – was well aware that the inscriptions it bears 
are acrophonic symbols of sorts, yet he could not make out how they 
were supposed to make it easier to work with numbers  : «  we don’t know 
much about such boards. That being said, if we are to believe that their 
arrangement was meant to help with arithmetical operations, then our 
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slab does not seem to have served such purpose in the least  » (Rangabé 
1846, 297)43. And rightly so, one might add, at least as long as our focus 
is on «  arithmetical operations  » as such rather than on the more special-
ized calculations we’ll bring into the picture later on44. Unsurprisingly, 
classicists and historians of mathematics did not think much of the Sala-
mis abacus. They occasionally dismissed it as a crude approximation of 
what a proper reckoning board should look like (Nagl 1918, 6), and – for 
lack of a better one (which, of course, no one is going to dig up any time 
soon) – they came to the rather disheartening conclusion that «  the Greeks, 
in fact, had little need of the abacus for calculations  » (Heath 1921, 51), 
thank you very much  ! 
43 Rizos Rangavis made the exact same point a few years later (cf. Rangabé 1855, 
590), as though Jean Antoine Letronne’s answer (Letronne 1846) and Alexandre Joseph 
Hidulphe Vincent’s comments (Vincent 1846) in the meanwhile had been to little or no 
avail and had left him as unconvinced as he was to start with. Unless we break the mould, 
history is going to repeat itself, eventually. Abacus studies are no exception and the Laurion 
specimen (Laurion Museum, 90) presents us with a later – and slightly more complicated – 
example of the same conundrum. Although West 1992b made short work of Themelis 
1989 allegation that the abacus inscription was a musical notation of sorts, he could not 
make out why the abacus’ numerical symbols did not follow a tidy numerical pattern. 
«  They do not continue the mathematical series correctly  », he complained, «  1/2 = 0.5, 
but then we ought to have 1/20 = 0.05, and in the second line 1 ought to be followed by 
1/10 and 1/100. However, they do seem to represent an attempt to continue the series with 
successively smaller fractions. The sage has simply used symbols current for subdivisions 
of the drachma and obol, going down to the minimal chalkous (X), instead of being fas-
tidious in his arithmetic and having to find notations for unfamiliar fractions  » (West 
1992b, 27-28). Either I am much mistaken or this whole talk about discontinued or incor-
rect numerical series is completely off-target. If the Laurion abacus – as well as several 
others – is inscribed with the subsequence «  1 drachma, 3 obols (= a half-drachma), 1 obol, 
4 coppers (= a half-obol), 1 copper  », this was no coincidence – it was no mistake either, 
nor the whim of a poorly trained individual  : it simply speaks volumes in favour of 
the commercial and financial nature of the abacus assisted operations, in fact transactions 
(I definitely side with Spuridês 1993, 66-72 on this one). 
44 Chiesa 1991, 226-236 paved the way for this line of approach with his translation 
(p. 226  : «  nous supposons que ce qui se passe dans les mots se passe aussi dans les choses 
comme il arrive à ceux qui comptent les suffrages en utilisant des cailloux  ») and focus 
on «  vote counting  » rather than calculation at large (p. 228  : «  there is an analogy between 
the sophistical understanding of language and the process of vote casting, where pebbles 
allow voters to make their electoral choices known  »). We’ll show that this cannot possibly 
be the kind of specialized reckoning Aristotle – who, by the way, was perfectly familiar 
with the role counters and court abaci played in juridical and political voting procedures – 
had in mind. Nevertheless, even if Chiesa 2013, 53-59 will give up on it later on, his 
original effort to pin down the precise notion of computation involved in Aristotle’s sim-
ile is instrumental in getting its meaning right. 
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Despite Schärlig’s brave effort, the whole concept might have been 
conveniently left to wither on the vine, had Reviel Netz not revived it, in 
rather a bold fashion at that  : 
«  for the abacus, one should note a complication – actually a rather minor 
one. As was already seen for obols and drachmas (and as is largely true for 
the higher denominations, minas and talants), the units involved do not fall 
into a simple decimal pattern, etc.  » (Netz 2002a, 332). 
Reviel Netz should have left it at that and let people trust him implic-
itly – as did Schärlig, who never bothered to ask why deviant inscriptions 
are the rule and regular ones are the exception (odd, isn’t it  ?). But the 
more brilliant a scholar, the more likely he is to forget that it is not an 
honest mistake that gets him into trouble – nay, it is the fancy footwork 
to fix it or to cover it up that does the damage. I’ll have to call Mr Netz 
on this one, albeit reluctantly, and use his poor excuse for an explanation 
as a case in point. Let’s go through his steps and see what happens  : 
«  the reason for this complicated pattern lies outside Greek history  : coin 
denominations are parasitic upon earlier weight systems which go back to 
the Ancient Near East. For obvious reasons, such metrological systems are 
extraordinarily conservative, and even today it takes enormous efforts by 
governments to effect conversions into decimal systems. Thus, all Ancient 
Mediterranean metrological systems ultimately derived from Mesopotamian 
temples, whose arithmetical culture was perhaps the most sophisticated the 
world has ever known. The peoples of the Mediterranean had to cope some-
how with a numerical system designed by highly trained scribes, masters of 
sexagesimal operations  » (Netz 2002a, 332). 
So far so good, even if the Babylonian connection strikes me as a 
trifle too straightforward to be taken at face value. That being said, since 
the ultimate origin of the non-decimal abacus’ layout has no immediate 
bearing on the issue at hand, there’s no harm in taking Netz’ word for it. 
Which leaves us with the real question – namely how did all this come 
to affect the ancient abacus  ? And therein, as the Bard would have it, lies 
the rub  : 
«  [a] this of course would make calculations somewhat difficult, but coin 
and weight calculations were effected by exactly the same [333] methods 
as purely arithmetical calculations. [b] Perhaps, in fact, this is why the abacus 
tended to be unmarked. An unmarked series of lines could serve equally 
well to represent “fives”, “tens”, “fifties”, etc., or, say, “obols”, “drach-
mas”, “ten-drachmas”, “minas”, etc. [c] Several literary references to the 
abacus envisage just that, while some of the numerical markings on the 
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edges of abaci belong to this family of symbols. [d] All one needed to do 
was to adjust, mentally, to the correct equivalences between neighbouring 
lines – and one had enormous experience with such equivalences, in daily 
economic life  » (Netz 2002a, 332-333). 
First things first, no literary reference – known to me – suggests, let 
alone implies, that unmarked abaci were more fashionable than marked 
ones ([b]  : «  the abacus tended to be unmarked  »). In fact, there might 
be more of these (inscribed abaci) than a conservative estimate allows. 
Inscriptions were either engraved, and therefore permanent, or painted. 
A few traces of such temporary inscriptions still survive as in the case of 
the painted columns of a Corinthian abacus (SEG XI 188) used for public 
accounting during the Hellenistic period (cf. Donati 2010, 10a and 21a). 
Of course, we cannot make much out of it, but it stands to reason to 
assume that ephemeral inscriptions bore more of the same and that they 
too were pecuniary in nature and purpose45. Again, no literary reference 
– known to me – suggests, let alone implies, that one had to shift – how-
ever easily – between decimal and non-decimal systems ([c] referring 
back to [b]  : «  “fives”, “tens”, “fifties”, etc., or, say, “obols”, “drach-
mas”, “ten-drachmas”, “minas”, etc.  »). In fact – with one possible 
exception46 – ancient Greek sources consistently stuck to the monetary 
standard and to the monetary standard alone. 
45 The argument’s circularity notwithstanding, the fact remains that there are a few 
more surviving abaci with monetary markings without columns than the other way around 
– and this should be telling. That being said, I’m afraid I’ll have to concede a stalemate 
here. 
46 Euripidis (quod fertur) Rhesus, 309-313  : «  στρατοῦ δὲ πλῆθος οὐδ’ ἂν ἐν ψήφου 
λόγῳ θέσθαι δύναι’ ἄν, ὡς ἄπλατον ἦν ἰδεῖν, πολλοὶ μὲν ἱππῆς, πολλὰ πελταστῶν 
τέλη, πολλοὶ δ’ ἀτράκτων τοξόται, πολὺς δ’ ὄχλος γυμνὴς ἁμαρτῇ, Θρῃκίαν ἔχων 
στολήν [Kovacs 2002, 387  : you could not count his host even by reckoning with pebbles, 
so ungraspable was it. Many were the cavalry, many the companies of shield bearers, 
many the shooters of arrows, and many the light troops in Thracian gear]  ». The wording 
ἐν ψήφου λόγῳ θέσθαι is unusual (even a bit awkward as suggested by Fraenkel 1965, 
238 and, more recently, by Liapis 2012, 147 and Fries 2014, 233), but the reference to the 
counters «  positioned  » on the abacus is transparent enough. Still, the Messenger’s allu-
sion to accurate calculation by means of pebbles does not give us the first clue as to how 
the ancient abacus worked. For all we know, the hyperbole might just as well be under-
stood as a reminder of the large amounts of currency abacus assisted calculations could 
easily handle (contrary to what some seem to believe – most notably Fait 1996, 186 quoted 
below – there’s no reason to assume that ancient Greeks expected their reckoning boards 
to compute infinite sums and products). Just the same, it is only reasonable to think that 
pebbles did stand here for soldiers and units of soldiers. As a result, an unmarked abacus 
or a decimal engraved one – if it ever existed – would have done the job nicely – as one 
274 LEONE GAZZIERO
Be that as it may, it is the whole notion that the abacus’ numerical 
markings made calculations somewhat more difficult ([a]) and required 
of the user constant mental adjustment ([d]) that is asinine and should be 
dismissed, full stop. To begin with, it makes no practical sense whatso-
ever  : what’s the point of using an abacus in the first place if you end up 
taking your calculations mentally off the board  ? Money and weight cal-
culations follow the exact same rules as purely arithmetical ones – fair 
enough. Now, try to preach the virtues of cognitive recalibration to a 
busy bunch of fishmongers, slave-traders and moneylenders working out 
monthly rates of interest or haggling over the price of anchovies and 
Phrygian beauties. More to the point, try to convince them that they are 
supposed to «  adjust, mentally, to the correct equivalences between 
neighbouring lines  » at the exact moment they’re taking care of their 
main priority, namely getting paid. Chances are that all you’re going to 
get is a colourful suggestion about where your mental gymnastics with 
recalcitrant notations belongs. Serious people doing serious business have 
a lot on their minds as it is  ; the last thing they need is another aggrava-
tion, as if disloyal competitors and stingey customers did not make their 
life miserable enough. Why in the world should they let constant mental 
catching-up get in the way when all they need to do is to look at the 
markings on the edges of the abacus  ? You do not mentally adjust when 
what you see is what you get (or what your customer thinks he gets) and, 
to be sure, honest businessmen (and dishonest ones too, especially the 
fishmongers) would not have it any other way. 
All in all, it makes a lot more sense to think of the abacus’ monetary 
inscriptions the other way around. It is not so much that they demanded 
mental adjustment each time calculators had to pretend that counters in a 
given column stood for some other value or arithmetical ratio than those 
spelled out in capital letters under their eyes. In fact, it is just the opposite  : 
abacus’ monetary inscriptions saved people the trouble of compensating 
for decimal discrepancies between neighbouring (and not so neighbour-
ing) columns. Instead of calling for extra-attention at every turn – which 
is a sheer waste of time and energy to no particular avail – the inscriptions 
can gather from Porter 1916, 60-61. Since it is immaterial for my purpose and I have very 
little to contribute anyway, I will not bring up the topic of the work’s authorship, which 
– as early as Ritchie 1964 and without interruption ever since – has been debated to quite 
a remarkable extent (see Manousakis & Stamatatos 2018 for a recent status quaestionis 
and an interesting combination of traditional and non-traditional authorship analysis). 
 LEAVING NO PEBBLE UNTURNED IN SOPHISTICI ELENCHI, 1 275
were put there for exactly the opposite reason  : that is, to spare people the 
hassle of wrapping their heads around the most common operations involv-
ing different ratios (times eight, six, five, twelve, sixty, and of course times 
ten – in whatever order the reckoning at hand called for). After all, it is 
easy enough to count numbers, even big numbers, as long as they stand in 
the same relationship (say, a neat decimal one). It is a whole different story 
to make out figures, even small ones, as soon as they run across scales 
(say, coppers, half-obols, obols, drachmas, staters, minas or talents). Reason 
enough, methinks, to drop the idea of a flawed abacus altogether. Ancient 
Greeks knew better than to play havoc with their everyday tools. All things 
considered, it is past time we acknowledge that abacus’ inscriptions are 
not so much part of the problem as they are part of the solution. If nothing 
else, we’ll stop embarrassing ourselves trying to play them down. More to 
the point, as soon as we do away with the silly notion that abacus’ inscrip-
tions were a liability, we may start using them as the asset they were in 
order to figure out how the ancient abacus operated and what purpose did 
it actually serve. But before we turn to the literary and epigraphic evidence 
which has only been hinted at so far, there’s at least one question we 
should not leave unanswered – two in fact  : what do all these biases have 
in common and, more important still, how do they hinder our understand-
ing of why, exactly, Aristotle brought words and counters together in the 
prologue of the Sophistici elenchi  ? 
hoW did it Come to thiS (and Why doeS it matter)  ? For all their 
differences and nuances, contemporary views on ancient counting boards 
labour under the same basic assumption and, as a consequence, they 
share the same shortcomings  : 
– on the one hand, once pebble-boards are equated with a «  state of 
mind  » and the abacus functions as a catchword for the maths rather 
than the reckoning skills required to operate it  ; 
– on the other hand, when the admittedly meagre epigraphic and literary 
evidence is either simply ignored or summarily laid aside  ; 
⸫ in both cases, it becomes all too easy to lose sight of the abacus’ hybrid 
nature and to conceive it in a rather abstract way, namely as if it were 
the material transcription of a plain arithmetic system (further on 
abbreviated as [arithmetiCaL biaS]).
Despite being almost universally accepted – most notably, among Aris-
totelian scholars who adopted it wholesale – such a view is misleading. 
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At the very least, it calls for qualification – or so we claim. This will be 
provided shortly, along the lines of a more specialized notion of abacus 
computation, involving first and foremost monetary calculations (ordinary 
currency conversions, routine accounting, everyday merchant transac-
tions and the like) – which only makes sense, considering that, in ancient 
sources, the abacus is most commonly associated with counting money. 
(A fact that has been completely overlooked by Aristotelian commenta-
tors so far). 
How is it then that [arithmetiCaL biaS] is so popular and comes so 
naturally to us that we take it for granted instead of asking ourselves 
whether it isn’t, after all, just another way of looking at the facts of the 
matter  ? As with every issue worth discussing, the question brings its 
own answer along with it  : there’s nothing more compelling in the tradi-
tional picture than our need to deal with things on familiar terms. More 
to the point, we don’t realize that there’s more to Aristotle’s analogy than 
the arithmetical routine of adding, dividing, multiplying and subtracting 
(in whatever order and combination) simply because we’ve always 
looked at it that way. As a matter of fact, Aristotle’s comparison between 
linguistic expressions and pebbles has largely been understood – or, 
rather, misunderstood – as if being skilled at moving the counters around 
boiled down to having a knack for arithmetical calculation as such. A page 
from Agostino Nifo’s book – an impressive piece of Aristotelian scholar-
ship in its own right, especially when it comes to familiarity with both 
Eastern and Western Aristotelian commentators47 – is as good a landmark 
as any and better than most. As a matter of fact, it epitomizes the view 
that had long become the standard story in the Latin and the Byzantine 
traditions alike, and convincingly passed it down to generations to 
come48  : 
[T10] Augustini Niphi expositiones in libros De sophisticis elenchis, 6ra  : 
«  “qUemadmodUm iGitUr et iLLiC, qUi non SUnt idonei CaLCULoS SUbStinere, 
47 While interest in Agostino Nifo as an Aristotelian commentator has steadily grown 
in recent years (though a trifle grandiloquent, Pattin 1991’s title has a ring of truth to it  ; 
more eloquently, De Bellis 2005 welcomed Nifo amongst Aristotelian interpreters who 
have achieved book-length bibliography status) – apart from a few exceptions (e.g. Ash-
worth 1976 and De Bellis 1997) – stakes in his logical production have not paid many 
dividends, yet. 
48 the trUth and nothinG bUt the trUth – yet not the WhoLe trUth. Whoever 
happens to be interested in the full story – including the edition of all the relevant sections 
in the Latin commentary tradition as well as a tribute to its unsung heroes (most notably, 
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a SCientibUS deCipiUntUr et ipSi diSpUtanteS et aLioS aUdienteS”. Epilo-
gat ea quae dixit et dicit  : “qUemadmodUm iGitUr et iLLiC”, scilicet in 
supputationibus “qUi non SUnt idonei CaLCULoS SUbStinere” ut sunt 
numerandi scientiae imperiti, “a SCientibUS” artem numerandi “deCipiUn-
tUr” scilicet in supputationibus et subaudi ita etiam “ipSi diSpUtanteS” qui 
opponunt “et aLioS aUdienteS” qui scilicet respondent, subaudi decipiuntur 
cum ignoraverint virtutes nominum ab iis qui eas sciunt [“jUSt Like thoSe 
Who are not Good at CaLCULationS, thoSe <who have little knowledge 
of the power of words> are deCeived by the expertS both When they 
partake in a diSCUSSion and When they LiSten <to one>”. Aristotle reca-
pitulates what he has previously stated and says  : “JUSt aS in the CaSe of”, 
namely just like with computations, “thoSe Who are not Good at makinG 
CaLCULationS”, insofar as they are ignorant of the science of reckoning, 
“are deCeived” namely <are deceived> when they calculate, “by thoSe 
Who maSter” the science of reckoning, the same happens – understand – to 
those “partakinG in a diSCUSSion” – engaged, that is, in opposing <an 
argument>  ; as well as to those who are “LiSteninG” or play the role of 
those who answer <to the former’s questions>, for – understand – they are 
deceived because they know little about the power of words and, for that 
reason, are taken in by those who know how this power works]  ». 
The fact that modern commentators have reached divergent – in fact, 
opposite – conclusions about the nature and purpose of Aristotle’s pebble 
analogy should not prevent us from looking at their differences as vari-
ables bound to the same constant. As a matter of fact, [arithmetiCaL 
biaS] is so embedded in the fabric of contemporary understandings of 
Aristotle’s simile that one simply has to tug at the thread to see their 
alleged variety unravel to reveal a common pattern. Admittedly, analysis 
grids – even broad and compelling ones – are a dime a dozen. This par-
ticular one, however, delivers more than the usual bang for your buck. If 
nothing else, because it comes with a routine check – provided by the 
text itself49 – which allows to set different readings at variance (insofar as 
the Anonymus Bavaricus and William of Ockham, who got the analogy just about right, 
pebbles and all  !) – will have to wait for the mediaeval instalment of the saga (Gazziero 
forthcoming).
49 There are, of course, exceptions to every rule, and [«  τὸ δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅμοιον  » 
teSt] has a few of its own. These are hard to come by, however, and they are best 
accounted for as people taking liberties with the text or relying on gross mistranslations. 
As for the former (exegetical liberties), cf. e.g. Rescher 2006, 108  : «  The Inexhaustibility 
of Fact. The point is that there is every reason to think that language cannot keep up with 
reality’s realm of actual existence. And this important point is not all that new. For the 
unbridgeable gulf between language and reality was already noted by Aristotle  : “It is 
impossible in a discussion to bring in the actual things discussed  : we use their names as 
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their conclusions are actually at odds) while laying bare their fundamental 
symbol instead, and we suppose that what obtains in the names obtains in the things as 
well… But the two cases are not alike. For names are finite and so are their combinations, 
while things are infinite in number. Inevitably, then, the same words, and a single name, 
have a number of meanings” (Aristotle, Sophistici elenchi, 165a 5-13). The crux is that 
facts need not be exhausted by truths, etc.  »… so much for the analogy between names 
and counters. That being said, it is pretty clear how Nicolas Rescher tested as far as [«  τὸ 
δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅμοιον  » teSt] is concerned. Truth be told, he wasn’t the first to go down 
that road – Lugarini 1963, 332 had already deconstructed the text in similar fashion. He 
won’t be the last either – Wey 2014, 324 cut Rolfes 1925’s translation of Aristotle’s text 
along the very same lines and read it accordingly  : «  man kann beim Disputieren nicht die 
Dinge selbst hernehmen, sondern gebraucht statt ihrer, als ihre Zeichen, die Worte. […]. 
Aber hier fehlt die Gleichheit usw.  »  ; as does Cosci 2014, 349 with Zanatta 1995’s  : 
«  poiché non è possibile discutere adducendo le cose stesse, ma ci serviamo dei nomi 
come di simboli in luogo delle cose, riteniamo che quel che accade per i nomi accada 
anche per le cose, […]. Ma la somiglianza non sussiste etc.  »). As for the latter (i.e., 
mistranslations), cf. e.g. Walz 2006, 244  : «  an analogy that Aristotle makes in Sophistical 
Refutations may be helpful for grasping the significance of this latter point. He says  : “For 
one cannot discuss by bringing in the things themselves, but we use names as symbols 
instead of the things, and we suppose that what follows about the names follows also about 
the things, just as those who calculate suppose about their pebbles. But it is not alike. For 
names and the quantity of calculations are limited, whereas things are unlimited in number. 
It is necessary, then, that the same calculation and one name signify for many”  ». Even 
if one disregards the rather infelicitous rendering of «  πλείω σημαίνειν  » («  signify for 
many  », as opposed to the more sensible «  have a number of meanings  » or «  signify 
several things  »), whatever λόγος means in [Urtext], 165a 11-13 – and we haven’t heard 
the last of the feud between those who understand it as «  account  » or «  definition  », on 
the one hand, and those who understand it as «  sentence  » or «  utterances  », on the other 
hand – it surely does not stand for «  calculation  ». If, this late in the game, one still feels 
like asking why, I’m not sure he or she would understand the answer anyway. Even if it 
is hardly part of their job description any more, a few modern translators have gone 
beyond and, in a few cases, above the call of duty and have made it plain where their 
sympathies lay. Forster 1955, 13, for one, sided with the most traditional view. His trans-
lation of [Urtext] reads  : «  for, since it is impossible to argue by introducing the actual 
things under discussion, but we use names as symbols in the place of the things, we think 
that what happens in the case of the names happens also in the case of the things, just as 
people who are counting think in the case of their counters. But the cases are not really 
similar  ; for names and a quantity of terms are finite, whereas things are infinite in num-
ber  ; and so the same expression and the single name must necessarily signify a number 
of things. As, therefore, in the above illustration, those who are not clever at managing 
the counters are deceived by the experts, in the same way in arguments also those who 
are unacquainted with the power of names are the victims of false reasoning, both when 
they are themselves arguing and when they are listening to others  ». Forster’s choice of 
words («  in the case of things  », «  in the case of counters  », «  but the cases are not really 
similar  ») strongly suggests that he understood the «  τὸ δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅμοιον  » clause as 
if Aristotle were opposing how we use words, on the one hand, and how we use counters, 
on the other hand  ; that is to say, along the lines of a fundamental lack of similarity 
between the two. Pickard-Cambridge 1928, 535-536, for another, provided extra clarity 
by spelling out what is what in «  τὸ δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅμοιον  », that is «  names  » and 
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agreement (insofar as they are, in reality, committed to the same underly-
ing assumption). 
[«  Τὸ δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅμοιον  » teSt]. Whoever skims – however curso-
rily – through [Urtext] and the relevant literature, will acknowledge that 
there is no way around the puzzling «  τὸ δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅμοιον [but this 
is not the same]  » (165a 10) Aristotle squeezed between the first mention 
of those who manipulate the counters for reckoning purposes and the 
main reason why those who use words for the sake of arguments should 
not trust them at every turn. As usual, – barring the occasional reader too 
clever for his own good (and anyone else’s) – everybody agrees that 
Aristotle’s reasoning ties up nicely. How it is so, however, is a matter of 
some controversy. In a nutshell  : how much stock did Aristotle put in his 
own simile  ? Are we to take him at his word – «  καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν 
ψήφων  » (165a 9-10), «  τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων  » (165a 
15) – and understand the analogy literally (linguistic expressions are to 
argumentation as counters are to abacus calculation, hence the way we 
mishandle the latter sheds some light on how we misuse the former)  ? 
Or, should we assume that computational and linguistic symbols work at 
cross purposes and the analogy is to be understood as if it meant the oppo-
site (linguistic expressions and counters simply don’t get along, hence 
how we put the latter to good use when we work figures out may cast 
some light on how the former let us down when we argue)  ? 
[diSanaLoGy vieW]  : too many ChipS, not enoUGh WordS. Despite 
being counterintuitive, the idea that Aristotle mentioned abacus’ tokens in 
order to explain how linguistic items do not work, rather than the other way 
«  things  »  : «  it is impossible in a discussion to bring in the actual things discussed  : we 
use their names as symbols instead of them  ; and therefore we suppose that what follows 
in the names, follows in the things as well, just as people who calculate suppose in regard 
to their counters. But the two cases (names and things) are not alike. For names are finite 
and so is the sum-total of formulae, while things are infinite in number. Inevitably, then, 
the same formulae, and a single name, have a number of meanings. Accordingly, just as, 
in counting, those who are not clever in manipulating their counters are taken in by the 
experts, in the same way in arguments too those who are not well acquainted with the 
force of names misreason both in their own discussions and when they listen to others  » 
(Barnes 1984 will undo Pickard-Cambridge’s efforts, for the revised translation reads  : 
«  but the two cases are not alike. For names are finite etc.  » – one step forward, two steps 
back). For all that Jules Tricot’s French translation usually does not look its best when 
compared to more recent endeavours, it is only fair to acknowledge that, in this particu-
lar instance, it definitely stands comparison  : «  or, entre noms et choses, il n’y a pas de 
ressemblance complète  : les noms sont en nombre limité, ainsi que la pluralité des défini-
tions, tandis que les choses sont infinies en nombre etc.  » (Tricot 1939, 3).
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around, has been remarkably successful. As a matter of fact, it has held 
sway amongst Aristotelian pundits since forever. It has also resonated with 
historians of linguistic theories and linguists alike, most notably through 
the corollary that calculations, as opposed to arguments, enjoy a direct, 
indeed a one-to-one relationship with what they are calculations about. 
Norman Kretzmann expounded [diSanaLoGy vieW] very concisely 
– and very effectively – in his mainstream «  History of Semantics  »50  : 
«  ambiguity, Aristotle maintained, is theoretically unavoidable, [363] for 
since “names and the sum-total of formulas [λόγοι] are finite while things 
are infinite in number… the same formula and a single name must neces-
sarily signify a number of things”. This will, however, give us no trouble 
unless “we think that what happens in the case of the names happens also 
in the case of the things, as people who are counting think of their counters”, 
which are in a one-to-one correspondence with the things counted (Sophis-
tical Refutations 165a 5)  » (Kretzmann 1967, 362-363). 
In so many words, he claims that people who reckon have good reason 
to think that the result of their calculations obtains out there, whereas those 
who use words instead of pebbles have little reason to be that confident. 
And – before you ask – pebble-pushers are usually right and word-spin-
ners aren’t because pebbles stand in a one-to-one relationship with the 
things they count, whereas words do not stand in so straightforward a 
relationship with the things they mean. Explanations in the same vein 
have achieved, on occasion, comparable accuracy and terseness51. They 
50 Since we have already dealt with the minutiae of the text, there’s no point in taking 
up again for discussion the curious claim that Aristotle’s homonymy results from the fact 
that the same name and the same definition applies to a number of things, a rather straight-
forward consequence of translating λόγος in [Urtext], 165a 13 as if it meant «  formula  » 
or «  account  » rather than «  sentence  » or «  statement  ». Only one thing worth noting 
here. Even though Norman Kretzmann was not, by far, the only one to operate under this 
particular delusion, he should have known better, given his impeccable credentials as a 
mediaevalist. As a matter of fact, neither Michael of Ephesus nor Latin commentators 
thought for one second that Aristotle could possibly be referring to ordinary names and 
definitions here. Robert of Hautecombe, for instance, made it pretty clear that  : «  et si 
dicatur quod illae nominantur nomine communi, non propter hoc sequitur nomen esse 
aequivocum quamvis unum nomen commune plures res comprehendat [and if one were 
to say that those things are named by means of a common name, it does not follow that, 
because of that, the name is equivocal, even if each common name refers to a plurality of 
things]  » (Commentarium in Sophisticos Elenchos, 136ra / 2va). Mediaeval Aristotelians 
knowing their business and all, no one ever bothered to make the same point about for-
mulae or accounts. 
51 No doubt, Michel Foucault and Louis-André Dorion achieved both, which – Fou-
cault being Foucault and Dorion being Dorion – is hardly surprising  : «  <the difference 
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may even exhibit a higher degree of technicality, but the outcome is 
pretty much the same  : what sets counters apart from words is that they 
are mere embodiments of abstract computational operands (units, tens, 
hundreds, thousands, etc.) which are dealt with in accordance with abstract 
computational rules (basic operations and ratios). 
Italian scholars have been particularly fond of this narrative, which 
they have perfected over the years52. 
Antonino Pagliaro – one of the very first to see the merits of the «  τὸ 
δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅμοιον  » proviso53 – set the tone in the early Sixties. He 
drove home a peculiar but telling point  : that is, «  Aristotle sets forth a 
clear-cut distinction between the language of numbers and the language of 
spoken words  » (Pagliaro 1962, 45)54. He argued – on a general principle – 
between names and things> consists in the fact that there is a finite number of names and 
an infinite number of things, that there is a relative scarcity of words  ; that we cannot 
establish a bi-univocal relation between words and things. In short, the relation between 
words and what they designate is not isomorphic to the relation that enables one to count  » 
(Foucault 1971, 44) – «  (ad 165a 3) the case of the names we use instead of things is not 
exactly similar or even analogue to the case of the pebbles we use when we reckon. 
Because, for a reason Aristotle will introduce immediately afterwards, between words and 
things there’s not the one-to-one relationship there is between counters and the unities 
constitutive of numbers  » (Dorion 1995, 206). Others achieved a poetic concision of sorts, 
most notably Larkin 1971, 10  : «  the reason for using names is that we cannot calculate 
with the things themselves  »… whatever that means. 
52 Precursors (and outsiders) rather than epigones will be our main concern here (with 
one exception  : Pagliaro’s clone mentioned below, note 54). Accordingly, we’ll not touch 
upon more recent avatars of [diSanaLoGy]. Amongst others, Gusmani 1993, 111 and 2004, 
155  ; Lo Piparo 2003, 183-186 (the section’s heading says it all though  : «  Le parole non 
sono sassolini  »)  ; Sorio 2009, 301  ; Gusmani & Quadrio 2018, 58. 
53 Picking a quarrel with McKeon 1947’s translation  : «  the two cases (of names and 
things), however, are not alike, for names are finite as is the sum-total of assertions, while 
things are infinite in number  » – which in our book is as good a translation as it gets and 
counts as two strikes («  names and things  », strike one, and «  sum-total of assertions  » strike 
two) – Pagliaro 1962, 45 note 11 sensed that much was at stake here  : «  according to this 
reading the dissimilarity implied by the τὸ δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅμοιον refers to an opposition 
between words and things, whereas we understand it as a dismissal of our belief (ἡγού­
μεθα συμβαίνειν) that what goes for words also goes for things, just like it happens with 
numbers, and the pebbles which stand for them, for they both refer directly to things  ». 
54 Di Cesare 1981a made the same exact point some twenty years later  : «  most nota-
bly, Aristotle sets verbal language and numeric language apart  » – all the more reason to 
put them in the same bag, considering that her main arguments are the same (Pagliaro 
1962 is suitably mentioned twice p. 23 note 6 and, more to the point, p. 24 note 8), almost 
to the letter (Pagliaro 1962, 45-46  : «  differenza netta tra il linguaggio dei numeri e il 
linguaggio fonico  », «  l’uno e l’altro non operano direttamente con gli oggetti partico-
lari  », «  nel rapporto tra il numero e le cose vi è un rapporto fisso, nel senso che il numero, 
applicandosi esclusivamente all’aspetto puramente quantitativo del reale, opera secondo 
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that numbers and their symbolic counterparts match things, no matter 
how many there are out there. Words, on the contrary, as made perfectly 
clear by Aristotle, are always in short supply. In addition, he resorted to 
an enthralling example to back up such claim  : 
«  clearly, the difference between those who speak and those who count or 
reckon with pebbles (the affinity between the two does not extend any fur-
ther than the fact that neither deal directly with the things themselves) 
consists in the fact that, as far as numbering is concerned, symbols and 
things are in a straightforward relationship with one another – one pebble 
stands for one book, two pebbles for two books. On the contrary, language 
makes use of signs, which – as such – have a remarkable latitude when it 
comes to meaning something. As a matter of fact, linguistic signs refer to 
concrete objects which they determine both through connotation and exten-
sion  : e.g., not only the word “book” can be used for books whose shape 
and content may differ, but it can also refer to one, two, three books or all 
of them (for we say: “the book contributes to the dissemination of culture”). 
Fallacies arise from within the scope of such meaning, understood as a 
concept  » (Pagliaro 1962, 46). 
Sure enough, Antonino Pagliaro’s take on Aristotle’s homonymy and 
its origin was way off the mark  : whether conceptual or not, the unity of 
meaning of the word «  book  » has nothing to fear from the fact that it 
stands not only for all kinds of books but also for all quantities thereof 
– one, two, three or the whole lot of them for that matter, needless to 
say  : in whatever shape, size and content they come. That being said, what 
Pagliaro lacked in Aristotelian orthodoxy and, arguably, in semantic insight 
tout court, he made up for in critical acumen, for his appreciation of the 
exegetical options available, as well as his preference for the idea that 
pebbles and words have next to nothing in common, were to shape later 
readers’ views starting with the decision about what side of the [«  τὸ δ’ οὐκ 
ἔστιν ὅμοιον  »] fence it is better to be sitting on. 
determinazioni ben stabilite  », «  nella numerazione concreta il rapporto del simbolo con 
la cosa è diretto, nel senso che il legame sul piano dell’estensione è univoco  », «  nel caso 
del linguaggio si opera con segni, che per sé hanno una grande latitudine connotativa e 
all’oggetto concreto si applicano, attraverso una duplice determinazione, connotativa e 
estensiva  », etc.  ; Di Cesare 1981a, 22-24  : «  distinzione tra linguaggio verbale e linguag-
gio numerico  », «  entrambi usano simboli al posto di degli oggetti particolari  », «  il 
numero ha un rapporto univoco con l’oggetto, dato che tale rapporto è determinato quan-
titativamente e perciò è fisso  », «  il nome che possiede una grande latitudine connotativa, 
si riferisce all’oggetto concreto attraverso una determinazione connotativa e denotativa  », 
etc.) – more of the same in Di Cesare 1981b, 16-20. 
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Walter Belardi took up where Antonino Pagliaro left off without adding 
much new, except for the fancy «  onomata  : pragmata = psêphoi  : prag-
mata  » proportion – a flawed one at that, as it turns out  : 
«  while “psêphoi  : pragmata” may be interpreted as a one-to-one (1:1) 
relationship, insofar as there are as many pebbles or calculi as there are things 
they stand for (it is a numerical representation, that is to say a reckoning), 
“onomata  : pragmata” is a different kind of relationship altogether, insofar 
as it is a one-to-many relationship (1:n, where n stands for a whole number 
whatsoever). From a “linguistic” point of view, a single sign, for instance 
the word “man”, stands for infinite men (it is a symbolic representation, 
that is to say a word). Accordingly, “psêphoi  : pragmata” is a relationship 
where quantity is identical  ; on the other hand, “onomata  : pragmata” is 
a relationship where quantity differs and is indeterminate, indeed undetermi-
nable because of the infinite latitude of things the name applies to, insofar as 
it can refer to whichever of the infinite (or, more accurately, the infinite 
number of possible) homogeneous individuals it stands for by virtue of the 
abstract generic notion these individuals amount to  » (Belardi 1975, 141-
142 = Belardi 1976, 83). 
It appears that Walter Belardi too took a wrong turn somewhere, for 
there’s no way a word can get us in trouble for just referring to multiple 
individuals of the same kind (this is precisely what «  homogeneous  » 
means here, if we are to take his cue). On the other hand, his account of 
why (and how) counters and words do not add up is a nice variation on 
an old favourite  : one-on-one and one-too-many are formulas whose 
appeal is seldom lost and arithmetic gadgets cut a nice figure and all, but 
we definitely are on familiar ground here, even if it is a slippery slope. 
Even though Eugenio Coseriu did not fix the alleged polysemy bug 
that had plagued his two predecessors (if anything, he made things 
worse with a highly unorthodox translation), he nevertheless pushed the 
commitment to [arithmetiCaL biaS] a step further – which, so it appears, 
he upheld in its purest form55 – the decimal friendly sort («  ein einziger 
Rechenstein auch bestimmte Gruppen von Sachen – z. B. 10, 100, 1000 
davon – vertreten kann, usw.  »)  : 
«  there’s no analogy between the relationship “names-things” and the rela-
tionship “counters-things”. Counters and things stand in a one-to-one rela-
tionship (regardless of whether a counter can stand for a given set of things 
55 Anecdotal evidence suggests that, since at least July 1977, Eugenio Coseriu believed 
numbers’ univocity to be a literal quotation from the prologue of Aristotle’s Sophistici 
elenchi – cf. Garcia Yebra 1981, 33-34. 
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as well, e.g. ten, one hundred, one thousand). It is a direct relationship  : 
counters simply stand for things. They have no “meaning”. Their only 
function is to represent things or to refer to them directly. Not so with 
names. A name does not stand directly for this or that thing. What it stands 
for is a unity, a single meaning. Accordingly, through such meaning, it 
can refer to multiple things (basically, it can refer to everything that 
matches its meaning, that is to say everything that is what the name means 
or possess the feature the name refers to). For precisely this reason, “those 
who are not familiar with the power of words” run into all kinds of pro-
blems  » (Coseriu 1979, 436). 
Interestingly enough, Eugenio Coseriu allowed counters to stand for 
more than one thing. Even so, he did not let it affect the margin of error 
for counter-assisted calculations, which hardly increased at all. As a mat-
ter of fact, it makes no difference how much a pebble is worth (be it one, 
ten, one hundred or one thousand, as Eugenio Coseriu revealingly put it). 
«  Why  ?  » would be an interesting question to ask – considering that, as 
it will be argued later on, first and foremost Aristotle’s analogy is about 
failure  : failure to handle counters no less than failure at juggling with 
words. For the time being, however, we’d like to point out instead that 
Coseriu’s concession only makes sense as long as computational symbols 
work as mere placeholders in the strictly controlled environment of num-
bering as such or purely arithmetical calculation. Stripped of all meaning, 
counters become perfectly safe to work with. Virtually indistinguishable 
from numbers themselves, they are in fact expected to operate at the same 
level of transparency and compliance to smooth arithmetical routines. 
tenGo na anaLoGia tanta. Is saddling Aristotle with a «  mistaken 
analogy  » the best we can do56  ? The standard story has been told for so 
very long that the question may appear, prima facie, more provocative 
than it actually is. Truth be told, not only has the issue been raised before, 
but we already have the answer or, at the very least, a good half of it. 
On the face of it (but feel free to scrape the surface and dig all you like), 
[diSanaLoGy vieW] bears two tell-tale signs. On the one hand, there is 
[diSanaLoGy], or the idea that Aristotle’s pebble analogy is an analogy 
in name only. On the other hand, there is [arithmetiCaL biaS], namely 
56 Albeit misguided and a tad naive, Schreiber 2003, 12 «  mistaken analogy  » label 
– his most noteworthy contribution on this issue – rings ominously true. If naming is 
nothing like counting, then – maybe – we’d better just let them go their separate ways 
instead of forcing one on the other while doing violence to both. 
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the idea that pebbles are of no interest by themselves and carry no par-
ticular significance – other than, of course, reminding us that people who 
toss them around are more or less proficient with numbers and calcula-
tions. If one does not particularly like this picture and wishes to replace 
it with a new one, he basically has two options. He can either reject the 
[diSanaLoGy] part of [diSanaLoGy vieW], while going along with the 
overall [arithmetiCaL] narrative itself, or he can get rid of the whole 
caboodle and discard not only [diSanaLoGy], but also – and especially – 
the [arithmetiCaL biaS] it is embedded with. 
The first option has been brilliantly argued for by Fait 1996 – hands 
down the finest piece of scholarship ever written on the subject57. While 
making quick work of [diSanaLoGy]’s flaws, Paolo Fait must have felt 
there was no need to tear down its conceptual framework in the process. 
As a result, instead of turning the page of the old narrative once and for 
all, his criticism of [diSanaLoGy] lead to a more refined version of the 
same old story. In Fait’s view, the «  computational analogy  » – as he 
calls it (which itself speaks volumes) – suffers no restrictions. On the 
contrary, it provides a powerful way of illustrating how calculation as 
such and language can shed light on each other. To begin with, it is sup-
posed to clarify Aristotle’s premiss and help us understand why we can’t 
have actual things speak for themselves  : 
«  the factual claim that it is impossible to display the things themselves 
when we talk about them gains greatly in clarity if we take into considera-
tion its arithmetical counterpart  : as long as small numbers are concerned, 
we can add things up directly, without resorting to counters. On the other 
hand, once we reach amounts that transcend the human ability for numerical 
representation, a positional system’s usefulness becomes obvious on account 
of its symbolic spareness  » (Fait 1996, 185). 
More to the point, the simile accounts for the success language and 
calculation achieve in dealing with an infinite number of different items 
by virtue of a finite number of tools, words and counters respectively58. 
57 Though we’ll end up disagreeing (amicus Paulus, etc.), it is only fair to acknowledge 
Paolo Fait’s breakthrough  : in hindsight, he deserves all the credit for having almost sin-
glehandedly brought down [diSanaLoGy] bias, the main stumbling block on the way of an 
adequate understanding of Aristotle’s counters comparison. 
58 It is a bit of a pity that emphasis on success – rather than on failure, as one would 
expect – is the lesson readers have drawn from Fait’s authoritative contribution (cf. e.g. 
Laspia 2004, 112). 
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And this is precisely, according to Paolo Fait, what makes the analogy 
worthwhile  : 
«  the analogy between words and counters also explains better the opposi-
tion between language, which is finite, and reality, which is infinite. As a 
matter of fact, the numerical notation systems ancient Greeks were familiar 
with had to resort to ever new symbols as the numbering went on. On the 
contrary, nine counters are, in principle, all you need to display any number 
on the abacus. In the precise and concise words of Hermann the Cripple 
(Hermann von Reichenau), author of a well-known treatise on the abacus  : 
column by column, “usque in infinitum progreditur” multiplying by ten 
over and over again. Since this feature of the abacus undoubtedly goes hand 
in hand with the counters’ “ambiguity” – on which the Elenchi’s comparison 
rests entirely – it is not hard to grasp the remarkable analogy between the 
fact that a few pebbles is all it takes to represent the infinite series of numbers 
and the idea that a limited number of linguistic items suffice to refer to an 
infinity of meanings  » (Fait 1996, 186-187). 
No wonder Paolo Fait conveys the kind of lame stereotypes we have 
already challenged – most notably, the myth of a «  decimal abacus  »59 
and the belief that ancient counting boards were used for calculations 
making little allowance for concerns other than purely arithmetical60. 
Nor does it come as a surprise that the meagre evidence he presents may 
be either dismissed as irrelevant or construed as implying the contrary61. 
59 In addition to the passages just quoted, cf. Fait 1996, 182-183  : «  it is likely that the 
type of abacus ancient Greeks used had a number of columns which stood for different 
orders of magnitude (to keep it simple, think of these as units, tens, hundreds, etc.)  ». 
60 Since there is no conclusive evidence, I won’t tackle here the issue of whether the 
ancient abaci were actually built to handle open-ended calculations. That being said, all 
the circumstantial evidence I’m aware of (and which will be provided shortly) is not 
consistent with Paolo Fait’s suggestion.
61 Predictably enough, Salamis’ abacus is the only counting board Paolo Fait shows 
any interest in (Fait 1996, 182). We have already cast some doubts on the literature he 
relies on (in particular, Cantor 1863, Heath 1921 and Smith 1921), so we will leave it at 
that. Predictably enough as well, an all too known passage from the Aristotelian Prob-
lemata is the only literary source Paolo Fait mentions at this juncture – Fait 1996, 187  : 
«  as a confirmation of the fact that Aristotle was fully aware of the properties of a posi-
tional system we may adduce a passage from the Aristotelian Problemata <XV 3, 910b 
38 - 911a 1> where Aristotle offers as a possible explanation of the success the decimal 
system has with all people, Greek and barbarian alike  : “or is it because all people were 
born with ten fingers  ? So having as it were their own number of counters, they count 
other things with this quantity as well  ?”  ». As of this moment, it is our word against 
Paolo’s. In a page or two, we hope to show that this very text tells quite a different story 
and is better understood as an explanation of the reason why decimal abaci weren’t built, 
despite the fact ancient calculators were perfectly familiar with the decimal system itself. 
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parS ConStrUenS (abaCUS antiqUorUm). We can now turn to the liter-
ary and epigraphic evidence that will provide the much-needed background 
[arithmetiCaL biaS] – for reasons that should be obvious by now – has no 
interest in taking into account. Since our aim here is to spell out the reasons 
why Aristotle resorted to the pebble analogy in the first place and to assess, 
accordingly, the implications for his views on how language occasionally 
fails us, we won’t indulge in a full-fledged reconstruction of the ancient 
abacus – specialists have long run out of educated guesses and ours, semi-
educated at best, are no great shakes – nor will we go into too many details 
– which we are in any case lacking – as to why, for all its strengths and 
sophistication, the abacus was an accident waiting to happen (to the unwary 
and the untrained, that is). A minimalist account of what reckoning boards 
must have looked like, interspersed with a summary survey of the literary 
and epigraphic evidence, will do for the purpose of illustrating the abacus’ 
features which Aristotle’s simile presupposed and relied upon. 
As far as we can tell, ancient abaci were crude but effective reckoning 
devices. Even if we do not go so far as to claim that any ruled board – or 
flat surface for that matter – along with a handful of tallies might have 
easily qualified as such, it is safe to assume that abaci came in all shapes 
and sizes, ranging from bulky, stationary items to light, portable ones. At 
almost five feet long, two and a half feet wide and as many inches thick, 
the Salamis abacus, with its 400 pounds of Pentelic marble, is firmly on 
the heavy side – as are, understandably enough, most of the thirty-odd 
other surviving stone specimens62. No small-scale counting board of old 
has survived63, so we have precious little to go on, besides the fact that 
62 As Rousset 2013, 290 note 8 pointed out not so long ago, an accurate (and complete) 
description (as well as inventory) of ancient Greek abaci is still a desideratum. For the 
time being, we’ll have to implement and cross-check lists, additions and the occasional 
rectification from different sources  ; most notably  : Lang 1957 and 1968  ; Pritchett 1968  ; 
De Grazia & Kaufman Williams 1977  ; Buchholz 1984, 562-563  ; Immerwahr 1986, 198 
note 7  ; Schärlig 2001, 61-95 (the most complete catalogue to date)  ; Knoepfler 2001, 
78-81  ; Chaniotis, Corsten, Stroud & Tybout 2001  ; Mathé 2009, 173  ; Marcellesi 2013, 
413-414. As far as the Salamis board is concerned (IG II2, 2777), the best preserved and 
first to be discovered, it was described for the first time by Rangabé 1846. Pritchett 1968, 
194 note 10 pointed out an error in previous drawings (Rangabé 1846, 296  ; Nagl 1899, 
357  ; Heath 1921, 50  ; as well as Lang 1964, in fact the only one he cared to catch out) 
– all three sets of numerals («  money units  » of course, as acknowledged by W.K. Pritchett 
himself) should be facing outwards rather than inwards – it figures.
63 The converted roof tiles and potsherds described in Lang 1956, 19 and Lang 1976, 
22 must have come pretty close to the real thing. The counting table painted on the so-
called Darius volute-crater comes in a distant second. It certainly is about the right size 
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they were easily summoned and put to use on the spot, as a comedic argu-
ment over the price of a dinner amongst friends is to suggest  :
[T11] Athenaei Naucratitae Deipnosophistae III, 117e 3-7  : «  ἐν δὲ Ἀπε­
γλαυκωμένῳ συμβολάς τις ἀπαιτούμενός φησι· <A> Παρ’ ἐμοῦ δ’, ἐὰν 
μὴ καθ’ ἓν ἕκαστον πάντα † δ’ ὡς †, χαλκοῦ μέρος δωδέκατον οὐκ ἂν 
ἀπολάβοις. <B> δίκαιος ὁ λόγος. <A> ἀβάκιον, ψῆφον. λέγε [Douglas 
Olson 2006, 57-59  : in The Man Who Had a Cataract <Alexis, fr. 15>, 
someone being asked to pay his share of the expenses for a dinner party 
says  : <A> unless † … † every item individually, you wouldn’t get a penny 
out of me. <B> fair enough. <A> bring an abacus and some counting pebbles  ! 
Go ahead  !]  ». 
There’s been a bit of controversy over who said what at the beginning 
of Alexis’ fragment, as reported by Athenaeus64. However, it makes no 
difference who took the initiative of fetching the abacus in order to settle 
accounts, be it the guest arguing the toss (A) or his associate intent on 
setting the record straight (B). Whichever character called for the reckon-
ing board, he certainly expected a slave or a servant to hand it to him as 
easily as the handful of counters that went with it65, rather than lead him 
to one. That being said, it might just as well have come down to the same 
thing  : whatever the actual shape and size of the abacus (wooden frame 
or table, stone slab, even the occasional dust or sand tray66), counters 
would have been added to the corresponding column and moved around 
and is often referred to as a reckoning board (cf. Sugden 1981, 7  ; Cuomo 2001, 11-13  ; 
Chankowski 2014). That being said, even if the pro abacus party has grown stronger of 
late, doubts linger whether it was a reckoning board to begin with rather than just a con-
venient desk for counting actual coins (cf. already Smith 1909, 193-195 and 1925, 161). 
64 Modern editions, as the one we adopted here for the editor’s candour, usually follow 
Schweighaeuser 1802, 323, and have (A) ask for the abacus. On the other hand, Kaibel 
1887 and Desrousseaux 1942, 53 have (B) – rather than (A) – speak the words  : «  δίκαιος 
ὁ λόγος. ἀβάκιον, ψῆφον  » (117e 7). Arnott 1996, 88 discusses the issue, very briefly, 
and takes (B) solution’s side, which indeed seems slightly more plausible  : (B), who has 
just acknowledged that (A) has every right to ask where the money has gone, makes it clear 
that the calculation will be run strictly by the book. 
65 As noted by Schweighaeuser 1802, 323, followed by Desrousseaux 1942, 53-54, we 
don’t need, strictly speaking, a plural here, since the singular ψῆφον may as well have a 
collective connotation. 
66 While ideal for tracing geometric figures, dust abaci would have been a hindrance 
more than a help when it comes to reckoning, unless impressions in the sand were erased 
as one went along (a cumbersome process all the same). Pushing pebbles would only make 
it worse – as Pullan 1968, 18 shrewdly observed  : «  it is not so easy to imagine counters 
being moved easily from place to place on a sandy surface, and grooves would only add 
to the difficulty of moving them  ». 
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as (B) talked (A) through the bill. As a matter of fact, even without press-
ing the point too hard, it is worth noticing that designs and inscriptions 
on diminutive or vestigial abaci matched those on larger, official ones, 
being in every case monetary symbols67 (more about that shortly). 
«  indULGe me  ». For there’s wisdom in asking to see a negative before 
providing a positive, let’s start with the abacus’ opposite number and 
67 Cf. e.g. Lang 1976’s E6 ( = Lang 1956’s n°79)  : an «  informal abacus, with the 
symbols serving as headings for the placement of pebbles  : 5 (drachmas), 1 (drachma), 
1 (obol), 1/2 (obol), 1/4 (obol)  » (Lang 1976, 22). Since we have already mentioned it, it 
is worth noticing all over again that – though somewhat atypical (cf. Tybout 1978 for a 
discussion of the peculiar symbols involved, in particular the letter Ψ for 1000, usually 
noted X (χίλιοι))  – the eight letters inscription on the Darius vase is monetary through 
and through (I would be hard pressed to say what to do exactly with Massa Pairault 1996, 
239-240 contention that the letters are in fact a cipher reminding Histiaeus’ plot to start 
the Ionian upraising against the Persians)  : T stands for τεταρτημόριον, that is a quarter 
obol  ; O is the initial letter for ὀβολός, namely an obol  ; chances are that the unusual 
«  <  »sign, placed as it is between T and O, is worth a ἡμιωβέλιον, i.e. an half-obol, etc. 
This might carry little weight though, for the painter – that’s my two cents – had another 
agenda altogether  : the whole scene is not so much a snapshot of an actual ongoing cal-
culation. Rather, it simply states the price of the vase which the Darius painter spelled out 
in unconverted obols (1340 obols, by my math  : that is 5 (O) + 1×5 (Π) + 3×10 (Δ) + 
3×100 (H) + 1×1000 (Ψ à la béotienne)), which by the way is not unheard of (cf. e.g. similar 
amounts expressed in Delian inscriptions both as «  δραχμάν, ὀδελοὺς δύο ἡμιωδέλιον  » 
(FD, III, 15) and «  ὀβολοὺς ὀκτὼ ἡμιωδέλιον  » (FD, III, 16)). Since Pouzadoux 2009, 
259 also worked out the figures, but they do not tally with mine [a], it is hard to say 
whether she made the same suggestion or not – for sure, she did not understand the epi-
graphic evidence along the same lines, namely as a standard whose unit is the obol rather 
than the drachma (which saves us the trouble of reading either too much or too little into 
the Π symbol and allows us to construe it as a most unexotic abbreviation for 5… 5 obols, 
that is – instead of the botched scratch it is usually thought to be). Anyway, whether I got 
her suggestion right or wrong [b] and for what it’s worth – I first picked up the idea from 
her  : «  if the overall picture catches the gist of a tax collection scene and presents us with 
the last piece of the Persian royalty in Alexander’s times, a closer look would have 
revealed the letters and their provenance. This might just be the piece of misdirection that 
allowed the painter to give away his origin and his work’s worth  » (Pouzadoux 2009, 259). 
[a] Pouzadoux 2009, 259  : «  the outcome of the operation, as depicted in the scene, might 
be 1235 drachmas and 5 obols (1000×1+ 100×3+10×3+5×1+1×5)  ». In fact, 1335 drach-
mas and 5 obols, for we counted them again over the phone. [b]. As it happened, more 
wrong than right, for what Claude Pouzadoux had in mind was more of a symbolic nature  : 
the hyperbolic figures the accountant is working his way up to – and, for sure, he’s 
nowhere near the final result, one hundred talents, as indicated in the diptych he holds in 
his left hand – epitomize the painter’s high opinion of his own work and craftsmanship. 
Admittedly, the figures I come up with may still be a bit on the expensive side (for com-
parison purposes, Alexis’ blow-out budget, as partially (?) recorded in [T15], was anything 
between fifty and sixty obols), but they should not shock even the harshest critics of the 
«  fine pottery  » lobby and their most conservative estimates (cf. notably Vickers 1990, 
613 note 6, confirmed in Gill & Vickers 1995, 227).
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work our way from there. Despite the fact that they bore the same name, 
the pebble board (ἄβαξ) – as well as the pebbles (ψῆφοι) – used in every-
day calculations were quite different from those used, say, in Athenian 
courts of justice and assemblies  : 
[T12] Aristotelis Atheniensium respublica 69, 1  : «  πάντες δ’ ἐπειδὰν ὦσι 
διεψηφισμένοι, λαβόντες οἱ ὑπηρέται τὸν ἀμφορέα τὸν κύριον, ἐξερῶ­
σιν ἐπὶ ἄβακα τρυπήματα ἔχοντα ὅσαιπερ εἰσὶν αἱ ψῆφοι, καὶ ταῦτα 
ὅπως αἱ κυρίαι προκείμεναι εὐαρίθμητοι ὦσιν, καὶ τὰ τρυπητὰ καὶ τὰ 
πλήρη. οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς ψήφους εἰληχότες διαριθμοῦσιν αὐτὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄβα­
κος, χωρὶς μὲν τὰς πλήρεις, χωρὶς δὲ τὰς τετρυπημένας. καὶ ἀναγορεύει 
ὁ κῆρυξ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ψήφων τοῦ μὲν διώκοντος τὰς τετρυπημένας 
τοῦ δὲ φεύγοντος τὰς πλήρεις· ὁποτέρῳ δ’ ἂν πλείων γένωνται, οὗτος 
νικᾷ, ἂν δὲ ἴσαι, ὁ φεύγων [Rhodes 2017, 171-173  : when all the jurors 
have voted, the attendants take the jar that is to count, and empty it on to a 
board which has as many holes as there are ballots, so that the votes that 
matter may be laid out for easy counting, both the hollow and the solid. 
The men in charge of the ballots count them on the board, the solid and 
the hollow separately  ; and the herald proclaims the numbers of the votes, 
the hollow for the plaintiff and the solid for the defendant. Whoever has the 
greater number wins  ; if they are equal the defendant wins]  ». 
As it happened, Athenian officials went to great lengths to prevent 
ambiguity  : so many jurors, so many counters, so many votes. More to 
the point, [T12] makes it plain that forensic abaci were positional, albeit 
in a peculiar way. As there were exactly as many holes on the counting 
board as ballots to be counted («  ἄβακα τρυπήματα ἔχοντα ὅσαιπερ 
εἰσὶν αἱ ψῆφοι  »), each pebble had its own unique (i.e. unequivocal) 
position and – until it was removed along with the others to be counted 
according to its kind, that is separately (οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς ψήφους εἰληχότες 
διαριθμοῦσιν αὐτὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄβακος, χωρὶς μὲν …, χωρὶς δὲ …) – it 
was not supposed to leave its spot on the abacus, let alone trade places 
with any other. Moreover, by Aristotle’s time, differences in value or 
meaning were conveyed upfront, by means of counters which had differ-
ent shapes, either pierced or solid (καὶ τὰ τρυπητὰ καὶ τὰ πλήρη). In 
short68, it would have taken an inordinate amount of ingenuity and a great 
68 As a general rule, the best place to look for details is still Rhodes 1981, ad loc. (in 
this case, p. 733-734), who however did not pay much attention to the ψῆφοι (δημοσίαι) 
– possibly because Boegehold 1963, 367-372 had been thorough enough a few years back. 
The same Alan L. Boegehold, in Boegehold 1976, discusses a number of dikastic ballots 
found in and around Athens (according to Atheniensium respublica, 57, 3 Zea’s court was 
where citizens accused of killing or wounding somebody defended themselves speaking 
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deal of dexterity to doctor the figures involved in a vote. No doubt, had 
a sleight of hand for tricking people into either believing that a hole 
hosted no pebble when it did (or the other way around) or mistaking 
pierced tokens for solid ones (or vice-versa) ever been successful, we would 
have heard about it. Since we have not, it is only reasonable to think that 
everybody – including Aristotle – took the verdict of forensic pebble-
reckoning at face value. Which is the exact opposite of what Aristotle’s 
comparison in [Urtext] is all about, for its whole point is to suggest that, 
contrary to what one would expect ([Urtext], 165a 8-10  : τὸ συμβαῖνον 
κτλ.), when dealing with words and counters, what you see is not – always – 
what you get. 
abaCi veStiGia. Different tools have different uses, and both archaeo-
logical and literary evidence suggest that everyday abaci operated on an 
entirely different principle than those used in tribunals  :
[T13] Polybii Historiae V 26, 12-13  : «  βραχεῖς γὰρ δὴ πάνυ καιροὶ 
πάντας μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὡς ἐπίπαν ὑψοῦσι καὶ πάλιν ταπεινοῦσι, μάλιστα 
δὲ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς βασιλείαις. [13] ὄντως γάρ εἰσιν οὗτοι παραπλήσιοι ταῖς 
ἐπὶ τῶν ἀβακίων ψήφοις· ἐκεῖναί τε γὰρ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ψηφίζοντος βού­
λησιν ἄρτι χαλκοῦν καὶ παραυτίκα τάλαντον ἰσχύουσιν, οἵ τε περὶ τὰς 
αὐλὰς κατὰ τὸ τοῦ βασιλέως νεῦμα μακάριοι καὶ παρὰ πόδας ἐλεεινοὶ 
γίνονται [Paton 1923, 73  : so brief a space of time suffices to exalt and 
abase men all over the world and especially those in the courts of kings, for 
those are in truth exactly like counters on a reckoning board. For these at 
the will of the reckoner are now worth a copper and now worth a talent, and 
courtiers at the nod of the king are at one moment universally envied and 
at the next universally pitied]  ». 
[T14] Diogenis Laertii Vitae philosophorum I 59, 1-5  : «  ἔλεγε δὲ τοὺς παρὰ 
τοῖς τυράννοις δυναμένους παραπλησίους εἶναι ταῖς ψήφοις ταῖς ἐπὶ τῶν 
λογισμῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων ἑκάστην ποτὲ μὲν πλείω σημαίνειν, ποτὲ δὲ 
ἥττω· καὶ τούτων τοὺς τυράννους ποτὲ μὲν ἕκαστον μέγαν ἄγειν καὶ 
λαμπρόν, ὁτὲ δὲ ἄτιμον [<Solon> used to say that those who have influence 
with tyrants are like the pebbles used in calculations  ; for just as each pebble 
some times is worth more some times is worth less, so the tyrant treats them 
some times as great and illustrious, some times as worthless]  ». 
[T15] Athenaei Naucratitae Deipnosophistae III, 117e 7 - 118a 13  : «  <A> 
ἀβάκιον, ψῆφον. λέγε. <B> ἔστ’ ὠμοτάριχος πέντε χαλκῶν. <A> 
λέγ’ ἕτερον. <B> μῦς ἑπτὰ χαλκῶν. <A> οὐδὲν ἀσεβεῖς οὐδέπω. λέγε. 
<B> τῶν ἐχίνων ὀβολός. <A> ἁγνεύεις ἔτι. <B> ἆρ’ ἦν μετὰ ταῦθ’ ἡ 
to the judges from a boat). As did Lang 1995 and, more recently, Lopez-Rabatel 2019, 
45-53. 
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ῥάφανος, ἣν ἐβοᾶτε; <A> ναί· χρηστὴ γὰρ ἦν. <B> ἔδωκα ταύτης 
δύ’ ὀβολούς. [118a] <A> τί γὰρ ἐβοῶμεν; <B> τὸ κύβιον τριωβόλου. 
<A> † ονεῖλκε χειρῶν γε † οὐκ ἐπράξατ’ οὐδὲ ἕν. <B> οὐκ οἶσθας, ὦ 
μακάριε, τὴν ἀγοράν, ὅτι κατεδηδόκασιν τὰ λάχαν’ <αἱ> τρωξαλλίδες. 
<A> διὰ τοῦτο <τὸ> τάριχος τέθεικας διπλασίου; <B> ὁ ταριχοπώλης 
ἐστίν· ἐλθὼν πυνθάνου. γόγγρος δέκ’ ὀβολῶν. <A> οὐχὶ πολλοῦ. 
Λέγ’ ἕτερον. <B> τὸν ὀπτὸν ἰχθὺν ἐπριάμην δραχμῆς. <A> παπαῖ, 
ὥσπερ πυρετὸς ἀνῆκεν, εἶτ’ † ἐν ἐπιτέλει †. <B> πρόσθες τὸν οἶνον, 
<ὃν> μεθυόντων προσέλαβον ὑμῶν, χοᾶς τρεῖς, δέκ’ ὀβολῶν ὁ χοῦς 
[Douglas Olson 2006, 59  : <A> bring an abacus and some counting 
pebbles  ! Go ahead  ! <B> there’s raw-saltfish for five chalkoi. <A> next 
item  ! <B> mussels for seven chalkoi. <A> you haven’t committed any 
sacrilege so far. Next item  ! <B> an obol for the sea-urchins. <A> you’re 
still clean. <B> wasn’t what came after that the cabbage you kept shouting 
for  ? <A> yeah – it was good. <B> I paid two obols for it. <A> so why did 
we shout for it  ? <B> the cube-saltfish cost three obols. <A> didn’t he 
charge anything for [corrupt]  ? <B> my dear sir, you don’t know how mat-
ters are in the marketplace  ; the locusts have consumed the vegetables. 
<A> is that why you’ve charged double for the saltfish  ? <B> that’s the 
saltfish-dealer  ; go ask him about it. Conger eel for ten obols. <A> that’s 
not much. Next item  ! <B> I purchased the roast fish for a drachma. <A> 
Damn  ! It dropped like a fever, then † corrupt †. <B> add the wine I bought 
when you were drunk  : three choes, at ten obols per chous]  ». 
Each in its own way, [T15] as well as [T13] and [T14]69 are a testament 
to the ancient abacus’ versatility. 
[T15] achieves its peculiar comic effect as the deadbeat character 
praises one moment the expenses his crony presents him with only to 
curse them the next. (A) does not mind the five coppers worth of one 
variety of saltfish nor the three obols worth of another, neither does he 
69 Polybius metaphor in particular – alone or along with Solon’s maxim to the same 
effect – has been quoted too many times to count, starting with Rangabé who had no sooner 
discovered the very first (and best preserved) abacus in Salamis than he mentioned already 
Polybius as a meaningful connexion between the archaeological finding he was the first to 
describe and ancient literary evidence (Rangabé 1846, 296-297) – in fact, [T13]’s relevance 
predates Rangavis’ finding, for already Yates 1842, 2 pointed out  : «  that the spaces of the 
abacus actually denoted different values, may be inferred from the following comparison 
in Polybius (V 26) etc.  ». Since it keeps showing up at every turn of the page, Polybius’ 
text is more conspicuous for its absence than for its presence, as in the case of Adkins 1956, 
which provides a number of references to the abacus in Greek literature. Appendix IV, 
307-308 gets Aristophanes, Diogenes Laertius, Theophrastus and even Plutarch right, but 
– inexplicably enough – says nothing about Polybius. On the misfortunes Apelles – the 
powerful schemer who inspired Polybius’ disparaging comparison – brought upon himself, 
cf. Errington 1967, Herman 1997 and Miltsios 2013, 97-99. 
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seem to begrudge the seven coppers for the mussels, the obol for the 
sea-urchins, or the ten obols for the eels. At two obols, he’s not pleased 
with the cabbage, while the whole drachma spent on the roast fish defi-
nitely gets him all worked up. For all we have is a fragment, we don’t 
know what reaction the 30 obols for the wine to wash everything down 
– on top of the beverage that had already intoxicated him and his fellow-
revellers – elicited from him. Be that as it may, we are to assume that the 
reckoning board allowed for such swift swings of mood and then some, 
for it made no difference in what order pebbles for coppers, obols and 
drachmas were added to the tally or how many times counters shifted 
back and forth between columns70. 
[T13] and [T14] make essentially the same point  : pebbles had no value 
in themselves and one had to decide time and again how much each one 
of them was worth ([T13  : κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ψηφίζοντος βούλησιν). In addi-
tion, [T13] and [T14] emphasize the fact it was the very same tokens 
([T13]  : ἐκεῖναί, [T14]  : ἐκείνων ἑκάστην) that varied in value ([T14]  : 
ποτὲ μὲν πλείω σημαίνειν, ποτὲ δὲ ἥττω), the scope of such variations 
being – on occasion – remarkably wide ([T13]  : ἄρτι χαλκοῦν καὶ παραυ­
τίκα τάλαντον ἰσχύουσιν)71. Moreover, [T13] underscores that such 
70 This is why we probably should not read too much into Herodotus comparison 
between the way Greeks and Egyptians wrote and reckoned (left-wise and right-wise 
respectively)  : «  γράμματα γράφουσι καὶ λογίζονται ψήφοισι Ἕλληνες μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν 
ἀριστερῶν ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ φέροντες τὴν χεῖρα, Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν δεξιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ 
ἀριστερά [Waterfield 1998, 110  : as Greeks write and do their sums they move their hands 
from left to right, but Egyptians move from right to left]  » (Herodoti historiae II 36, 4). 
For one thing, there’s always the possibility – and a strong one at that – that Herodotus was 
just referring to the way operations and their results were recorded rather than processed 
on the abacus (Griffiths 1955, 141-144 has built an interesting case in favour of the letter-
letters and letter-numbers hypothesis  ; in recent years, he’s been followed by Lloyd 1989, 
261 and 1994, 161). For another, it is irrelevant whether we proceed from left to right (or 
contrariwise) when working out figures on the abacus  : the whole point of using one was 
to pick up the right column, whatever side it happened to be in relation to the preceding 
step or steps of an ongoing calculation. 
71 A rough estimate – indexed on the Attic standard – would allow for a 1  : 288.000 
odd ratio between the two denominations (that is to say, 1 talent is worth 288.000 cop-
pers)  : 1 (τάλαντον), times 60 (μναῖ), times 100 (δραχμαί), times 6 (ὀβολοί), times 8 
(χαλκοί) – cf. Walbank 1957, 560 for the maths. For there’s no such thing as coincidence, 
Cantor 1863, 141-142 noticed a long time ago that Polybius’ chosen denominations 
matched the highest (T = τάλαντον) and the lowest (X = χαλκοῦς) end of the Salamis 
abacus’ scale range  : «  I’d like to emphasize that the end-values mentioned here, that is 
copper and talent, correspond exactly to the inscriptions on the Salamis table  ». Ten years 
later, Edmond Saglio observed to the same effect that «  both the lowest and the highest 
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changes happened all at once (βραχεῖς, παρὰ πόδας), which goes well 
with the idea that pebbles actually traded places on the counting board, 
as is also suggested by a few other turns of phrase which convey the idea 
that handling the counters involved moving them around rather than sim-
ply laying them down72. This is a possibility backed up by archaeological 
monetary units – namely, the copper and the talent – are inscribed each at one end of the 
scale for everyone to see, etc.  » (Saglio 1873, 2-3). 
72 Should one feel that Aristotle’s τὰς ψήφους φέρειν ([Urtext], 165a 14) is too close 
to home for comfort, a quick background check might help him see that there’s nothing 
to be suspicious about. Whilst Plato’s parallel between questions and answers interplay, 
on the one hand, and checkers strategy, on the other hand, has little to contribute to the 
matter (this much is controversial, but it will have to wait), the association of ability (ὑπὸ 
τῶν πεττεύειν δεινῶν), tokens and arguments (οὐκ ἐν ψήφοις ἀλλ’ ἐν λόγοις) with the verb 
φέρειν is relevant. Plato’s ψῆφοι were supposed to move on the board, even if – at some 
point – they had nowhere to go  : «  καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, πρὸς μὲν ταῦτά 
σοι οὐδεὶς ἂν οἷός τ’ εἴη ἀντειπεῖν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοιόνδε τι πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες 
ἑκάστοτε ἃ νῦν λέγεις· ἡγοῦνται δι’ ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ 
λόγου παρ’ ἕκαστον τὸ ἐρώτημα σμικρὸν παραγόμενοι, ἁθροισθέντων τῶν σμικρῶν 
ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τῶν λόγων μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἀναφαίνεσθαι, καὶ 
ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πεττεύειν δεινῶν, οἱ μή, τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείονται καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν 
ὅτι [487c] φέρωσιν, οὕτω καὶ σφεῖς τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείεσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ὅτι 
λέγωσιν ὑπὸ πεττείας αὖ ταύτης τινὸς ἑτέρας, οὐκ ἐν ψήφοις ἀλλ’ ἐν λόγοις [Reeve 
2004, 180  : and Adeimantus replied  : “no one, Socrates, would be able to contradict these 
claims of yours. But all the same, here is pretty much the experience people have on any 
occasion on which they hear the sorts of things you are now saying  : they think that 
because they are inexperienced in asking and answering questions, they are led astray a 
little bit by the argument at every question, and that when these little bits are added 
together at the end of the discussion, a big false step appears that is the opposite of what 
they said at the outset. Like the unskilled, who are trapped by the clever checkers players 
in the end and cannot make a move, they too are trapped in the end, and have nothing to 
say in this different kind of checkers, which is played not with pieces, but with words”]  » 
(Platonis Respublica VI, 487b 1 - 487c 3). In addition to the standard πεττεία references 
(e.g., Kurke 1999 and Guéniot 2000), it’s definitely worth mentioning Conche 1986, 446-
447 who – in his commentary on Heraclitus’ fragment 130 (52) – provides a very interest-
ing discussion of ancient checkers as opposed to other board games involving a random 
element, κυβεία most notably. That pebbles were moved around and not simply placed 
on the abacus is also suggested by other turns of phrase which may be construed as imply-
ing motion, e.g. «  ἕλκειν τὰς ψήφους  » used by Simonides (Hibeh Papyri Simonidis 
sententiae, 65.23-25  : «  τὸ δὲ ἀναλωθὲν ὀλίγου μὲν εἴληπται, προσαναλίσκεται δὲ τὸ 
διπλάσιον· διὸ δεῖ ἕλκειν τὰς ψήφους [Grenfell & Hunt 1906, 65  : expenditure is reck-
oned of slight account, and twice as much is spent again  ; so one should draw back the 
counters]  » – as suggested by Gilbart Smyly 1908, 149-150, the expression ἕλκειν τὰς 
ψήφους is more likely to refer to moving counters from one area of the abacus to another, 
where assets and expenditures were calculated separately, rather than between columns) 
and Theocritus (Theocriti epigrammata, 14.1-5  : «  ἀστοῖς καὶ ξείνοισιν ἴσον νέμει ἥδε 
τράπεζα· θεὶς ἀνελεῦ ψήφου πρὸς λόγον ἑλκομένης. ἄλλος τις πρόφασιν λεγέτω· τὰ 
δ’ ὀθνεῖα Κάικος χρήματα καὶ νυκτὸς βουλομένοις ἀριθμεῖ [Gow 1952, 247  : this bank 
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evidence as well. As a matter of fact, twelve or so surviving abaci 
– amongst them the one from Salamis (as first noted by Pritchett 1968, 
189) – have raised rims built into their structure73, a feature which is 
definitely consistent with the assumption that counters were moved 
around  : the raised rims preventing them from being knocked off the 
table while switching position on the reckoning board. 
If we now take [T13], [T14] and [T15] together and compare what they 
say with what survives today of the ancient abaci themselves, a couple of 
features (henceforth referred to as [poSitionaLity] and [hybridity] 
respectively) stand out, which are of paramount importance for getting 
Aristotle’s pebble simile straight. 
[poSitionaLity]. First things first, [T13] and [T14] make it very clear 
that the abacus’ tokens had no intrinsic value of their own  ; their worth 
had to be determined according to a place value system which was either 
left to the reckoner’s discretion or indexed on the headings inscribed on 
either edge of the counting board itself (occasionally on more than one 
side of the abacus). Counters – usually pebbles of roughly the same shape 
and size – symbolized figures, be they units (e.g. coin or weight measures  : 
drachmas, for instance), subunits (to stick with the same monetary and 
ponderal standard, by far the best attested one – in fact, the only one we 
know of for sure  : obols, half-obols and coppers) or superunits (staters, 
minas and talents) as determined by the column in which they were 
placed at one step or another of whatever sequence of operations was 
being processed. As the reckoning proceeded ([T15]), they were alterna-
tively added to or removed from any column of the abacus. The very 
same pebbles could also be transferred from one column of the abacus to 
any other ([T13]). Each and every time their position on the abacus changed, 
counters were assigned a new value accordingly, which was therefore 
entirely contingent upon the place they held on the counting board at any 
given moment of an ongoing calculation. 
[hybridity]. Whilst Aristotelian scholarship has eventually come to 
terms with the fact that a pebble’s worth on the abacus was inherently 
positional and that – for the same reason – the abacus itself was a position-
serves native and foreigner alike. Deposit, and then withdraw according to the reckoning 
when an account is made up. Others may make excuses, but Caicus, at need, transacts 
foreign business even after dark]  »).
73 In fact more, if we are to add the Volos abaci (Bakhuizen 1972, 406 and 1992, 263-
264) to Rousset 2013, 294’s list. 
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value system through and through74, there has been little or no interest in 
– and therefore little or no effort put into – making out what the positions 
on the counting board actually stood for and, consequently, what the 
abacus’ positionality was ultimately about. First of all, as far as evidence 
goes – and there’s really no point in either ignoring available data or 
extrapolating anything except more of the same – we can definitely rule 
out that the abacus’ layout and markings were designed to meet the needs 
of an abstract, arithmetical system. Needless to say, there’s nothing 
wrong with the notion itself. There’s nothing anachronistic either. Aris-
totle for one – or somebody so close to his school as to make guilt by 
association plausible enough75 – knew everything there is to know about 
it or, at any rate, as much as it takes to ask why – barring a few half-wits 
of Thracian descent – everybody had fallen in love with the decimal 
number system  : 
[T16] Aristotelis quod fertur Problemata XV 3, 910b 23-31 and 910b 38 
- 911a 4  : «  διὰ τί πάντες ἄνθρωποι, καὶ βάρβαροι καὶ Ἕλληνες, εἰς τὰ 
δέκα καταριθμοῦσι, καὶ οὐκ εἰς ἄλλον ἀριθμόν, οἷον βʹ, γʹ, δʹ, εʹ, εἶτα 
πάλιν ἐπαναδιπλοῦσιν, ἓν πέντε, δύο πέντε, ὥσπερ ἕνδεκα, δώδεκα; 
οὐδ’ αὖ ἐξωτέρω παυσάμενοι τῶν δέκα, εἶτα ἐκεῖθεν ἐπαναδιπλοῦσιν; 
ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστος τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὁ ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ἓν ἢ δύο, καὶ οὗτος 
74 Merit where merit is due – as we’ve already pointed out above, Fait 1996 deserves 
to be regarded – in this respect – as a watershed in Aristotelian studies, for it truly marked 
a turning point in our understanding of Aristotle’s pebble analogy. 
75 Preferably if someone else is to draw the inference, that is. Truth be told, what follows 
is a bit speculative and, strictly speaking (i.e., as per the requirements of the argument at 
hand), beyond – if not above – the call of duty. Accordingly, without claiming any credit 
for it (nor avoiding any blame – and there’s always plenty to pass around), I’m content to 
go along with one of the most likely – and widely accepted – authorship scenarios. Spe-
cifically, I follow Zucker 2010, 35 note 38  : «  as it stands, the Problemata collection 
cannot be ascribed to Aristotle, even if it is Aristotelian in both essence and methodol-
ogy  ». Concerning the plausibility of an Aristotelian Urcompilation (as alluded to by 
Aristotle himself on seven or eight occasions, most notably in De generatione animalium 
IV 4, 772a 37 - 772b 12 referring to Problemata, X, 14 and 41, as well as in Meteoro-
logica II 6, 363a 24-25 referring to XXVI), cf. e.g. Louis 1991, XXIII-XXXV or Mayhew 
2011, XVIII-XX (if you don’t read French or are in a hurry – or both, as is generally the 
case). On our hands being man’s «  natural abacus  », cf. Caveing 1997, 229. Problemata, 
book XV’s title, program and general interpretation have elicited a keen interest  : 
Acerbi 2011, Mayhew 2012 and Bowen 2015 will help you get off the starting blocks. 
Bodnar 2011, is an excellent general introduction to the collection of Aristotelian prob-
lems. For the history of the text (Greek tradition)  : cf. Marenghi 1961, Mansfeld 1992 
(translated and slightly revised in Mansfeld 2009) and Bertier 2003  ; and for its mediaeval 
legacy  : De Leemans & Goyens 2006 and Brouillette & Giavatto 2010. More bibliography 
in Ulacco 2011. 
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ἄλλος τις, ἀριθμοῦσι δ’ ὅμως ὁρίσαντες ἄχρι τῶν δέκα. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀπὸ 
τύχης γε αὐτὸ ποιοῦντες φαίνονται καὶ ἀεί· τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων 
οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης, ἀλλὰ φυσικόν. […] ἢ ὅτι πάντες ὑπῆρξαν ἄνθρωποι 
ἔχοντες δέκα δακτύλους; οἷον οὖν ψήφους ἔχοντες τοῦ οἰκείου [911a] 
ἀριθμοῦ, τούτῳ τῷ πλήθει καὶ τἆλλα ἀριθμοῦσιν. μόνοι δὲ ἀριθμοῦσι 
τῶν Θρᾳκῶν γένος τι εἰς τέτταρα, διὰ τὸ ὥσπερ τὰ παιδία μὴ δύνασθαι 
μνημονεύειν ἐπὶ πολύ, μηδὲ χρῆσιν μηδενὸς εἶναι πολλοῦ αὐτοῖς 
[Mayhew 2011, 457-459  : why do all people, both barbarians and Greeks, 
count up to ten, and not to another number, such as 2, 3, 4, 5, and then 
repeat them again, one-five, two-five, just as (they count) eleven, twelve  ? 
Or again, why do they not stop (at some number) beyond ten, and then 
repeat from there  ? For each of the numbers is the preceding (number) plus 
one or two, and this is some other (number), but nevertheless they count by 
setting the limit up to the tens. For indeed, it is not from chance that all 
people plainly do in truth do this and always  ; but what is always the case 
and for all people is not from chance, but natural. (…). Or is it because all 
people began (counting) with ten fingers  ? So having as it were their own 
number of counters, they count other things with this quantity as well. But 
a certain race of Thracians alone count up to four, because just like children 
they cannot remember for long, nor do they use much of anything]  ». 
As [T16] implies, a decimal abacus was beyond neither the techno-
logical capabilities nor the intellectual grasp of anybody interested in 
building one. In a sense, the thing itself had been around forever, albeit 
not as an artefact. For longer than people cared to remember, fingers had 
always provided them with a natural abacus of sorts (a digital abacus, if 
you like). This might help explain, to some extent at least, why Ancient 
Greeks expected more of their abaci than simply to assist them with 
operations their hands could easily take care of, i.e. operations whose 
numeric values – even and especially when they changed – stood in one 
and the same relationship (say again, a neat decimal one). Be that as it 
may, the fact remains that the ancient abacus wasn’t bound to any spe-
cific arithmetical basis (most certainly not a decimal one), exclusive of 
others. On the contrary, if the reckoning board’s vestigial markings mean 
anything – and they have to, since they were put there for a purpose 
(other than being purely decorative, which they were not) – they consist-
ently mirrored non-decimal monetary conventions rather than plain 
numerical arrays. (Mark the words «  non-decimal  » and «  conven-
tional  », for they’ll come in handy soon enough). As a matter of fact, 
without exception, ancient reckoning boards neither laid out numerical 
values as such nor did they arrange numbers according to a purely arith-
metical order (whichever its basis happened to be, provided the abacus’ 
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inscribed figures consistently stuck to the same numerical sequence, which 
they did not). As it happened, counting tables were labelled with monetary 
symbols instead – or their weight equivalents (as in “so much worth of wine, 
olive oil, lupini beans or whatever your houseboy was buying on that fine 
day”)76. When they were labelled at all, that is. Without claiming to be exhaus-
tive, a fairly comprehensive list of monetary scaled abaci would include 
findings from Athens77, Epidaurus78, Eretria79, Hosios Loukas80, Imbros81, 
Korinthos82, Laurion83, Minoa84, Oropos85, Rhamnous86, Thyrrheum87 and, 
76 For obvious reasons (it being their proper function), the close association of mon-
etary and ponderal standards is most evident in the case of σηκώματα (mensae ponder-
ariae), which however we will have to disregard here. The best-studied measuring table 
was discovered in Naxos in the 1870s (IG XII 5 99)  : it displays a row of monetary signs 
for tallying purposes as recorded and described by Dumont 1873, 46 and discussed by 
Lang 1968, 242 and, more recently, by Cioffi 2014. Those in Delos have also attracted 
their fair share of scholarly attention – starting with Deonna 1938, 167-185 and down to 
Chankowski & Hasenohr 2014. 
77 IG II2 2778, 2779, 2780 and 2781. Another alleged board, a Pentelic marble frag-
ment found around 1933 in a previous excavation’s dump, is mentioned by Lang 1968, 
242-243. 
78 IG IV, 984 and IG IV2, 1 159. Cf. Pritchett 1968, 189-190. 
79 IG XII 9 894. Petrakos 1981, 330 describes two more abaci whose inscriptions range 
– standardly enough – from the highest to the lowest monetary denomination – up to T 
(talents) and down to X (chalkous), that is. 
80 Rousset 2013, 290-291. The Hosios Loukas’ abacus shares a peculiar feature with 
the Thyrrheum boards (cf. below note 87), that is it includes the stater (Σ = στατήρ) in its 
standard. On the other hand, it seems to be the only abacus on record lacking a sign for 
the drachmas, as pointed out by Rousset 2013, 293 in his masterly reconstruction of the 
«  Δ (δέκα μναῖ), Π (πέντε μναῖ), Π (μνᾶ), Δ (δέκα στατῆρες), Π (πέντε στατήρες), 
Σ (στατήρ), Ο (ὀβολός), ῆ (ἡμιωβέλιον), Τ (τεταραμόριον), Χ (χαλκοοῦς)  » inscribed 
sequence. 
81 IG XII 8 61 and IG XII 8 62. 
82 SEG XI 188 and SEG XXVI 401. Broneer 1933, 563-565 (discovery)  ; De Grazia 
& Kaufman Williams 1977, 72-73 and 76 (description and discussion as item 28 and 29 
of his catalogue of findings)  ; Immerwahr 1986, 200-201 and Donati 2010, 10, 20-23 
(further discussion). 
83 Cf. note 43 above. 
84 IG XII 7 282. 
85 IG VII 762, 763 and 765. Cf. Leonardos 1926, 44-45 for the three of them (labelled 
each as λογιστικὸς ἄβαξ, items 156, 157 and 159 respectively). 
86 Petrakos 1999, 121. 
87 IG IX 12 362, 363, 364. Cf. Woisin 1886, 4  ; Tod 1912, 112  ; Nagl 1914, 20  ; 
Rhomaios 1916, 48. Contra Schärlig 2001, 94-95 («  A bogus abacus  : Acarnania II  »), 
we follow Tod 1927, 144-145 and 1947, 26 epigrammatic interpretation (most notably, 
Σ is for στατήρ and T is for τριώβολον) of the inscription as a monetary scale rather than 
a given amount of money (16.666 drachmas) as previously believed by Cousin 1886, 179-
180 and Dittenberger 1897, 121 (= IG IX 1 488). 
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of course, Salamis88. While markings and their exact patterns may be 
slightly different from one abacus to another89, they all have in common 
one feature, namely they all are symbols for monetary denominations – 
which, as everyone is well aware, were both conventional and non- 
decimal (more about that in a moment). So, the question is not so much 
«  what did abacus inscriptions mean precisely  ?  » – we know that all too 
well90 – but, rather, «  why ancient abacists inscribed their reckoning 
boards with monetary units and monetary signs instead of abstract numbers 
and scales  ?  ». Might it be that the abacus was used, first and foremost, 
for counting money and was labelled accordingly  ? Simple as that. And 
88 IG II2, 2777. The undisputed star in our list. Cf. note 62 above for its description, 
depiction and relevant bibliography. 
89 E.g., usually «  Ͱ  » was the symbol for drachmas, but Epidaurus (IG IV, 984) and 
Korinthos (SEG XXVI 401) abaci had «  O  » instead. Drachmas were most commonly 
followed by obols, yet Eretria abacus (IG XII 9 894) had an added 3 obols or half-drachma 
sign «  Ϟ» between «  Ͱ  » and «  –  » (which is also a relatively peculiar symbol for obols). 
Marcus Niebuhr Tod’s authoritative contributions to Ancient Greek numeral systems (and 
their so called «  acrophonic  » – Keil 1894, 253 note 1 – notations) are to this day the best 
place to start looking into the matter (cf. Tod 1912, 1913, 1927, 1937 and 1950). Schmandt-
Besserat 1996 (a summary of Schmandt-Besserat 1992) will provide the scrupulous reader 
with a broader perspective on numerical writing in general.
90 That abacus inscriptions have to do – exclusively or almost exclusively – with mon-
etary numerals is a very well-known fact, at least amongst archaeologists, epigraphists and 
French historians of Greek mathematics. Antoine-Jean Letronne (a fine archaeologist in 
his prime), Marcus Niebuhr Tod (a distinguished epigraphist his whole life) and Maurice 
Caveing (one of the greatest, if not the greatest historian of ancient mathematics, whose 
only fault was that he wrote in a doomed vernacular, now moribund) said it all a long time 
ago. Reading is believing and one cannot but rejoice at how good these scholars were and 
just how easy it is to look at things standing on their shoulders. Letronne 1846, 306  : «  its 
<the Salamis abacus’> is a numerical scale which, twice, starts its sequence with the 
figure 500 and, once, with the talent (6.000). It always ends up with the chalkous (a cop-
per coin), that is the smallest monetary denomination of old. For what we have here are 
monetary amounts and nothing else  ». Tod 1945, 113  : «  especially significant is the 
abacus from Salamis, now in the Epigraphical Museum at Athens (IG II2 2777), on which 
are engraved three series of monetary signs (not pure numbers) in descending order of 
value  ». Caveing 1997, 229  : «  first and foremost, the abacus was a tool for accounting, 
whose columns stood for monetary units (…). Therefore, we should not look at it as a 
substitute for pure, abstract numbers  ». It is worth noting that even William Kendrick 
Pritchett – who staunchly opposed the idea that the same abacus Letronne, Tod and Caveing 
had in mind, that is the Salamis table, was a reckoning board – did not challenged the fact 
that «  the chief reason for assuming that the table was an abacus seems to have been the 
series of monetary numerals at the edges  » (Pritchett 1968, 200), that is  : «  the numeral 
signs are arranged in descending order, ranging from 1,000 drachmai to 1/8 obol, the two 
additional characters being Γᵡ (= 5,000 drachmai) and T (= talent or 6,000 drachmai). The 
lowest and highest money units are at the two ends of the scale. The system of notation 
is that employed regularly by the Athenians  » (Pritchett 1968, 195). 
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rightly so  : stating the obvious – «  most Greek abaci seem to have been 
set up to handle monetary calculations, etc.  » (Wyatt 1964, 269)91 – is 
always the best answer to a question that deals with the most ordinary 
tools of everyday life. And – make no mistake about it – the ancient abacus 
was just another run-of-the-mill gizmo common people used one moment 
and forgot all about it afterwards – unless, of course, something weird 
happened right next to it92. Besides, it is only reasonable to assume that 
91 Based on Letronne’s archaeological data and analysis alone (the Salamis abacus file, 
for short), Moritz Cantor, who could still read French, drew a similar conclusion according 
to which all signs (monetary numerals, huge dimensions and sturdily built) supported the 
inference that the Salamis table was a «  Zahltisch eines Wechslers  », that is a money-
changer’s counter (Cantor 1863, 133). 
92 There’s nothing particularly inspiring about ancient abacuses and one has no prob-
lem understanding why people did not fancy the kind of chores they were supposed to 
help with. Some things never change and computational duties have always been a pain 
in the neck (ἐνέργεια λυπηρά)  : «  ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ἡδονὴ ἐξακριβοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ 
χρονιωτέρας καὶ βελτίους ποιεῖ […]. φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς ἐνεργείας αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι, 
οἷον εἴ τῳ τὸ γράφειν ἀηδὲς καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἢ τὸ λογίζεσθαι· ὃ μὲν γὰρ οὐ γράφει, ὃ 
δ’ οὐ λογίζεται, λυπηρᾶς οὔσης τῆς ἐνεργείας [the proper pleasure of an activity makes 
it accurate, last longer and improves it. (…). Pain that belongs by itself to an activity, on 
the other hand, destroys it. For example, someone loathes and can’t stand writing or doing 
sums – well, he’ll neither write nor will he do sums, because he finds it annoying]  » 
(Ethica nicomachea X 5, 1175b 13-15 et 17-20). For the sake of decorum, we won’t dwell 
upon the secret life of ancient abaci. That being said, if one were to dig for unsavoury 
details, he would unearth the usual amount of dirt and then some. One always does, espe-
cially when bankers are involved and money changes hands faster than you can count. 
A short fragment from Lysias will suffice to remind us of the close proximity – if not 
intimate kinship – between whoring and banking, two of the oldest and most lucrative 
trades of the civilized world  : «  ἐφ’ ἑτέρου μὲν γὰρ εἴρηται ὑπὸ Λυσίου ἐν τῷ ὑπὲρ 
Καλλαίσχρου, “μετ’ ἀβακίου δὲ καὶ τραπεζίου πωλῶν ἑαυτόν” [the word “abacus” is 
used in still another sense by Lysias in his On behalf of Callaeschrus  : “selling himself 
between an abacus and a counter”]  » (Pollucis onomasticon X 105, 221.12-14). Already 
Johann Georg Baiter and Hermann Sauppe suggested – p. 191 of their 1850 edition of the 
Attic orators – that the word ἀβάκιον does not mean here «  gaming table (tabula luso-
ria)  » but «  counting table  ». They went even further and suspected without much proof, 
as Carey – p. 418 of his 2007 edition of Lysias orations and fragments – rightly pointed 
out, that the servus argentarii was the employee servicing both the mensula and the men-
tula (the syntagma πολεῖν ἑαυτόν, as it occurs in the Lysias’ fragment possibly for the 
first time, has been discussed with references to Lysias and later sources by Colla 2012, 
50-51). True enough, it is immaterial to ascertain here whether the hired hand worked both 
jobs or not, and I may have made the point a bit flippantly, but, folks, there’s a serious 
issue here  : the moral of the story is that wherever banking counters were to be found [a], 
abaci were not far away. Not to mention the fact that τράπεζα and ἄβαξ are occasional 
synonyms and therefore may refer at times to the same thing, as the epigraphic evidence 
from one of the Corinthian surviving specimens (SEG XI 188) shows  : «  ΔΑΜΟΣΙΑ 
ΚΟΡΙΝΘΙῶΝ  » is inscribed on the lower right corner of the abacus, that is to say  : 
δαμοσία <τράπεζα> – as Donati 2010, 10a-b took good notice  : «  the δαμοσία Κορινθίων 
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Ancient Greeks gave up finger counting and set up the abacus when they 
needed to, that is when they had to go through lengthy calculations or 
work out figures based on both decimal and non-decimal ratios. Needless 
to say, this is precisely what happened each and every time they reckoned 
to any degree of precision how many coppers make up how many obols 
and how many of these you need to have such and such amount of drach-
mas, minas or talents. 
if yoU pay beanS, yoU Get jUrorS. A cautionary tale, which Aristo-
phanes has one of his most level-headed and likeable characters tell, 
might just spell it out for us. How do you rip off your opinionated and 
gullible senior citizens  ? Easy busy jurors squeezy – you set them on 
your political foes in court and you keep the whole lot both happy and 
hungry, feeding them scantily the leftovers from the pie you and your 
cronies have lavishly helped yourselves to  : 
[T17] Aristophanis Vespae, 655-664  : «  <Βδελυκλέων  :> ἀκρόασαί νυν, 
ὦ παπίδιον, χαλάσας ὀλίγον τὸ μέτωπον. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν λόγισαι φαύλως, 
μὴ ψήφοις ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ χειρός, τὸν φόρον ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων συλλήβδην 
τὸν προσιόντα, κἄξω τούτου τὰ τέλη χωρὶς καὶ τὰς πολλὰς ἑκατοστάς, 
πρυτανεῖα, μέταλλ’, ἀγοράς, λιμένας, μισθώσεις, δημιόπρατα· τούτων 
πλήρωμα τάλαντ’ ἐγγὺς δισχίλια γίγνεται ἡμῖν. ἀπὸ τούτου νυν κατάθες 
μισθὸν τοῖσι δικασταῖς ἐνιαυτοῦ, ἓξ χιλιάσιν – “κοὔπω πλείους ἐν τῇ 
χώρᾳ κατένασθεν”. γίγνεται ἡμῖν ἑκατὸν δήπου καὶ πεντήκοντα τάλαντα. 
<Φιλοκλέων  :> οὐδ᾽ ἡ δεκάτη τῶν προσιόντων ἡμῖν ἄρ᾽ ἐγίγνεθ᾽ ὁ μισθός 
[Henderson 1998, 305  : <Loathecleon  :> then listen, pop, and relax your 
frown a bit. First of all, calculate roughly, not with your counters but on 
your fingers, how much tribute we receive altogether from the allied cities. 
Then make a separate count of the taxes and the many one percents, court 
dues, mines, markets, harbours, rents, proceeds from confiscations. Our 
total income from all this is nearly two thousand talents. Now set aside the 
annual payment to the jurors, all six thousand of them, “for never yet have 
more dwelt in this land”. We get, I reckon, a sum of one hundred and fifty 
talents. <Lovecleon  :> so the pay we’ve been getting doesn’t even amount 
to a tenth of the revenue]  ». 
identifies the counting table as the property of the Corinthian state [10b] with the feminine 
singular gender of δαμοσία alluding to τράπεζα (table) and not the masculine ἄβαξ (aba-
cus)  ». [a] As a matter of fact, we know where the Athenian counters were traditionally 
located, somewhere in the northwest corner of the Agora (cf. Thompson & Wycherley 
1972, 171 note 12) – a corner Socrates and Hippias were pretty familiar with, as evidenced 
by Plato’s Apology (17c 7-9  : ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν) and Hippias minor (368b 2-5  : 
ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ ταῖς τραπέζαις). 
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Whilst it is just possible that the dutiful son character wishes to keep 
the pebbles out of his father’s reach and sight, lest he gets too excited all 
over again and relapses even before his sobering up could begin, no one 
– in the last two hundred years – has missed the fact that Aristophanes 
set apart rough off-hand reckoning (λογίζομαι φαύλως, ἀπὸ χειρός) 
from accurate pebble computation (λογίζομαι ψήφοις)93. Few, on the 
other hand, seem to have noticed that the digital calculations Bdelukleôn 
is running by his old man stick to the same monetary denomination  : 
as a matter of fact, however conspicuous, the approximate sums (ἐγγὺς 
δισχίλια, ἑκατὸν δήπου καὶ πεντήκοντα) are all expressed in talents 
(τάλαντα). As a result, although the domestic whistle-blower is keeping 
track of a whole lot of coin, no fancy conversion is called for and even 
his intoxicated, delusional jury-duty fiend of a father has no problem fol-
lowing the money and figuring out that he’s been seriously bamboozled. 
Just the same, few have taken notice of the fact that when Philokleôn 
finally catches up and realises he and his fellow minions have been feast-
ing on crumbs94, he takes the figures of the racket he’s been involved in 
and rounds them up to the nearest decimal, a tithe precisely – give or take 
fifty talents, that is (which is, by the way, more than he would earn in 
several lifetimes as a juror). 
93 By contemporary standards the «  Dean Ireland Scholarship for the promotion of clas-
sical learning and taste  »’s test is definitely elite philologists’ stuff – how many people, apart 
from Sten Ebbesen, Philippe Hoffmann and a chosen few, do you know who would be 
comfortable with translating off-hand, either in Latin hexameters or in Greek iambics, stanzas 
from Spenser’s The Faery Queene  ? When it was established back in 1825 (cf. Parecbolae, 
1846, 203-207), it was meant for undergraduate students (who, by the way, were no longer 
eligible to take it after their sixteenth term, that is beyond their fourth year). As it happened, 
[T17] caught the examiners’ imagination around 1844, for they required that year’s candi-
dates to translate Aristophanes verses and comment, albeit shortly, on their content – 
technically-wise if we are to judge from their other requirements… for instance, that same 
year, Fufidius’ scam (cf. Horatii saturae, I, 2.14  : «  quinas hic capiti mercedes exsecat 
[Rushton Fairclough 1926, 19  : five times the interest he slices away from the principal]  ») 
was to be assessed according to Roman moneylending customs and laws  : «  what was the 
usual rate of interest at Rome  ? Mention some of the laws by which it was regulated  ».
94 As suggested in a scholium (Scholia in Aristophanis Vespas, ad 663), Bdelukleôn 
worked out the figure on the basis of jurors daily pay (τριώβολον τῆς ἡμέρας), times the 
number of jurors (ἓξ χιλιάσιν), times the number of available months in a year (δέκα 
μῆνας). While the reasoning is sound and the τριώβολον as well as the number of jurors 
are solid enough figures (MacDowell 1971, 222  ; Sommerstein 1983, 198  ; Biles & Olson 
2015, 293), three hundred court days – year in, year out – is undoubtedly more often than 
the Athenian calendar actually allowed and the jurors – all six thousand of them – could 
actually stand if they were to attend every day (Hansen 1979 reduced these figures sig-
nificantly, whether he went too far or not, he was definitely headed in the right direction, 
as pointed out by Harris 1986). 
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When did yoU Get to pULL the pebbLeS oUt of the baG then  ? The 
answer to that question should be clear by now  : you pick up the count-
ing board when you cannot trust your fingers to do the job, either because 
you run out of digits before the calculation is over or because the ongoing 
computation involves more variables than your hands can handle on their 
own95. Albeit in short supply, literary evidence points precisely in this 
direction (and in this direction only)  : the abacus main strength and, as a 
result, its primary utility and overall interest laid in its reliability in car-
rying on long-drawn-out reckonings, especially when they involved back 
and forth permutations between decimal and non-decimal operands. 
Alexis’ carousers – whom we’ve already met ([T11] and [T15]) – and the 
bull artist from Theophrastus’ portrait gallery96 offer a fascinating glimpse 
into the abacus’ workings  : 
[T18] Theophrasti Characteres XXIII 6, 130.20 - 132.26  : «  καὶ ἀγνώτων 
δὲ παρακαθημένων κελεῦσαι θεῖναι τὰς ψήφους ἕνα αὐτῶν καὶ ποσῶν 
95 That much should be uncontroversial – but it isn’t. Who disagrees  ? Franco Lo 
Piparo, for one, is of a different mind altogether. Admittedly, there’s subtle and there’s too 
subtle – and some at least of Lo Piparo’s distinction are so subtle they’re lost on me – for 
instance, the distinction between an Aristotelian notion of «  symbol  » and its opposite un-
Aristotelian number  : «  our text does not claim that words are symbols of facts. Rather, it 
says that – when discussing – we use words-that-are-symbols  » (Lo Piparo 2003, 184). His 
examples, on the other hand, are delightful – even when they prove exactly the opposite of 
what they are supposed to show. In this particular instance, let’s follow Lo Piparo to 
the market and meddle in his salesman’s business. Hermogenes buys and sells sheep and 
uses counters to keep track of his transactions. Does he really need them  ? Better safe than 
sorry… but let Lo Piparo tell us more about it  : «  this is how our salesman keeps accounts  : 
he matches sheep and pebbles so that he puts one of these in his bag each and every time 
he buys one of those and does the opposite when he sells instead of buying. If Hermogenes 
does not make a mess of it (that is if he does not get drunk and miss the one-to-one rela-
tionship between sheep and pebbles), at the end of the day he’ll have as many sheep in his 
barn as he has pebbles in his bag. By my math, ten pebbles equal 10 sheep (that is the 
four sheep Hermogenes bought to start with, minus the two he sold at some point, plus the 
eight more he purchased before calling it a day)  » (Lo Piparo 2003, 184). Let me ask 
again  : does one need an abacus or even a bunch of pebbles to count up to ten (add four, 
subtract two, add eight… equals ten – attaboy  !)  ? Whatever the answer, unless one can’t 
be bothered to properly match one pebble and one sheep as need be while keeping track of 
both at one and the same time (in Lo Piparo’s terse scientific prose  : «  se non ha fatto errori 
nell’operazione della messa in corrispondenza uno-a-uno di pecore e sassolini, alla fine dei 
suoi affari avrà tante pecore quanti sono i sassolini che si trovano nella sua bisaccia  »), 
then he has no business counting them at all, with or without an abacus  ! 
96 It is worth noticing that Theophrastus mentioned the abacus on no less than three 
different occasions. As a matter of fact, in addition to the boastful man ([T18]), the abacus 
reveals peculiar features of two other characters  : the moron (XIV 2, 106.3-5) and the 
arrogant man (XXIV 12, 134.15-17). While the former’s absentmindedness is farcical and 
heartening, the latter’s high-handedness is more informative, i.e. more supportive of the 
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κατὰ χιλίας [a] καὶ κατὰ μίαν καὶ προστιθεὶς πιθανὰ ἑκάστοις τούτων 
ὀνόματα ποιῆσαι καὶ δέκα τάλαντα· καὶ τοῦτο φῆσαι εἰσενηνοχέναι εἰς 
ἐράνους αὐτῶν· καὶ τὰς τριηραρχίας εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὐ τίθησιν, οὐδὲ τὰς 
λειτουργίας, ὅσας λελειτούργηκε [Diggle 2004, 131  : when he finds him-
self sitting next to complete strangers he will ask one of them to work the 
calculator, and then he does an addition counting from the thousand-
drachma to the one-drachma column, and putting a plausible name to each 
item, and reaches as much as ten talents, and says that these are the sums 
he has contributed towards loans for friends – and he has not included the 
trierarchies and all his other compulsory public services]  ». [a] κατὰ χιλίας 
is Wilamowitz 1898’s, 522 conjecture. It is widely accepted on account of 
the fact that, on the one hand, ancient abaci lacked a 600 drachmas column 
(whereas they actually had one for the 1000 drachmas) and, on the other 
hand, the figure 600 (καθ’ ἑξακοσίας) may be explained as a confusion 
between the alphabetic and the acrophonic values of X (it being understood 
that abaci’s markings are usually consistent with the acrophonic system). 
[T18] and [T15] deal with similar situations  : Theophrastus’ braggart 
and Alexis’ partygoers – ἐρανισταί both, as it happened – were in for 
more than a few rounds of additions and conversions. 
Ὁ ἀλαζών. On top of the five talents worth of charities he handed out 
during the famine (5) as well as the civic contributions he’s burdened 
with as the wealthy citizen he pretends to be (6), Theophrastus’ fraud 
boasts about the ten talents he allegedly spent helping out friends in need. 
And our friendly neighbour certainly has been busy comforting indigent 
pals, for he’s making up stories about liberalities whose figures are sup-
posed to add up as high as ten talents, that is as much as sixty thousand 
drachmas. True enough, [T18] doesn’t say much about the average 
amount of such loans97, but – as Diggle 2004, 439 observed – the «  κατὰ 
monetary and commercial agenda I’ve been pushing all along – see [T23] below. Millett 
2007 (in particular 69-70) and Pertsinidis 2018 are two short, student-friendly introductions 
to Theophrastus work. Cf. Lane Fox 1996 for a more detail-oriented, almost book-length 
study (in particular, 134-135). 
97 For what it is worth, Demosthenes (or, perhaps, Apollodoros himself, which is some-
what ironic considering there was no love lost between the two) recorded two such loans 
granted to Nicostratos, a friend turned foe, for an amount of 300 (which the former even-
tually condoned) and 1000 drachmas (an ἔρανος contribution for the latter’s ransom)  : 
«  τάς τε τριακοσίας, ἃς τῷ ἀδελφῷ αὐτοῦ ἔδωκα ἐφόδιον ὅτε ἐπορεύετο ἐπὶ τοῦτον, 
ἀφιείην αὐτῷ, χιλίας τε δραχμὰς ἔρανον αὐτῷ εἰς τὰ λύτρα εἰσοίσοιμι [Bers 2009, 
59-60  : I forgave the loan of three hundred drachmas that I gave his brother when he 
travelled to get him and said I would contribute a thousand drachmas towards his ran-
som]  » (Contra Nicostratum 8, 204.20-23). Demosthenes again – in an early speech against 
his guardians over his father’s squandered estate – listed amongst the assets that should 
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χιλίας καὶ κατὰ μίαν  » suggests that loans covered the full range of 
columns. If this is true or even half true, it does not matter how clever 
with their hands Theophrastus’ mythomaniac and his audience were sup-
posed to be  ; only an abacus would have allowed them to navigate 
through the fairly long string of operations involved in [T18]’s reckoning 
divagations.
Ὁι ἐρανισταί. Even under the best of circumstances, dinner arrange-
ments are a sensitive matter to say the least, and you’d better discuss 
them beforehand, lest you get into an argument as soon as the party’s 
over and party animals start turning on each other. This is precisely what 
makes [T15] an awkward and potentially hilarious situation  : instead of 
sleeping off the booze or having it off with the flute girl98, as any decent 
bloke would have done instead, A and B picked up a fight over the price 
of mussels, cabbage and sea-urchins – what’s wrong with you people  ? 
One thing they got right though  : whether they went at each other intox-
icated or not, there’s no way they got to the bottom of the matter relying 
have been bequeathed to him a number of loans  : «  ναυτικὰ δ’ ἑβδομήκοντα μνᾶς, ἔκδο­
σιν παρὰ Ξούθῳ, τετρακοσίας δὲ καὶ δισχιλίας ἐπὶ τῇ τραπέζῃ τῇ Πασίωνος, ἑξακο­
σίας δ’ ἐπὶ τῇ Πυλάδου, παρὰ Δημομέλει δὲ τῷ Δήμωνος υἱεῖ χιλίας καὶ ἑξακοσίας, 
κατὰ διακοσίας δὲ καὶ τριακοσίας ὁμοῦ τι τάλαντον διακεχρημένον. καὶ τούτων αὖ 
τῶν χρημάτων τὸ κεφάλαιον πλέον ἢ ὀκτὼ τάλαντα καὶ πεντήκοντα μναῖ γίγνονται 
[MacDowell 2004, 24  : in maritime assets he left 70 minas on loan to Xuthus, 2.400 drach-
mas at Pasion’s bank, 600 at Pylades’, 1.600 with Demomeles son of Demon, and various 
loans of 200 or 300 amounting to about a talent. The total sum of this money comes to 
more than 8 talents 50 minas]  » (Prima in Aphobum oratio 11, 45.11-18). Korver 1941, 
14-15, Thompson 1979, 227 and Millett 1991, 157 note 38 have suggested that the twenty 
odd loans Demosthenes mentions amongst his non-earning assets did not yield interests 
and are to be considered ἔρανος-like credits (Bogaert 1986, 22 disagrees). In which case, 
the amount of operations Theophrastus’ schmoozer has his occasional acquaintance lay 
down on the abacus might be ridiculously high – hardly out of character, ain’t it  ? Be that 
as it may, sums may well be imaginary, the computation is not – Theophrastus’ fraud may 
be fabricating names and contriving figures, but he calculates as if the amounts were all 
too real, on the abacus that is. 
98 Admittedly, there is more about ancient musician women than meets the classicist 
eye (cf. e.g. Burton 1998, Harmon 2005, Goldman 2015, etc.), starting with the label itself 
– «  flute girl  » – which may well be an anachronistic fabrication (cf. West 1992a, 1). That 
being said, Old Comedy clichés apart (cf. e.g. Gianvittorio 2018), Alexis’ characters 
– especially A (a man after my own heart) – strike me as they would not think twice before 
going for Philokleôn’s bold manoeuvre and snatch the αὐλητρίς for their personal comfort… 
Vespae, 1345-1347  : «  ὁρᾷς ἐγώ σ᾿ ὡς δεξιῶς ὑφειλόμην μέλλουσαν ἤδη λεσβιεῖν τοὺς 
ξυμπότας· ὧν εἵνεκ᾿ ἀπόδος τῷ πέει τῳδὶ χάριν [Henderson 1998, 391  : did you see how 
handily I sneaked you away just when you were supposed to start sucking the guests  ? for that 
you owe my cock here a favor]  » (you can quote me on that). 
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only on their fingers for adding seven coppers of this, one drachma of 
that, three of those at ten obols each. etc. We ignore whether eventually 
A and B found some sort of closure (for all we know, they might still be 
quibbling and tossing the pebbles around). If they ever did, they had to 
thank the non-decimal notations on the abacus they called for and put to 
good use to add and convert – as needs be – non-decimal monetary 
denominations like coppers, obols and drachmas. 
* * *
What do [poSitionaLity] and [hybridity] teLL US aboUt ariStotLe’S 
pebbLe anaLoGy  ? For the sake of brevity, we have left aside a few 
additional allusions to the abacus and a number of passing mentions of 
the counters in ancient Greek literature – they sing pretty much the same 
tune anyway99. All in all, if I’m right or even half right, then the best way 
to make sense of Aristotle’s analogy is also the most natural, insofar as 
it is consistent with most of the epigraphic and literary evidence availa-
ble. Specifically, everything we’ve gathered so far warrants two related 
claims. The first is that – contrary to what [arithmetiCaL biaS] would 
have us believe – there’s more to the abacus comparison than just plain 
arithmetic. Insofar as abacus assisted calculations were first and foremost 
pecuniary transactions, they routinely involved operations and conver-
sions related to monetary and weight standards. More to the point, if 
plain numbers and plain arithmetical rules entered the Aristotelian picture 
at all, they didn’t do so for their own sake (wherefore the [proxy] label 
our first assumption will henceforth go by). Our second claim is that 
Aristotle was not so much interested in comparing calculation and argu-
mentation as such (let alone language at large), as he was in comparing 
why (and how) they both fail. As a matter of fact, the whole point of the 
pebble analogy is failure  ; in this particular instance, failure to detect and 
99 For instance, Pindar’s tenth Olympian opening strophe relies heavily on ancient 
accounting jargon  : indebtedness (χρέος) and repayment with interests (τόκος), etc. 
Several scholars have thus come to the conclusion that the poet chose the ψᾶφος metaphor 
accordingly, that is in reference to the pebbles used in money-calculations (Norwood 
1974, 111  ; Kromer 1976, 426-428 and Faraguna 2008, 36-37). Others have been more 
nuanced (Verdenius 1987, 60). All in all, the poet seems to have conflated two images 
when he mentions the flow of his song washing away his debt  : on the one hand, the 
clearing of the counters off the counting table after the reckoning has been successfully 
carried out and, on the other hand, the washing away of the pebbles swept by the ever-
rolling wave. 
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prevent abusive value shifts affecting words and counters (wherefore the 
[faiLUre] label etc.)100. 
Before we expound [proxy] and [faiLUre] in more detail, let us first 
clear a technical hurdle involved in shifting the focus of Aristotle’s anal-
ogy away from the arithmetical bias that has traditionally plagued its 
interpretation  : is Aristotle’s choice of words consistent with the idea that 
merchant arithmetic and bean counting were the kind of calculations he 
had in mind when comparing poor reckoning and poor debating skills  ? 
In so many words, yes. 
Λογίζομαι (ἐπὶ τῶν ψήφων). If one were to ask what exactly Aristo-
tle’s «  λογιζόμενοι  » ([Urtext], 165a 9-10) were counting, the answer 
would be as vague as the verb is rich in nuances – most likely a jest 
(«  the counters, you silly  ») or a shrug («  just about anything and every-
thing the counters can stand for, I guess  »). So late in the game, an 
attempt at narrowing down the polysemy of the expression by virtue of 
its association with the pebbles would look like cheating or begging the 
question, to an extent. That being said, the fact remains that, whether the 
counters are explicitly mentioned or not, λογίζομαι was used to refer to 
all sorts of practical computations, for the most part involving money. To 
stay in character, supportive fathers do not fare much better than abusive 
ones in Aristophanes’ family sagas, especially when their offspring 
develop expensive addictions  ; their financial problems, however, were 
referred to and assessed in the same terms, as Strepsiades – the onanist 
opsimath who got in deep with the sharks and thought philosophy was 
100 For we lack conclusive evidence concerning how calculations were actually per-
formed on the abacus, we haven’t indulged in a thorough, albeit tentative, reconstruction 
of what could have possibly gone wrong on the counting board when chips were pushed 
around. If I were to single out the one line of speculation that – in another life – I’d pur-
sue, I would say that, for all practical purposes, tracking pebbles on the abacus must have 
been nearly impossible to begin with. As far as we know, the abacus simply did not allow 
one to display anything but the outcome of the reckoning. As [T18] and [T15] are to sug-
gest, we can safely assume that most calculations run on the abacus went through more 
than just one step – why bother otherwise to get out the counters and set up the reckoning 
board in the first place  ? So many steps, so many manipulations resulting over and over 
in a different configuration of the counters on the abacus. Each successive arrangement 
on the pebble-board modified and replaced the one it resulted from and was superseded 
by the one it led to. Since we are not aware that the abacus would record any previous 
stage of a calculation, short of working them backwards and comparing (mental) notes 
along the way, it must have been extremely difficult to nail down exactly what went south. 
And, to be sure, a number of things could have gone wrong  : a displaced counter, or a 
shortcut replacement between non-adjacent columns, etc. 
308 LEONE GAZZIERO
the easy way out (think again  !) – put it when prompting the houseboy to 
bring him the ledger on a sleepless, anguish-fuelled night101  : 
[T19] Aristophanis Nubes, 16-20  : «  ὁ δὲ κόμην ἔχων ἱππάζεταί τε καὶ 
ξυνωρικεύεται ὀνειροπολεῖ θ’ ἵππους. ἐγὼ δ’ ἀπόλλυμαι ὁρῶν ἄγουσαν 
τὴν σελήνην εἰκάδας· οἱ γὰρ τόκοι χωροῦσιν. ἅπτε, παῖ, λύχνον κἄκ­
φερε τὸ γραμματεῖον, ἵν’ ἀναγνῶ λαβὼν ὁπόσοις ὀφείλω καὶ λογίσωμαι 
τοὺς τόκους [Halliwell 2015, 21  : he lets his hair grow long and his life’s 
an obsession with horses and chariot-racing – he even dreams of horses. 
Meanwhile I’m distraught as I watch the moon reach the twentieth day of 
the month. All that interest mounting up! Hoy, slave, a lamp! And bring 
me out my accounts. I want to read how many my creditors are and work 
out the interest]  ». 
People being people, they hold grudges over money more than over 
anything else  : now and then, family members fritter away their next of 
kin’s heritage, trade partners turn on each other, bankers rob their clients 
blind – business as usual. It is hardly surprising then that ancient legal 
courts offer a wealth of lexical evidence  ; and λογίζομαι figures promi-
nently in all kinds of financial litigations  : embezzlement of funds and 
goods, misappropriation of estates and revenues, miscalculation of profits 
and costs, concealment of property, creative accounting – you name it102. 
[T20] Lysiae De bonis Aristophanis ad aerarium 9-10, 184.23 - 185.3  : 
«  συκοφαντούμεθα καὶ κινδυνεύομεν περὶ ὧν οἱ πρόγονοι ἡμῖν κατέλι­
πον κτησάμενοι ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου. καίτοι, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ὁ ἐμὸς πατὴρ 
ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ πλείω εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἀνήλωσεν ἢ εἰς αὑτὸν καὶ τοὺς 
οἰκείους, διπλάσια δὲ ἢ νῦν ἔστιν ἡμῖν, ὡς ἐγὼ [10] λογιζομένῳ αὐτῷ 
πολλάκις παρεγενόμην. μὴ οὖν προκαταγιγνώσκετε ἀδικίαν τοῦ εἰς 
αὑτὸν μὲν μικρὰ δαπανῶντος, ὑμῖν δὲ πολλὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον τὸν ἐνιαυτόν, 
κτλ. [Todd 2000, 203-204  : we are being attacked by sycophants and are 
on trial for the property which our ancestors justly possessed and handed 
down to us. And yet throughout his life, gentlemen of the jury, my father 
spent more on the city than on himself and the members of his family  : 
twice what we now possess, as I often heard him calculate. Do not convict 
prematurely of wrongdoing the person who spends little on himself but a 
great deal every year on you, etc.]  ». 
101 On Strepsiades’ financial troubles as an «  outstanding Athenian example of a “con-
sumption loan”  », cf. Millett 1991, 66. A representative selection of material evidence 
about money circulation and loans, is gathered in Bogaert 1976, who previously studied 
the world of Greek credit in Bogaert 1968 (cf. in particular 37-60 for a study of ancient 
banking vocabulary). For a more recent survey – building on Bogaert – cf. Shipton 2008. 
102 I defer to Cuomo 2001, 20-24 who has already reviewed and discussed the evidence 
I hint at here, and refer the reader to Cuomo 2013 for a few sound suggestions about 
ancient numeracy, accounting and accountability (cf. already Davies 1994).
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Being under suspicion as an accessory in a scheme involving a transfer of 
seizable assets, Lysias’ client may or may not be trusted implicitly – all the 
more so since he seems to have been the only witness of his father’s reckon-
ing. That being said, we have no reason to think that the jurors understood 
the λογιζομένῳ αὐτῷ as referring to anything else but the process of cal-
culating the expenses the defendant’s old man incurred on behalf of the city. 
More to the point, when both words (λογίζομαι and ψῆφοι) occurred 
in the same sentence, before you know it, you are counting money or 
someone is counting money for you. Demosthenes – referring back to 
Aeschines – and Theophrastus said it all  : 
[T21] Aeschinis Contra Ctesiphontem, 59.3-9  : «  ὅσπερ ὅταν περὶ χρημά­
των ἀνηλωμένων διὰ πολλοῦ χρόνου καθεζώμεθα ἐπὶ τοὺς λογισμούς, 
ἐρχόμεθα δή που ψευδεῖς οἴκοθεν ἐνίοτε δόξας ἔχοντες·ἀλλ’ ὅμως ἐπει­
δὰν ὁ λογισμὸς συγκεφαλαιωθῇ, οὐδείς ἐστιν οὕτω δύσκολος τὴν φύσιν 
ὅστις οὐκ ἀπέρχεται τοῦτο ὁμολογήσας καὶ ἐπινεύσας ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ὅ 
τι ἂν αὐτὸς ὁ λογισμὸς αἱρῇ [Carey 2000, 185  : when we take our seats at 
an audit session for expenditure over a long time, we may sometimes come 
from home with false impressions, but still when the account is reckoned up 
there is none of you of so grudging a disposition that he leaves without 
admitting and agreeing that the figure proved by the reckoning is true]  ». 
[T22] Demosthenis De corona oratio, 227.1-5  : «  εἶτα σοφίζεται καὶ φησὶ 
προσήκειν ἧς μὲν οἴκοθεν ἥκετ’ ἔχοντες δόξης περὶ ἡμῶν ἀμελῆσαι, 
ὥσπερ δ’, ὅταν οἰόμενοι περιεῖναι χρήματά τῳ λογίζησθε, ἂν καθαραὶ 
ὦσιν αἱ ψῆφοι καὶ μηδὲν περιῇ, συγχωρεῖτε, οὕτω καὶ νῦν τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ 
λόγου φαινομένοις προσθέσθαι [Yunis 2005, 87  : next, he <Aeschines> 
made a very clever suggestion  : you are to disregard the opinion that you 
had of us when you came here from home, and, just as when you audit 
people for supposedly retaining surplus funds but acquit them if the figures 
balance and there is no surplus, so in this case too you are to concur with 
the evident force of the argument]  ». 
[T23] Theophrasti Characteres XXIV 12, 134.15-17  : «  ἀμέλει δὲ καὶ 
λογιζόμενος πρός τινα τῷ παιδὶ συντάξαι τὰς ψήφους διαθεῖναι καὶ 
κεφάλαιον ποιήσαντι γράψαι αὐτῷ εἰς λόγον [Diggle 2004, 135  : and you 
may be sure that when the arrogant man is reckoning someone’s account he 
instructs his slave to do the calculations, work out a total, and write him out 
an invoice for that amount]  ». 
As is well known, Aeschines and Demosthenes did not get along 
very well103. Still, they would have agreed between them – and with 
103 On character assassination and Aeschines and Demosthenes rivalry, cf. Worman 2004, 
2008, 213-274, 2018 and Kamen 2020, 60-86. Since the winner takes it all, on Demos-
thenes portrait of his foe as a Theophrastean character – a comic one of course – 
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Theophrastus – on one thing  : whomever the finger of blame should be 
pointed at, λογισμοί, λογίζομαι and ψῆφοι definitely belong together 
and have a distinct reek of money about them. 
Παρακρούω. If we are to believe ancient lexicographers104, a similar 
case might be argued for the other expression associated with the counters 
in [Urtext], namely the verb παρακρούω  :
[T24] Harpocrationis Lexicon in decem oratores, Π 28  : «  παρακρούε­
ται· ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐξαπατᾷ. πολὺ δ’ ἐστὶ παρά τε τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἀττικοῖς καὶ 
παρὰ Δημοσθένει ἐν τοῖς Φιλιππικοῖς. μετῆκται δὲ τοὔνομα ἀπὸ τοῦ 
τοὺς ἱστάντας τι ἢ μετροῦντας κρούειν τὰ μέτρα καὶ διασείειν ἕνεκα 
τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν, ὡς καὶ Σοφοκλῆς που “ὡς μήτε κρούσῃς μήθ’ ὑπὲρ 
χεῖλος βάλῃς” [παρακρούεται (strike aside, mislead) for ἐξαπατᾷ (deceive). 
It occurs often both in the other Attic <orators> and in Demosthenes’ 
Philippics. The word is a metaphor derived from how people who weigh 
or measure something flick the measures and shake them to obtain a pro-
fit – as Sophocles says somewhere  : “that you neither flick nor exceed the 
rim”]  ». 
Did Aristotle actually use παρακρούω in [Urtext], 165a 15 to convey 
the idea that smart pebble-movers take advantage of less experienced ones 
by fixing the counters  ? Tempting though this is – after all, meddling with 
the counters for profit is not so different from tipping the scales – we’ll 
leave it at that and will only allow that nothing in [Urtext] rules out the 
possibility that παρακρούω means cheating unwary people out of their 
money through a wicked sleight of hand. 
[proxy]. Despite the overwhelming epigraphic and literary evidence 
suggesting the opposite and against a solid consensus amongst some of 
the best archaeologists, numismatists and historians of Greek mathematics 
– [arithmetiCaL biaSed] interpreters have long been labouring under the 
wrong assumption that the purpose of Aristotle’s pebble analogy was to 
draw a parallel between computation and speech tout court – as if the 
way we work out numbers in general could shed any light on how we 
misuse words. This is, of course, misleading on several counts. First if 
not foremost, nowhere does Aristotle compare numbers and linguistic 
expressions as such, their features or their relations to the things we talk 
cf. Rowe 1966  ; stylistic and linguistic issues of the crown speech have been addressed in 
Yunis 2001 and, more recently, in Murphy 2016. 
104 On Harpocration’s glossary, cf. Dickey 2007, 94, both concise and much to the 
point. Same entry in Photius (Π 253), Suda (Π 373), Lopadiota (Π 18), etc. 
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and make calculations about. In fact, [Urtext] offers little support to the 
idea that, when Aristotle referred to counters, he was leaning on a kinship 
of sorts – or any kinship, for that matter – between calculation and speech 
themselves. He wasn’t. As [CompLiCation biaS] and [hybridity] discus-
sions have made it abundantly clear, leisure calculation or counting for 
the sake of crunching numbers – not to speak of more abstract forms of 
ancient logistic105 – were anything but a priority for those who conceived 
and built the counting tables which have survived to this day106. In fact, 
if these are any indication of what ancient designers and users looked for 
in their abacus, then it is safe to assume that all they cared about was the 
105 The kind of higher, more speculative disciplines investigating the true nature of 
numbers, their many properties and relations, which Plato had already set apart as a mat-
ter of course while separating the theoretical requirements of philosophers interested in 
numbers theory from the all too practical needs of ordinary people busy measuring and 
counting off everyday things (Philebus, 56d 4 - 57a 4). It is not always easy to determine 
whether Plato thought of philosophical logistic as a science all unto itself and to what 
extent exactly it was germane to other branches of human knowledge and overlapped with 
them – most notably arithmetic (cf. e.g. Gorgias, 451a 8 - 451c 5 and Respublica VII, 
525a 10 - 527c 10). Insofar as neither is to be mistaken with counting and measuring crafts 
– the only maths vulgar calculators were supposed to know and arguably cared about 
anyway – we won’t try to address the issue here. Klein 1934-1936 brilliantly raised the 
problem and went a long way toward solving it  ; half the story though it is, Majolino 2012 
may be considered the final word on this as well as on a number of related matters, most 
notably ancient dislike for fractions – also addressed most competently in Knorr 1982, 
Vitrac 1992, Mendell 2008 and Acerbi 2019. It is a little out of our jurisdiction and we 
probably should trust our layman’s instincts and leave it out, but Boyer 1968, 66 may have 
something there  : «  it is likely that the widespread use of the abacus accounts at least in 
part for the amazingly late development of a consistent positional system of notation for 
integers and fractions  ». As a matter of fact, as pointed out by Carl Boyer himself, insofar 
as «  the abacus can be readily adapted to any system of numeration or to any combination 
of systems  » (Boyer 1968, 66), it made it perfectly natural to treat fractions as multiple 
subunits  : on the counting board, a chalkous does not look anything like an eighth of an 
obol… rather, it takes eight coppers coins to make one obol. Likewise, on the abacus, an 
obol is not a sixth of a drachma, but six obols make one drachma, and so on and so forth. 
For it stands out as the most astute description of how abacus computations were likely 
to be performed, let’s hear it from Henry Mendell  : «  I may need to divide 2 drachmas 
equally among 5 people. Well, I multiply 2 drachmas by 6 obols per drachma to get 12 
obols, which, in division, gives me 2 obols per payee with 2 remainder. But I multiply 
these by 8 coppers per obol to get 16 coppers, so that I can disperse 2 obols 3 coppers. 
The remaining copper is not worth much, so I will just give it to anyone  » (Mendell 2018, 
205-206). 
106 Instead of skimming through the exhibits all over again, let all be reminded that 
even the most [arithmetiCaL biaSed] abacus specialist – in a moment of great insight – 
acknowledged that «  the Salamis abacus <IG II2, 2777> is inscribed with three sequences 
of numerals, monetary numerals as it is always the case with abaci’s numerals  » (Schärlig 
2001, 66 – his emphasis). 
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comfort of merchants, retail-traders, accountants and other money han-
dlers who dealt with numbers for no other reason than to buy and sell 
goods, charge interest rates or exchange currencies. Counting coin is 
where pebble boards really shone and proved most useful, so it definitely 
stands to reason that we assume arithmetical operations by themselves 
hardly entered the picture for Aristotle. If they came into play at all, it 
was by proxy  : while there ain’t no such thing as two arithmetics, if 
Aristotle’s pebbles were to be meaningful in any way, knowing one’s 
numbers properly was not the same as moving counters around on the 
reckoning board. Provided that we understand Aristotle’s abacus simile 
along the lines of the epigraphic and literary evidence available – as we 
should – it become obvious then that it presupposed numeracy all right, 
but it was not about numeracy itself. To begin with, granted that coin and 
weight calculations follow now and then the same arithmetical rules 
through and through, the fact remains that they do not reflect arithmetical 
procedures alone. Monetary and ponderal conventions are at least as 
important and they have their own set of rules concerning conversions 
between different denominations  : it is not because one and one is two 
and three times four equals twelve that, say, an obol was worth eight cop-
pers in Athens and twelve in Aegina or that it took seventy drachmas here 
and one hundred there to make a mina – this is simply the way monetary 
standards work, to the fishmongers’ delight if we are to believe ancient 
humour107. Moreover, just as Aristotle took for granted that dialectical 
107 For a most succinct introduction to ancient Greek standards and the long-standing 
dissensions amongst scholars, see Duyrat 2014 and De Catallataÿ 2017. Marcellesi 2000 
tackles a few practical problems Hellenistic monetary standards confronted ancient traders 
and accountants with on a daily basis. On the divergence between Aeginetan and Attic 
standards in particular, cf. Pollucis Onomasticon IX 76, 168.17-19  : «  τὴν μὲν Αἰγιναίαν 
δραχμὴν μείζω τῆς Ἀττικῆς οὖσαν – δέκα γὰρ ὀβολοὺς Ἀττικοὺς ἴσχυεν – Ἀθηναῖοι 
παχεῖαν δραχμὴν ἐκάλουν, μίσει τῶν Αἰγινητῶν Αἰγιναίαν καλεῖν μὴ θέλοντες [since 
the Aeginetan was larger than the Attic drachma (in fact, its worth was ten Athenian 
obols), Athenians preferred to call it the “big drachma” rather than the “Aeginetan 
drachma”, for they loathed Aeginetans]  ». Athenaeus (VI 224c - 227b) relays several 
comic tirades against fishmongers, most notably a fragment from Diphilus’ Busybody  : 
«  ᾤμην ἐγὼ τοὺς ἰχθυοπώλας τὸ πρότερον εἶναι πονηροὺς τοὺς Ἀθήνησιν μόνους. 
τόδε δ’, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ γένος ὥσπερ θηρίων ἐπίβουλόν ἐστι τῇ φύσει καὶ πανταχοῦ. 
ἐνταῦθα γοῦν ἔστιν τις ὑπερηκοντικώς, κόμην τρέφων μὲν πρῶτον ἱερὰν τοῦ θεοῦ, ὡς 
φησίν· οὐ διὰ τοῦτό γ’, ἀλλ’ ἐστιγμένος πρὸ τοῦ μετώπου παραπέτασμ’ αὐτὴν ἔχει. 
οὗτος ἀποκρίνετ’, ἂν ἐρωτήσῃς “πόσου ὁ λάβραξ”, “δέκ’ ὀβολῶν”, οὐχὶ προσθεὶς 
ὁποδαπῶν. ἔπειτ’ ἐὰν τἀργύριον αὐτῷ καταβάλῃς, ἐπράξατ’ Αἰγιναῖον· ἂν δ’ αὐτὸν 
δέῃ κέρματ’ ἀποδοῦναι, προσαπέδωκεν Ἀττικά. κατ’ ἀμφότερα δὲ τὴν καταλλαγὴν 
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patsies had basic language proficiency and at least minimal argumenta-
tional awareness, it is only fair to assume that he also presupposed that 
inept calculators had at least crude numerical understanding and elemen-
tary computational training. However inexperienced and little acquainted 
with semantic subtleties, inferior debaters had to know enough Greek 
and questions and answers routine to follow a discussion, indeed to be 
involved in one ([Urtext], 165a 15-17). Likewise, incapable though they 
were of carrying out digital feats with the counters on their own and 
poorly equipped to spot them on the abacus, incompetent calculators 
must nonetheless have known enough maths to sit at a counting table to 
start with and toss the occasional pebble around ([Urtext], 165a 14-15). 
That being said, Aristotle’s simile did not dwell on either, that is to say  : 
it is neither primarily nor specifically about numeracy and computational 
articulateness as such, any more than it is about literacy and discursive 
fluency per se108. What is Aristotle’s pebble analogy all about then  ? 
Pebbles… what else  ? And this is precisely the feature [arithmetiCaL 
biaS] has traditionally taken out of the equation, namely the fact that 
Aristotle compared logistical and linguistic symbols insofar as they are 
ἔχει [Douglas Olson 2006, 17  : I used to think it was only the fish-sellers in Athens who 
were no good. But apparently this breed is like wild animals  : their very nature makes 
them treacherous everywhere. Here, at any rate, there’s one who’s outdone them all  ; he’s 
growing his hair long, first of all, as an act of piety – so he says. That’s not the reason  ; 
he’s been tattooed, and he uses his hair as a screen to cover his forehead. If you ask him 
“how much for the sea-bass  ?”, he answers “ten obols”, without specifying the currency. 
Then if you pay him the money, he charges you on the Aeginetan standard  ; and if he has 
to give change, he offers Attic coins  ! Either way, he makes money on the deal]  » (Deip-
nosophistae VI, 225a 6 - 225b 10). On fishmongers’ bad reputation, see Davidson 1993 and 
Paulas 2010. 
108 It is perfectly possible to have a decent grasp of arithmetic calculations and still get 
into trouble with the pebbles for exactly the same reason average people – that it is to say 
people who have no problem at all grasping the general principles of verbal communica-
tion and dialectical disputation – are tricked on a regular basis by those who know better. 
Following a different line of argument and without cluttering up his minds (or the readers’) 
with mentions of exotic historical evidence, McCready-Flora 2019, 55-56 has arrived to 
this very same conclusion, which I endorse without reservation  : «  a person could be great 
at doing sums, but baffled by moving stones around … verbal naïfs go wrong in the same 
way that leads to bad stone-movers getting cheated. Mathematical error, though, is not 
what separates marks from their money. What the hustlers understand (epistēmenōn <no 
point in messing with the Smurf – if you get it wrong, mate>) and weaponize is how to 
move stones (psēphous pherein) … all this entails that what lets the hustlers cheat is an 
instrumental failure distinct from the cognitive capacity to do sums. If the inept stone-mover 
suffers instrumental failure and the same goes for word-novices, then the errant word-
novice also suffers instrumental failure  » – my point exactly  ! 
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useful tools but require a degree of savoir-faire and must be handled with 
care. As a matter of fact, there can be little doubt that Aristotle’s turn of 
phrase lays stress on the counters and those who used (and misused) them 
rather than on computation as an art or on reckoning at large. In other 
words, the emphasis of the analogy is definitely on the pebbles, the han-
dling of which is the area of expertise – or, rather, the lack thereof – 
around which the whole simile revolves. Why else, of all calculators, 
would Aristotle have singled out those who are good – and not so good – 
at moving the stones  ? One might object that we’re taking a liberty with 
the text when we claim that Aristotle’s experts are not so much accom-
plished arithmeticians as they are individuals skilled at pushing the coun-
ters around. Granted, but let’s turn the question around  : what precisely 
do Aristotle’s «  ἐπιστήμονες  » ([Urtext], 165a 14) know that «  οἱ μὴ 
δεινοὶ τὰς ψήφους φέρειν  » (165a 15) don’t  ? Precisely. In fact, while 
anyone who picks up the counters shares, at least to a degree, the belief 
that we can depend on them, it is how deftly or clumsily we manipulate 
them that makes all the difference in [Urtext]. Skilled and unskilled 
calculators alike put at least a measure of trust in their pebbles (other-
wise, why use them in the first place  ?), but only the former could trust 
themselves to come out on top of every transaction, especially the unfair 
ones. 
[faiLUre]. Once we relinquish the idea that calculation as such took 
centre stage in Aristotle’s abacus simile, it becomes easier to pinpoint 
what its terms were and why Aristotle brought pebbles and words 
together in the first place. More to the point, it is possible to turn the 
analogy on its head and set it back upon its feet by shifting its focus 
from trying to explain why computation and language succeed to trying 
to explain why pebble reckoning and dialectical argumentation fail – 
which, by the way, is so much more in character with the subject mat-
ter [Urtext] is supposed to introduce us to, that is fallacies, paradoxes, 
falsities, improprieties and babbling. In fact, while [Urtext] does not 
provide much in the way of comparing linguistic and computational 
habits per se (after all, we don’t calculate with words any more than we 
speak in numbers, etc.), it definitely tells us that they both rely on sym-
bols and – for this very reason – share the same liability  : linguistic and 
computational substitutes alike are prone to inconspicuous and yet 
momentous variations, which we will fail to prevent as long as we do not 
come to terms with the fact that both linguistic expressions and counters 
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may have different values. For this is the core of Aristotle’s analogy  : 
linguistic expressions are to argumentation as counters are to computa-
tion insofar as their worth may change without us always being able to 
keep up or keep track. Hence, linguistic symbols (ὀνόματα, λόγοι) and 
computational ones (ψῆφοι) play similar roles and, more to the point, 
have the same shortcomings. The problem with words is the same as 
the problem with counters – not because there’s a however intimate or 
loose relation between argumentation and calculation, let alone between 
the way we talk and the way we reckon, but because words and counters 
fail us the same exact way when their value or their meaning as symbols 
shifts at the hands of unscrupulous debaters and malicious calculators with-
out us taking duly notice or having the proper understanding of how it 
happens. 
***
[epiLeGomena]. How well do verbal and computational prestidigitation 
compare and, more importantly, what do they teach us about Aristotle’s 
views on language and its workings  ? Provided that we understand 
Aristotle’s pebble analogy on its own terms as the kind of heavy-duty 
comparison people were expected to figure out without racking their 
brains, it fares well enough to drive home an important, albeit unso-
phisticated, truth about language – and what it tells us about language 
is that it is, by and large, a matter of savoir-faire  : after all is said and 
done, the answer to the question «  what do we ask of words  ?  » is not 
so different from the answer to the question «  what do we ask of coun-
ters  ?  ». In a nutshell, we ask them both to be worth something and to 
allow us to go about our conversational and computational business on 
the assumption that this is going to be the case as long as we don’t 
change our mind and agree to use either words or counters with a dif-
ferent value altogether. All that is required for it to work then is that 
we play by the rules, keep an eye out for those who don’t and pay as 
much attention when we speak as we do when we give the change or 
check our balance. Where’s the excitement in all that  ? Beats me, but to 
quote again Aristotle’s tribesmen of old ([Urtext], 164a 27)  : «  it is 
better to be bored and right than to get robbed and outsmarted at every 
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